wg TBD R. Moskowitz Internet-Draft HTT Consulting Intended status: Informational H. Birkholz Expires: 4 August 2024 Fraunhofer SIT M. Richardson Sandelman 1 February 2024 Guide for building an EC PKI draft-moskowitz-ec-pki-02 Abstract This memo provides a guide for building a PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) of EC certificates using openSSL. Certificates in this guide can use either ECDSA or EdDSA. Along with common End Entity certificates, this guide provides instructions for creating IEEE 802.1AR iDevID Secure Device certificates. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 August 2024. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 1] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Comparing ECDSA and EdDSA certificates . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. The Basic PKI feature set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Getting started and the Root level . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1. Setting up the Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.2. Create the Root Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. The Intermediate level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6.1. Setting up the Intermediate Certificate Environment . . . 9 6.2. Create the Intermediate Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6.3. Create a Server EE Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.4. Create a Client EE Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7. The 802.1AR Intermediate level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.1. Setting up the 802.1AR Intermediate Certificate Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.2. Create an 802.1AR iDevID Certificate . . . . . . . . . . 14 8. Setting up a CRL for an Intermediate CA . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8.1. Create (or recreate) the CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8.2. Revoke a Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 9. Setting up OCSP for an Intermediate CA . . . . . . . . . . . 17 9.1. Create the OCSP Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 9.2. Revoke a Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9.3. Testing OCSP with Openssl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10. Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10.1. Certificate Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10.2. Some OpenSSL config file limitations . . . . . . . . . . 21 10.3. subjectAltName support now works . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 10.4. Certificates with only subjectAltName . . . . . . . . . 21 10.5. DER support, or lack thereof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 12.1. Adequate Randomness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 12.2. Key pair Theft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 2] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Appendix A. OpenSSL config file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 1. Introduction The IETF has a plethora of security solutions targeted at IoT. Yet all too many IoT products are tested and deployed with no or improperly configured security. In particular resource constrained IoT devices and non-IP IoT networks have not been well served in the IETF. Additionally, more IETF (e.g. DOTS, NETCONF) efforts are requiring secure identities, but are vague on the nature of these identities other than to recommend use of X.509 digital certificates and perhaps TLS. This effort provides the steps, using the openSSL application, to create such a PKI of ECDSA [NIST.FIPS.186-5], ED25519, or ED448 ([RFC8032] and [NIST.FIPS.186-5]) certificates. The goal is that any developer or tester can follow these steps, create the basic objects needed and establish the validity of the standard/program design. This guide can even be used to create a production PKI, though additional steps need to be taken. This could be very useful to a small vendor needing to include 802.1AR [IEEE 802.1AR] that references [RFC4108] iDevIDs in their product (Note: EdDSA certificates are not supported in 802.1AR-2018; this is for future work). This guide was originally developed with openSSL 1.1.1; it is updated using openSSL 3.0.9 on Fedora 38 and creates PEM-based certificates. It closely follows [ecdsa-pki]. Current updates follow some lessons learned in developing [drip-dki] Previous versions had multiple openssl config files. This version has a single config file to support all the openssl commands used herein. 2. Terms and Definitions Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 3] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 2.1. Requirements Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 2.2. Notations This section will contain notations 2.3. Definitions There are no draft specific definitions at this time 3. Comparing ECDSA and EdDSA certificates There are two differences between ECDSA and EdDSA certificates that impact the use of openSSL. There are no options with EdDSA, and thus the pkeyopt variable is not used. Likewise there are no hash options. The hashes used by EdDSA are preset and not selectable. As such, none of the hash options should be needed. It should be noted here that ED25519 certificates can be ~100 bytes smaller than corresponding ECDSA certificates not using ECDSA point- compression. This size difference may be critical in some devices and communication technologies. ED448 certificates are similar in size with ECDSA p256 certificates yet with a stronger security claim. 