Internet-Draft | Signed SAVNET-Peering Information | September 2024 |
Chen, et al. | Expires 30 March 2025 | [Page] |
This document defines a "Signed SAVNET-Peering Information" (SiSPI) object, a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) protected content type included in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). A SiSPI object is a digitally signed object which carries the list of Autonomous Systems (ASes) deploying inter-domain SAVNET. When validated, the eContent of a SiSPI object confirms that the holder of the listed ASN produces the object and the AS has deployed inter-domain SAV and is ready to establish neighbor relationship for preventing source address spoofing.¶
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Attacks based on source IP address spoofing, such as reflective DDoS and flooding attacks, continue to present significant challenges to Internet security. Mitigating these attacks in inter-domain networks requires effective source address validation (SAV). While BCP84 [RFC3704] [RFC8704] offers some SAV solutions, such as ACL-based ingress filtering and uRPF-based mechanisms, existing inter-domain SAV mechanisms have limitations in terms of validation accuracy and operational overhead in different scenarios [inter-domain-ps].¶
Inter-domain SAVNET [savnet] proposes to exchange SAV-specific information among ASes to solve the problems of existing inter-domain SAV mechanisms. Two SAV-specific information exchanging protocols (or SAVNET protocols for short) are shown to achieve higher validation accuracy and lower operational overhead in large-scale emulations [emu-9-savs]. However, operators face significant difficulties in deploying SAVNET protocols. To benefit Internet routing, supporting incremental deployment is an essential requirement of SAVNET protocols [inter-domain-ps]. As illustrated in the Section 9.2 of [savnet], during the partial or incremental deployment of SAVNET protocols, protocol-speaking agents (or SAVNET agents) within the SAVNET-adopting ASes need to find and establish connections with other SAVNET agents. Currently, there is no mechanism to achieve this automatically, and operators of SAVNET-adopting ASes must configure peering SAVNET relationship by hand, which is slow and error-prone.¶
The neighbor discovery and connection setup process of SAV protocols can be done in an automatic and correct manner, with the introduction of a public registry that contains all ASes which both deploy SAVNET and are willing to setup SAVNET peering relationships. A newly adopting AS can use this registry as a reference, and pick appropriate ASes to setup SAVNET peering relationship.¶
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is the most suitable to host this public registry, because the primary purpose of RPKI is to improve routing security [RFC6480], and defending against address spoofing is a main aspect of routing security. To this end, a mechanism is needed to facilitate holders of Automous System (AS) identifiers to declare their deployment of SAVNET [savnet]. The digitally Signed SAVNET-Peering Information (SiSPI) object described in this document serves the function.¶
A SiSPI object is a cryptographically verifiable attestation signed by the holder of an AS identifier. It contains the identification information of one AS, which means the listed AS has deployed SAVNET and can perform SAV on its data plane.¶
The SiSPI object makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects [RFC6488], which defines a Crytopgraphic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] wrapper for the SiSPI content as well as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. In accordance with Section 4 of [RFC6488], this document defines:¶
The object identifier (OID) that identifies the SiSPI object. This OID appears in the eContentType field of the enCapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo structure.¶
The ASN.1 syntax for the SiSPI eContent, which is the payload that specifies the AS deploying SAVNET. The SiSPI eContent is encoded using the ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690].¶
The steps required to validate a SiSPI beyond the validation steps specified in [RFC6488].¶
This document makes use of the terms and concepts described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], "X.509 Extensions for IP Address and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" [RFC6488], and "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates" [RFC6487]. The readers should be familiar with the terms and concepts.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
The content-type for a SiSPI object is defined as id-ct-rpkiSiSPI, which has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.52 (suggested). This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as well as the ContentType signed attribute within the signerInfo structure (see [RFC6488]).¶
The content of a SiSPI object identifies a single AS that has deployed SAVNET [savnet] for inter-domain SAV and a list of its IP addresses. The eContent of a SiSPI object is an instance of SAVNETAttestation, formally defined by the following ASN.1 [X.680] module:¶
RpkiSiSPI-2024 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) id-mod-rpkiSiSPI-2024-2024(TBD0) } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS CONTENT-TYPE FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268] { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ; ct-rpkiSiSPI CONTENT-TYPE ::= { TYPE SAVNETAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-rpkiSiSPI } id-ct-rpkiSiSPI OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) TBD1 } SAVNETAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0, asID ASID, addresses SEQUENCE OF IPFamilyAddresses } ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295) IPFamilyAddresses ::= SEQUENCE { ipFamily IP-ADDRESS-FAMILY.&afi ({IPAddressFamilySet}), ipAddresses IP-ADDRESS-FAMILY.&IPAddresses ({IPAddressFamilySet}{@ipFamily}) } IP-ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= CLASS { &afi OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) UNIQUE, &IPAddresses } WITH SYNTAX { AFI &afi IP &IPAddresses } IPAddressFamilySet IP-ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= { ipAddressFamilyIPv4 | ipAddressFamilyIPv6 } ipAddressFamilyIPv4 IP-ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= { AFI afi-IPv4 IP IPv4Addresses } ipAddressFamilyIPv6 IP-ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= { AFI afi-IPv6 IP IPv6Addresses } afi-IPv4 OCTET STRING ::= '0001'H afi-IPv6 OCTET STRING ::= '0002'H IPv4Addresses ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF IPAddress{ub-IPv4} IPv6Addresses ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF IPAddress{ub-IPv6} ub-IPv4 INTEGER ::= 32 ub-IPv6 INTEGER ::= 128 IPAddress {INTEGER: ub} ::= BIT STRING (SIZE(0..ub)) END¶
Note that this content appears as the eContent within the encapContentInfo as specified in [RFC6488].¶
The version number of the SAVNETAttestation that compiles with this specification MUST be 2 and MUST be explicitly encoded.¶
The asID field contains the AS number that has deployed SAVNET and can perform SAV on the data plane.¶
The addresses field contains a SEQUENCE of IPFamilyAddresses, which stores the router's IP addresses within the AS whose ID is asID, which is utilized for establishing SAVNET connections.¶
This field contains a SEQUENCE which contains one instance of ipFamily and one instance of ipAddresses.¶
This field contains an OCTET STRING which is either '0001'H (IPv4) or '0002'H (IPv6).¶
This field contains a SEQUENCE of IPAddress instances.¶
This element is length bounded through the Information Object Class IP-ADDRESS-FAMILY and its type is a BIT STRING.¶
Before, a relying party can use a SiSPI object to validate the deployment of SAVNET for inter-domain SAV, the relying party MUST first validate the SiSPI object. To validate a SiSPI object, the relying party MUST perform all the validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional specific validation steps of the Signed AS List.¶
The contents of the CMS eContent field MUST adhere to all the constraints described in Section 2.¶
The AS Identifier Delegation Extension [RFC3779] MUST be present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the SiSPI object), and the asID in the SiSPI object eContent MUST be contained within the set of AS numbers specified by the EE certificate's AS Identifier Delegation Extension.¶
The EE certificate's AS Identifier Delegation Extension MUST NOT contain any ''inherit'' elements.¶
The IP Address Delegation Extension [RFC3779] MUST be absent.¶
The pseudocode for SiSPI validation is as follows:¶
function ValidateSiSPI(sispiObject, eeCertificate): // Step 1: Validate the SiSPI object using the generic RPKI // validation procedure. // This includes checking the CMS wrapper, signature, and // certification path. if not IsValidRPKISignedObject(sispiObject): return False, "Invalid RPKI Signed Object" // Step 2: Check the content-type of the SiSPI object. if not sispiObject.eContentType == SAVNETAuthzOID: return False, "Invalid content-type" // Step 3: Parse the eContent of the SiSPI object as // SAVNETAttestation. sispiContent = ParseSAVNETAttestation(sispiObject.eContent) if sispiContent is None: return False, "Unable to parse SAVNETAttestation" // Step 4: Ensure the version number is explicitly set to 2. if not (sispiContent.version exists and sispiContent.version==2): return False, "Invalid version" // Step 5: Validate the AS Identifier Delegation Extension in // the EE certificate. if not ValidateASIdExt(eeCertificate, sispiContent.asID): return False, "AS Identifier Extension validation failed" // Step 6: Ensure the EE certificate's AS Identifier Delegation // Extension does not contain 'inherit'. if "inherit" in eeCertificate.asIdentifiers: return False, "AS Identifier Delegation Extension contains 'inherit'" // Step 7: Ensure the IP Address Delegation Extension is absent. if HasIPAddressDelegationExtension(eeCertificate): return False, "IP Address Delegation Extension is present" // Step 8: Determine if all validation checks are successful. return True, "SiSPI object is valid" function ValidateASIdentifierExtension(eeCertificate, asID): // Check if the asID is within the set of AS numbers // specified by the AS Identifier Delegation Extension. return asID in eeCertificate.asIdentifiers function HasIPAddressDelegationExtension(eeCertificate): // Check for the presence of the IP Address Delegation // Extension. return "ipAddresses" in eeCertificate.extensions¶