4. The Basic PKI feature set A basic PKI has two levels of hierarchy: Root and Intermediate. The Root level has the greatest risk, and is the least used. It only signs the Intermediate level signing certificate. As such, once the Root level is created and signs the Intermediate level certificate it can be locked up. In fact, the Root level could exist completely on a uSD boot card for an ARM small computer like a RaspberryPi. A copy of this card can be made and securely stored in a different location. The Root level contains the Root certificate private key, a database of all root signed certificates, and the public root certificate. It can also contain the Intermediate level public certificate and a Root level CRL. Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 4] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 The Intermediate level contains the Intermediate certificate private key, the public certificate, a database of all its signed certificates, the certificate trust chain, and Intermediate level CRL. It can also contain the End Entity public certificates. The private key file needs to be keep securely. For example as with the Root level, a mSD image for an ARM computer could contain the complete Intermediate level. This image is kept offline. The End Entity CSR is copied to it, signed, and then the signed certificate and updated database are moved to the public image that lacks the private key. For a simple test PKI, all files can be kept on a single system that is managed by the tester. End Entities create a key pair and a Certificate Signing Request (CSR). The private key is stored securely. The CSR is delivered to the Intermediate level which uses the CSR to create the End Entity certificate. This certificate, along with the trust chain back to the root, is then returned to the End Entity. There is more to a PKI, but this suffices for most development and testing needs. 5. Getting started and the Root level This guide was originally developed on a Fedora 29-beta armv7hl system (Cubieboard2 SoC). It should work on most Linux and similar systems that support openSSL 1.1.1. Current work has been on with openSSL 3.0.9 on Fedora 38. All work was done in a terminal window with extensive "cutting and pasting" from this draft guide into the terminal window. Users of this guide may find different behaviors based on their system. The sourcecode blocks are now structured to work with Carsten Bormann's kramdown-rfc-extract-sourcecode script. At the time of publication, this script was part of the gem kramdown-rfc collection. Place the xml for this document into a directory and run: | kramdown-rfc-extract-sourcecode thisdraft.xml --dir=scriptdir This will create all the scripts below into directory scriptdir/bash and config files into scriptdir/conf. Edit these to suit your needs then proceed. Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 5] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 5.1. Setting up the Environment The first step is to create the PKI environment. Modify the variables in setup1.sh to suit your needs. export dir=/root/ca export cadir=/root/ca export format=pem export algorithm=ed25519 # or ed448 # or for ECDSA with P-256: # export algorithm="ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1" mkdir $dir cp scriptdir/conf/openssl.cnf $dir cd $dir mkdir certs crl csr newcerts private chmod 700 private touch index.txt touch serial sn=8 countryName="/C=US" stateOrProvinceName="/ST=MI" localityName="/L=Oak Park" organizationName="/O=HTT Consulting" #organizationalUnitName="/OU=" organizationalUnitName= commonName="/CN=Root CA" DN=$countryName$stateOrProvinceName$localityName DN=$DN$organizationName$organizationalUnitName$commonName echo $DN export subjectAltName=email:postmaster@htt-consult.com Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 6] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 where: dir : Directory for certificate files cadir : Directory for Root certificate files format : File encoding: PEM or DER At this time only PEM works algorithm : EC algorithm used in certificates sn : Serial Number length in bytes For a public CA the range is 8 to 20 DN : Distinguished Name Policy is LOOSE; Recommended at least providing Common Name The DN and SAN fields are examples. Change them to appropriate values. If you leave one blank, it will be left out of the Certificate. "OU" above is an example of an empty DN object. | Make sure that $dir/openssl.cnf from the contents in Appendix A | exists. setup1.sh should have copied it into your CA directory. 5.2. Create the Root Certificate Next is the rootcert.sh script with the openssl commands to create the Root certificate keypair, and the Root certificate. Included are commands to view the file contents. Environment variables are used to provide considerable flexibility in the certificate contents. Many of these variables need to be customized; sample values are provided. Validity notBefore and notAfter days variables are used, rather that life in days. This is not supported in the standard self-sign root certificate creation, so a "throw-away" self-signed certificate is created first which is used to sign a certificate with the same key and proper validity dates which is then the root certificate. It is not uncommon to get warning messages in "openssl ca" commands on not including some value it expects. For example a warning of not having "default_days", as we are using actual validity dates. These can be ignored. Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 7] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 OpenSSL does not allow empty variables in the config file. So in the example below, certextkeyusage is empty. There are a few req_ext sections (e.g. req_ext_bkes, bke, bks, and bk) to cover the more common sets of extensions used. If a different set is needed, add it to the config file. # Create passworded keypair file export encryptkey="" #export encryptkey="-aes256" # use to password protect private key openssl genpkey $encryptkey -algorithm $algorithm\ -outform $format -out $dir/private/ca.key.$format # For ECDSA point-compression #openssl ec -conv_form compressed \ # -in $dir/private/ca.key.$format\ # -out $dir/private/ca.key.$format chmod 400 $dir/private/ca.key.$format openssl pkey -inform $format -in $dir/private/ca.key.$format\ -text -noout # Create Self-signed Throw-away Certificate file export signprv="ca" export signcert="cabase" export basicConstraints="critical, CA:true" export certkeyusage="critical, keyCertSign" export certextkeyusage="" export hwType="place holder" # all ENV in config must export hwSerialNum="place holder" # be define export startdate=20230801000000Z # YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ export enddate=20430731000000Z # YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ openssl req -config $dir/openssl.cnf\ -set_serial 0x$(openssl rand -hex $sn)\ -keyform $format -outform $format\ -key $dir/private/ca.key.$format -subj "$DN"\ -new -x509 -extensions v3_ca\ -out $dir/certs/$signcert.cert.$format openssl x509 -in $dir/certs/$signcert.cert.$format\ -inform $format -text -noout openssl x509 -purpose -inform $format\ -in $dir/certs/$signcert.cert.$format -inform $format Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 8] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 # Create Self-signed Root Certificate file openssl req -config $dir/openssl.cnf -reqexts req_ext_bk\ -key $dir/private/ca.key.$format \ -subj "$DN" -new -out $dir/csr/ca.csr.$format openssl req -text -noout -verify\ -in $dir/csr/ca.csr.$format openssl rand -hex $sn > $dir/serial # hex 8 is minimum, 20 is maximum openssl ca -config $dir/openssl.cnf\ -extensions v3_ca -notext \ -in $dir/csr/ca.csr.$format\ -out $dir/certs/ca.cert.$format chmod 444 $dir/certs/ca.cert.$format openssl x509 -inform $format -in $dir/certs/ca.cert.$format\ -text -noout openssl x509 -purpose -inform $format\ -in $dir/certs/ca.cert.$format -inform $format openssl x509 -in $dir/certs/ca.cert.$format\ -out $dir/certs/ca.cert.der -outform der 6. The Intermediate level 6.1. Setting up the Intermediate Certificate Environment The next part is to create the Intermediate PKI environment. Modify the variables in intermediate_setup.sh to suit your needs. In particular, set the variables for CRL and/or OCSP support. export dir=$cadir/intermediate mkdir $dir cp openssl.cnf $dir cd $dir mkdir certs crl csr newcerts private chmod 700 private touch index.txt sn=8 # hex 8 is minimum, 20 is maximum echo 1000 > $dir/crlnumber Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 9] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 # cd $dir export crlDP= # For CRL support use, uncomment these: #crl=intermediate.crl.pem #crlurl=www.htt-consult.com/pki/$crl #export crlDP="URI:http://$crlurl" export default_crl_days=30 export ocspIAI= # For OCSP support use, uncomment these: #ocspurl=ocsp.htt-consult.com #export ocspIAI="OCSP;URI:http://$ocspurl" export signprv="ca" export signcert="ca" export basicConstraints="critical, CA:true, pathlen:0" export certkeyusage="critical, cRLSign, keyCertSign" export certextkeyusage="" commonName="/CN=Signing CA" DN=$countryName$stateOrProvinceName$localityName$organizationName DN=$DN$organizationalUnitName$commonName echo $DN | The Intermediate level CA now uses the same openssl config file as | the root. The intermediate_setup.sh should have copied it from | the main directory into the Intermediate. 6.2. Create the Intermediate Certificate Here are the openssl commands to create the Intermediate certificate keypair, Intermediate certificate signed request (CSR), and the Intermediate certificate. Included are commands to view the file contents. # Create passworded keypair file export encryptkey="" #export encryptkey="-aes256" # use to password protect private key openssl genpkey $encryptkey -algorithm $algorithm\ -outform $format -out $dir/private/intermediate.key.$format # For ECDSA point-compression #openssl ec -conv_form compressed \ # -in $dir/private/intermediate.key.$format\ # -out $dir/private/intermediate.key.$format chmod 400 $dir/private/intermediate.key.$format openssl pkey -inform $format\ -in $dir/private/intermediate.key.$format -text -noout Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 10] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 # Create the CSR openssl req -config $cadir/openssl.cnf -reqexts req_ext_bk\ -key $dir/private/intermediate.key.$format \ -keyform $format -outform $format -subj "$DN" -new\ -out $dir/csr/intermediate.csr.$format openssl req -text -noout -verify -inform $format\ -in $dir/csr/intermediate.csr.$format # Create Intermediate Certificate file export startdate=230801000000Z # YYMMDDHHMMSSZ export enddate=20340731000000Z # YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ openssl rand -hex $sn > $dir/serial # hex 8 is minimum, 20 is maximum # Note 'openssl ca' does not support DER format openssl ca -config $cadir/openssl.cnf\ -extensions v3_intermediate_ca -notext \ -in $dir/csr/intermediate.csr.$format\ -out $dir/certs/intermediate.cert.pem chmod 444 $dir/certs/intermediate.cert.$format openssl verify -CAfile $cadir/certs/ca.cert.$format\ $dir/certs/intermediate.cert.$format openssl x509 -noout -text -in $dir/certs/intermediate.cert.$format openssl x509 -in $dir/certs/intermediate.cert.$format\ -out $dir/certs/intermediate.cert.der -outform der # Create the certificate chain file cat $dir/certs/intermediate.cert.$format\ $cadir/certs/ca.cert.$format > $dir/certs/ca-chain.cert.$format chmod 444 $dir/certs/ca-chain.cert.$format 6.3. Create a Server EE Certificate Here are the openssl commands to create a Server End Entity certificate keypair, Server certificate signed request (CSR), and the Server certificate. Included are commands to view the file contents. If EE certificates are created at a different time than the Intermediate signing certificate, care needs to be taken that all variables are properly reset. Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 11] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 export cadir=$cadir/intermediate commonName="/CN=Web Services" DN=$countryName$stateOrProvinceName$localityName DN=$DN$organizationName$organizationalUnitName$commonName echo $DN serverfqdn=www.example.com emailaddr=postmaster@htt-consult.com export subjectAltName="DNS:$serverfqdn, email:$emailaddr" echo $subjectAltName export signprv="intermediate" export signcert="intermediate" export basicConstraints="CA:FALSE" export certkeyusage="critical, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment" export certextkeyusage="serverAuth" export encryptkey="" #export encryptkey="-aes256" # use to password protect private key openssl genpkey $encryptkey -algorithm $algorithm\ -out $dir/private/$serverfqdn.key.$format # For ECDSA point-compression #openssl ec -conv_form compressed \ # -in $dir/private/$serverfqdn.key.$format\ # -out $dir/private/$serverfqdn.key.$format chmod 400 $dir/private/$serverfqdn.key.$format openssl pkey -in $dir/private/$serverfqdn.key.$format -text -noout openssl req -config $cadir/openssl.cnf -reqexts req_ext_bkes\ -key $dir/private/$serverfqdn.key.$format \ -subj "$DN" -new -out $dir/csr/$serverfqdn.csr.$format openssl req -text -noout -verify -in $dir/csr/$serverfqdn.csr.$format export startdate=230801000000Z # YYMMDDHHMMSSZ export enddate=240731000000Z # YYMMDDHHMMSSZ openssl rand -hex $sn > $dir/serial # hex 8 is minimum, 20 is maximum # Note 'openssl ca' does not support DER format openssl ca -config $cadir/openssl.cnf\ -extensions server_cert -notext \ -in $dir/csr/$serverfqdn.csr.$format\ -out $dir/certs/$serverfqdn.cert.$format chmod 444 $dir/certs/$serverfqdn.cert.$format openssl verify -CAfile $dir/certs/ca-chain.cert.$format\ $dir/certs/$serverfqdn.cert.$format openssl x509 -noout -text -in $dir/certs/$serverfqdn.cert.$format openssl x509 -in $dir/certs/$serverfqdn.cert.$format\ -out $dir/certs/$serverfqdn.cert.der -outform der Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 12] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 6.4. Create a Client EE Certificate Here are the openssl commands to create a Client End Entity certificate keypair, Client certificate signed request (CSR), and the Client certificate. Included are commands to view the file contents. For a Client certificate with "no" subject and only a subjectAltName, set the variable DN to "/". Also the subjectAltName MUST be marked "critical". commonName= UserID="/UID=rgm" DN=$countryName$stateOrProvinceName$localityName DN=$DN$organizationName$organizationalUnitName$commonName$UserID echo $DN clientemail=rgm@example.com export subjectAltName="email:$clientemail" echo $subjectAltName export basicConstraints="CA:FALSE" export certkeyusage="critical, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment" export certextkeyusage="" export encryptkey="" #export encryptkey="-aes256" # use to password protect private key openssl genpkey $encryptkey -algorithm $algorithm\ -out $dir/private/$clientemail.key.$format # For ECDSA point-compression #openssl ec -conv_form compressed \ # -in $dir/private/$clientemail.key.$format\ # -out $dir/private/$clientemail.key.$format chmod 400 $dir/private/$clientemail.key.$format openssl pkey -in $dir/private/$clientemail.key.$format -text -noout openssl req -config $dir/openssl.cnf -reqexts req_ext_bks\ -key $dir/private/$clientemail.key.$format \ -subj "$DN" -new -out $dir/csr/$clientemail.csr.$format openssl req -text -noout -verify\ -in $dir/csr/$clientemail.csr.$format Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 13] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 export startdate=230801000000Z # YYMMDDHHMMSSZ export enddate=240731000000Z # YYMMDDHHMMSSZ openssl rand -hex $sn > $dir/serial # hex 8 is minimum, 20 is maximum # Note 'openssl ca' does not support DER format openssl ca -config $dir/openssl.cnf\ -extensions usr_cert -notext \ -in $dir/csr/$clientemail.csr.$format\ -out $dir/certs/$clientemail.cert.$format chmod 444 $dir/certs/$clientemail.cert.$format openssl verify -CAfile $dir/certs/ca-chain.cert.$format\ $dir/certs/$clientemail.cert.$format openssl x509 -noout -text -in $dir/certs/$clientemail.cert.$format openssl x509 -in $dir/certs/$clientemail.cert.$format\ -out $dir/certs/$clientemail.cert.der -outform der 7. The 802.1AR Intermediate level 7.1. Setting up the 802.1AR Intermediate Certificate Environment There is no longer a need for a special 802.1AR Intermediate Certificate CA. The regular Intermediate Certificate CA may be used for 802.1AR iDevID certificates. A special CA may be set up by following the steps outlined in Section 6, but into a separate intermediate8021AR directory. The difference with 802.1AR device certificates may be in including in the subject the device serial number. 802.1AR iDevID certificates MUST have an afterDate of forever and a specific subjectAltName with the hardwareModuleName OID [RFC4108]. Details for these follow. 7.2. Create an 802.1AR iDevID Certificate Here are the openssl commands to create a 802.1AR iDevID certificate keypair, iDevID certificate signed request (CSR), and the iDevID certificate. Included are commands to view the file contents. Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 14] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 DevID=Wt1234 countryName= stateOrProvinceName= localityName= organizationName="/O=HTT Consulting" organizationalUnitName="/OU=Devices" commonName= serialNumber="/serialNumber=$DevID" DN=$countryName$stateOrProvinceName$localityName DN=$DN$organizationName$organizationalUnitName$commonName DN=$DN$serialNumber echo $DN # hwType is OID for HTT Consulting, devices, sensor widgets export hwType=1.3.6.1.4.1.6715.10.1 export hwSerialNum=01020304 # Some hex export subjectAltName="otherName:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.4;SEQ:hmodname" echo $hwType - $hwSerialNum openssl genpkey -algorithm $algorithm\ -out $dir/private/$DevID.key.$format # For ECDSA point-compression #openssl ec -conv_form compressed \ # -in $dir/private/$DevID.key.$format\ # -out $dir/private/$DevID.key.$format chmod 400 $dir/private/$DevID.key.$format openssl pkey -in $dir/private/$DevID.key.$format -text -noout openssl req -config $dir/openssl.cnf -reqexts req_ext_8021AR \ -key $dir/private/$DevID.key.$format \ -subj "$DN" -new -out $dir/csr/$DevID.csr.$format openssl req -text -noout -verify\ -in $dir/csr/$DevID.csr.$format openssl asn1parse -i -in $dir/csr/$DevID.csr.pem # offset of start of hardwareModuleName and use that in place of 169 openssl asn1parse -i -strparse 169 -in $dir/csr/$DevID.csr.pem Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 15] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 export startdate=230801000000Z # YYMMDDHHMMSSZ export enddate=99991231235959Z # per IEEE 802.1AR openssl rand -hex $sn > $dir/serial # hex 8 is minimum, 20 is maximum # Note 'openssl ca' does not support DER format openssl ca -config $dir/openssl.cnf\ -extensions 8021ar_idevid -notext \ -in $dir/csr/$DevID.csr.$format\ -out $dir/certs/$DevID.cert.$format chmod 444 $dir/certs/$DevID.cert.$format openssl verify -CAfile $dir/certs/ca-chain.cert.$format\ $dir/certs/$DevID.cert.$format openssl x509 -noout -text -in $dir/certs/$DevID.cert.$format openssl asn1parse -i -in $dir/certs/$DevID.cert.pem # offset of start of hardwareModuleName and use that in place of 367 openssl asn1parse -i -strparse 367 -in $dir/certs/$DevID.cert.pem openssl x509 -in $dir/certs/$DevID.cert.$format\ -out $dir/certs/$DevID.cert.der -outform der 8. Setting up a CRL for an Intermediate CA This part provides CRL support to an Intermediate CA. In this memo it applies to both Intermediate CAs. Set the crlDistributionPoints as provided via the environment variables. 8.1. Create (or recreate) the CRL It is simple to create the CRL. The CRL consists of the certificates flagged with an R (Revoked) in index.txt: # Select which Intermediate level intermediate=intermediate #intermediate=8021ARintermediate dir=$cadir/$intermediate crl=$intermediate.crl.pem cd $dir # Create CRL file openssl ca -config $dir/openssl.cnf \ -gencrl -out $dir/crl/$crl chmod 444 $dir/crl/$crl openssl crl -in $dir/crl/$crl -noout -text Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 16] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 8.2. Revoke a Certificate Revoking a certificate is a two step process. First identify the target certificate, examples are listed below. Revoke it then publish a new CRL. targetcert=$serverfqdn #targetcert=$clientemail #targetcert=$DevID openssl ca -config $dir/openssl.cnf\ -revoke $dir/certs/$targetcert.cert.$format Recreate the CRL using Section 8.1. 9. Setting up OCSP for an Intermediate CA This part provides OCSP support to an Intermediate CA. In this memo it applies to both Intermediate CAs. Set the authorityInfoAccess as provided via the environment variables. 9.1. Create the OCSP Certificate OCSP needs a signing certificate. This certificate must be signed by the CA that signed the certificate being checked. The steps to create this certificate is the similar to a Server certificate for the CA: Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 17] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 # Select which Intermediate level intermediate=intermediate #intermediate=8021ARintermediate # Optionally, password encrypt key pair encryptkey= #encryptkey=-aes256 # Create the key pair in Intermediate level $intermediate cd $dir openssl genpkey -algorithm $algorithm\ $encryptkey -out $dir/private/$ocspurl.key.$format # For ECDSA point-compression #openssl ec -conv_form compressed \ # -in $dir/private/$ocspurl.key.$format\ # -out $dir/private/$ocspurl.key.$format chmod 400 $dir/private/$ocspurl.key.$format openssl pkey -in $dir/private/$ocspurl.key.$format -text -noout # Create CSR commonName="/CN=ocsp" DN=$countryName$stateOrProvinceName$localityName DN=$DN$organizationName$organizationalUnitName$commonName echo $DN emailaddr=postmaster@htt-consult.com export subjectAltName="DNS:$ocspurl, email:$emailaddr" echo $subjectAltName openssl req -config $dir/openssl.cnf -reqexts req_ext_bks \ -key $dir/private/$ocspurl.key.$format \ -subj "$DN" -new -out $dir/csr/$ocspurl.csr.$format openssl req -text -noout -verify -in $dir/csr/$ocspurl.csr.$format # Create Certificate export startdate=230801000000Z # YYMMDDHHMMSSZ export enddate=99991231235959Z # per IEEE 802.1AR openssl rand -hex $sn > $dir/serial # hex 8 is minimum, 20 is maximum # Note 'openssl ca' does not support DER format openssl ca -config $dir/openssl.cnf\ -extensions ocsp -notext \ -in $dir/csr/$ocspurl.csr.$format\ -out $dir/certs/$ocspurl.cert.$format chmod 444 $dir/certs/$ocspurl.cert.$format openssl verify -CAfile $dir/certs/ca-chain.cert.$format\ $dir/certs/$ocspurl.cert.$format openssl x509 -noout -text -in $dir/certs/$ocspurl.cert.$format Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 18] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 9.2. Revoke a Certificate Revoke the certificate as in Section 8.2. The OCSP responder SHOULD detect the flag change in index.txt and, when queried respond appropriately. 9.3. Testing OCSP with Openssl OpenSSL provides a simple OCSP service that can be used to test the OCSP certificate and revocation process (Note that this only reads the index.txt to get the certificate status at startup). In a terminal window, set variables dir and ocspurl (examples below), then run the simple OCSP service: dir=/root/ca/intermediate ocspurl=ocsp.htt-consult.com openssl ocsp -port 2560 -text\ -index $dir/index.txt \ -CA $dir/certs/ca-chain.cert.pem \ -rkey $dir/private/$ocspurl.key.pem \ -rsigner $dir/certs/$ocspurl.cert.pem \ -nrequest 1 In another window, test out a certificate status with: targetcert=$serverfqdn #targetcert=$clientemail #targetcert=$DevID openssl ocsp -CAfile $dir/certs/ca-chain.cert.pem \ -url http://127.0.0.1:2560 -resp_text\ -issuer $dir/certs/intermediate.cert.pem \ -cert $dir/certs/$targetcert.cert.pem Revoke the certificate, Section 8.2, restart the test Responder again as above, then check the certificate status. 10. Footnotes Creating this document was a real education in the state of openSSL, X.509 certificate guidance, and just general level of certificate awareness. Here are a few short notes. Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 19] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 10.1. Certificate Serial Number The certificate serial number's role is to provide yet another way to maintain uniqueness of certificates within a PKI as well as a way to index them in a data store. It has taken on other roles, most notably as a defense. The CABForum guideline for a public CA is for the serial number to be a random number at least 8 octets long and no longer than 20 bytes. Appendix B of [RFC5280] states that "CAs MUST force the serialNumber to be a non-negative integer, that is, the sign bit in the DER encoding of the INTEGER value MUST be zero". By default, openssl makes self-signed certificates with 8 octet serial numbers. This guide uses openssl's RAND function to generate a random value and pipe it into the serial file which is used in by the config file. This number MAY have the first bit as a ONE; the DER encoding rules prepend such numbers with 0x00. Thus increasing the actual certificate size by a byte. An 8-byte serial number with the first bit of zero can be generated by limiting the random generation to less than 2^63: printf "%016X\n" $(shuf -rn 1 -i 1-9223372036854775807 \ --random-source=/dev/urandom) > $dir/serial # or printf "%016X\n" $((16#$(openssl rand -hex 8) & 0x7fffffffffffffff))\ > $dir/serial A private CA need not follow the CABForum rules and can use anything number for the serial number. For example, the root CA (which has no security risks mitigated by using a random value) could use '1' as its serial number. Intermediate and End Entity certificate serial numbers can also be of any value if a strong hash, like SHA256 used here. A value of 4 for ns would provide a sufficient population so that a CA of 10,000 EE certificates will have only a 1.2% probability of a collision. For only 1,000 certificates the probability drops to 0.012%. The following was proposed on the openssl-user list as an alternative to using the RAND function: Keep k bits (k/8 octets) long serial numbers for all your certificates, chose a block cipher operating on blocks of k bits, and operate this block cipher in CTR mode, with a proper secret key and secret starting counter. That way, no collision detection is Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 20] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 necessary, you’ll be able to generate 2^(k/2) unique k bits longs serial numbers (in fact, you can generate 2^k unique serial numbers, but after 2^(k/2) you lose some security guarantees). With 3DES, k=64, and with AES, k=128. 10.2. Some OpenSSL config file limitations There is a bit of inconsistency in how different parts and fields in the config file are used. Environment variables can only be used as values. Some fields can have null values, others cannot. The lack of allowing null fields means a script cannot feed in an environment variable with value null. In such a case, the field has to be removed from the config file. The expectation is each CA within a PKI has its own config file, customized to the certificates supported by that CA. 10.3. subjectAltName support now works Older versions of openSSL had limitations in support for subjectAltName (SAN). This is no longer the case. This document sets up the SAN in the config file. Alternatively, the "-addext" option can be used directly in the command line. 10.4. Certificates with only subjectAltName In Section 4.2.1.6 of [RFC5280]: if the only subject identity in the certificate is in subjectAltName, then Subject MUST be empty and subjectAltName MUST be marked as critical. This can be achieved with the variable DN=/ and subjectAltName (example given): DN=/ export subjectAltName=critical,email:postmaster@htt-consult.com 10.5. DER support, or lack thereof The long, hard-fought battle with openssl to create a full DER PKI failed. There is no facility to create a DER certificate from a DER CSR. It just is not there in the 'openssl ca' command. Even the 'openssl x509 -req' command cannot do this for a simple certificate. Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 21] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 Further, there is no 'hack' for making a certificate chain as there is with PEM. With PEM a simple concatenation of the certificates create a usable certificate chain. For DER, some recommend using PKCS#7 [RFC2315], where others point out that this format is poorly support 'in the field', whereas PKCS#12 [RFC7292] works for them. Finally, openssl does support converting a PEM certificate to DER: openssl x509 -outform der -in certificate.pem -out certificate.der This should also work for the keypair. However, in a highly constrained device it may make more sense to just store the raw keypair in the device's very limited secure storage. 11. IANA Considerations TBD. May be nothing for IANA. 12. Security Considerations 12.1. Adequate Randomness Creating certificates takes a lot of random numbers. A good source of random numbers is critical. Studies [WeakKeys] have found excessive amount of certificates, all with the same keys due to bad randomness on the generating systems. The amount of entropy available for these random numbers can be tested. On Fedora/Centos and most Linux systems use: cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail If the value is low (below 1000) check your system's randomness source. Is rng-tools installed? Consider adding an entropy collection service like haveged from issihosts.com/haveged. 12.2. Key pair Theft During the certificate creation, particularly during keypair generation, the files are vulnerable to theft. This can be mitigate using umask. Before using openssl, set umask: restore_mask=$(umask -p) umask 077 Afterwards, restore it with: $restore_mask Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 22] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 or just close the shell that was used, and start a new one. (The -p option to umask is a bash-ism) There is nothing in these recipes that requires super-user on the system creating the certificates. Provided that adequate randomness is available, a virtual machine or container is entirely appropriate. Containers tend to have better access to randomness than virtual machines. The scripts and configuration files and in particular, private keys, may be kept offline on a USB key for instance, and loaded when needed. The OCSP server needs to be online and available to all clients that will use the certificates. This may mean available on the Internet. A firewall can protect the OCSP server, and port-forwards and/or ACL rules can restrict access to just the OCSP port. OCSP artifacts are signed by a key designed for that purpose only so do not require that the associated CA key be available online. Generating new CRLs, however, requires that the CA signing key be online, which is one of the reasons for creating an intermediate CA. 13. Acknowledgments This work was jump started by the excellent RSA pki guide by Jamie Nguyen. The openssl-user mailing list, with its many supportive experts; in particular: Rich Salz, Jakob Bolm, Viktor Dukhovni, and Erwann Abalea, was of immense help as was the openssl man pages website. Finally, "Professor Google" was always ready to point to answers to questions like: "openssl subjectAltName on the command line". And the Professor, it seems, never tires of answering even trivial questions. The openssl-user mailing list, with its many supportive experts, was of immense help in the nuance differences between ECDSA and EdDSA. The sourcecode blocks are structured to work with Carsten Bormann's kramdown-rfc-extract-sourcecode script. At the time of publication, this script was part of the gem kramdown-rfc collection. 14. References 14.1. Normative References Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 23] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . 14.2. Informative References [drip-dki] Moskowitz, R. and S. W. Card, "The DRIP DET public Key Infrastructure", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- moskowitz-drip-dki-09, 23 October 2023, . [ecdsa-pki] Moskowitz, R., Birkholz, H., Xia, L., and M. Richardson, "Guide for building an ECC pki", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-ecdsa-pki-10, 31 January 2021, . [IEEE 802.1AR] IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks - Secure Device Identity", DOI 10.1109/ieeestd.2018.8423794, 31 July 2018, . [NIST.FIPS.186-5] Chen, L., Moody, D., Regenscheid, A., Robinson, A., and National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.), "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.186-5, 3 February 2023, . [RFC2315] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5", RFC 2315, DOI 10.17487/RFC2315, March 1998, . [RFC4108] Housley, R., "Using Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) to Protect Firmware Packages", RFC 4108, DOI 10.17487/RFC4108, August 2005, . Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 24] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, . [RFC7292] Moriarty, K., Ed., Nystrom, M., Parkinson, S., Rusch, A., and M. Scott, "PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange Syntax v1.1", RFC 7292, DOI 10.17487/RFC7292, July 2014, . [RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017, . [WeakKeys] Heninger, N.H., Durumeric, Z.D., Wustrow, E.W., and J.A.H. Halderman, "Detection of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices", July 2011, . Appendix A. OpenSSL config file The following is the openssl.cnf file contents # OpenSSL CA configuration file. # Copy to `$dir/openssl.cnf`. [ ca ] # `man ca` default_ca = CA_default [ CA_default ] # Directory and file locations. dir = $ENV::dir cadir = $ENV::cadir format = $ENV::format signprv = $ENV::signprv signcert = $ENV::signcert certkeyusage = $ENV::certkeyusage certextkeyusage = $ENV::certextkeyusage basicConstraints = $ENV::basicConstraints certs = $dir/certs crl_dir = $dir/crl new_certs_dir = $dir/newcerts database = $dir/index.txt Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 25] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 serial = $dir/serial RANDFILE = $dir/private/.rand # The signing key and signing certificate. private_key = $cadir/private/$signprv.key.$format certificate = $cadir/certs/$signcert.cert.$format # For certificate revocation lists. crlnumber = $dir/crlnumber crl = $dir/crl/ca.crl.pem crl_extensions = crl_ext default_crl_days = 30 # SHA-1 is deprecated, so use SHA-2 instead. default_md = sha256 name_opt = ca_default cert_opt = ca_default default_startdate = $ENV::startdate default_enddate = $ENV::enddate preserve = no policy = policy_loose copy_extensions = copy [ policy_loose ] # Allow the intermediate CA to sign a more # diverse range of certificates. # See the POLICY FORMAT section of the `ca` man page. countryName = optional stateOrProvinceName = optional localityName = optional organizationName = optional organizationalUnitName = optional commonName = optional UID = optional serialNumber = optional [ req ] # Options for the `req` tool (`man req`). distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name string_mask = utf8only #req_extensions = req_ext default_crl_days = 30 # SHA-1 is deprecated, so use SHA-2 instead. default_md = sha256 Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 26] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 # Extension to add when the -x509 option is used. x509_extensions = v3_ca [ req_distinguished_name ] # See . #countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) #stateOrProvinceName = State or Province Name #localityName = Locality Name #0.organizationName = Organization Name #organizationalUnitName = Organizational Unit Name commonName = Common Name [ req_ext ] [ req_ext_bkes ] basicConstraints = $ENV::basicConstraints keyUsage = $ENV::certkeyusage extendedKeyUsage = $ENV::certextkeyusage subjectAltName = $ENV::subjectAltName [ req_ext_bke ] basicConstraints = $ENV::basicConstraints keyUsage = $ENV::certkeyusage extendedKeyUsage = $ENV::certextkeyusage [ req_ext_bks ] basicConstraints = $ENV::basicConstraints keyUsage = $ENV::certkeyusage subjectAltName = $ENV::subjectAltName [ req_ext_bk ] basicConstraints = $ENV::basicConstraints keyUsage = $ENV::certkeyusage [ req_ext_8021AR ] basicConstraints = $ENV::basicConstraints keyUsage = $ENV::certkeyusage subjectAltName = $ENV::subjectAltName [ hmodname ] hwType = OID:$ENV::hwType hwSerialNum = FORMAT:HEX,OCT:$ENV::hwSerialNum [ v3_ca ] # Extensions for a typical CA (`man x509v3_config`). subjectKeyIdentifier = hash authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid:always basicConstraints = $ENV::basicConstraints Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 27] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 keyUsage = $ENV::certkeyusage [ v3_intermediate_ca ] # Extensions for a typical intermediate CA (`man x509v3_config`). subjectKeyIdentifier = hash authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid:always # basicConstraints = $ENV::basicConstraints # keyUsage = $ENV::certkeyusage # subjectAltName = $ENV::subjectAltName [ usr_cert ] # Extensions for client certificates (`man x509v3_config`). subjectKeyIdentifier = hash authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid:always # uncomment the following if the ENV variables set # crlDistributionPoints = $ENV::crlDP # authorityInfoAccess = $ENV::ocspIAI [ usr_req ] # Extensions for client certificates (`man x509v3_config`). subjectAltName = critical, $ENV::subjectAltName [ server_cert ] # Extensions for server certificates (`man x509v3_config`). subjectKeyIdentifier = hash authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid:always # uncomment the following if the ENV variables set # crlDistributionPoints = $ENV::crlDP # authorityInfoAccess = $ENV::ocspIAI [ 8021ar_idevid ] # Extensions for IEEE 802.1AR iDevID # certificates (`man x509v3_config`). subjectKeyIdentifier = hash authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid:always # uncomment the following if the ENV variables set # crlDistributionPoints = $ENV::crlDP # authorityInfoAccess = $ENV::ocspIAI [ crl_ext ] # Extension for CRLs (`man x509v3_config`). authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always [ ocsp ] # Extension for OCSP signing certificates (`man ocsp`). subjectKeyIdentifier = hash authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid:always Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 28] Internet-Draft EC PKI Guide February 2024 Authors' Addresses Robert Moskowitz HTT Consulting Oak Park Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com Henk Birkholz Fraunhofer SIT Rheinstrasse 75 64295 Darmstadt Germany Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de Michael C. Richardson Sandelman Software Works Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca URI: http://www.sandelman.ca/ Moskowitz, et al. Expires 4 August 2024 [Page 29]