Please add an item for the SiSPI object file extension to the RPKI Signed Object registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki/rpki.xhtml#signed-objects) as follows:¶
Name | OID | Reference ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Signed SAVNET-Peering Information | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.52 (suggested) | draft-chen-sidrops-sispi¶
Please add an item for the SiSPI object file extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Scheme" registry created by [RFC6481] as follows:¶
Filename Extension | RPKI Object | Reference ------------------------------------------------------------------------ .sav | Signed SAVNET-Peering Information | draft-chen-sidrops-sispi¶
IANA is requested to allocate the following in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:¶
Decimal | Description | Reference --------------------------------------------------------------- TBD | id-mod-rpkiSiSPI-2024-2024 | draft-chen-sidrops-sispi¶
The IANA is requested to register the media type application/rpki-sispi in the "Media Type" registry as follows:¶
Type name: application Subtype name: rpki-sispi Required parameters: N/A Optional parameters: N/A Encoding considerations: binary Security considerations: Carries Signed SAVNET-Peering Information. This media type contains no active content. See Section 4 of draft-chen-sidrops-sispi for further information. Interoperability considerations: None Published specification: draft-chen-sidrops-sispi Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators Additional information: Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined in {{RFC6488}}, which contains a payload of an AS identifer as defined in draft-chen-sidrops-sispi. Magic number(s): None File extension(s): .sav Macintosh file type code(s): Person & email address to contact for further information: Li Chen <lichen@zgclab.edu.cn> Intended usage: COMMON Restrictions on usage: None Change controller: IETF¶
A router can use the AS_Path from BGP announcements, ASPA objects, and SiSPI to find the closest ASes to set up SAVNET peering, as described below:¶
BGP AS_Paths Analysis:¶
ASPA Verification:¶
Peering Candidates Determination:¶
Identify the ASes that frequently appear on the preferred paths to various destinations, implying they are topologically 'close' or significant transit providers.¶
Among these ASes, rank those according to their frequency in an descending order, since the frequency indicates the weight of traffic from the local AS and higher frequency represents more volume of traffic to transmit for the local AS.¶
SiSPI Objects Utilization:¶
Peering Candidates Selection:¶
Peering Establishment:¶
Based on the above steps, a description of the detailed procedure to establish SAVNET peering relationships is as follows:¶
Let the set of selected AS paths to all the potential destinations be denoted as ASPaths.¶
Let i = 1. Validate ASPaths(i) using ASPA objects.¶
Let the set of validated AS paths be denoted as ASPaths-V.¶
If ASPaths(i) passes the validation of ASPA objects, add it to ASPaths-V.¶
Increment i to i+1.¶
If ASPaths(i) is null, then set i_max = i - 1 and go to Step 7. Else, go to Step 4.¶
Let j = 1 and k = 1. Initialize AS-set S(1) = ASPaths-V(1)(1) and N(ASPaths-V(1)(1)) = 1.¶
If ASPaths-V(j)(k) belongs to S, N(ASPaths-V(j)(k)) = N(ASPaths-V(j)(k)) + 1. Else, N(ASPaths-V(j)(k)) = 1 and S(J * k) = ASPaths-V(j)(k).¶
Increment k to k+1.¶
If ASPaths-V(j)(k) is null, then go to Step 11. Else, go to Step 8.¶
Increment j to j+1.¶
If ASPaths-V(j)(k) is null, then go to Step 13. Else, go to Step 8.¶
Rank the AS-set N according to its values in descending order.¶
Retrieve SiSPI objects from the RPKI repository and let the set of ASes within the SiSPI objects be denoted as O.¶
Let m = 1. Create a SAVNET neighbor candidate set C.¶
If N(m) belongs to O, add N(1) to C.¶
Increate m to m + 1.¶
If N(m) is null or the number of ASes in set C exceeds 4000, go to Step 19. Else, go to Step 16.¶
Establish SAVNET peering relationship with the selected candidate ASes in set C.¶
The newly SAVNET-adopting ASes need to register the SiSPI object proactively to help other SAVNET-adopting ASes find it and establish SAVNET peering relationships, as well as using the SiSPI objects to establish SAVNET peering relationships with other SAVNET-adopting ASes.¶
To register the SiSPI object, the newly SAVNET-adopting ASes should share its information as described in Section 3.¶
To establish SAVNET peering relationships with other SAVNET-adopting ASes, the newly SAVNET-adopting ASes should collect BGP announcements, ASPA objects, and SiSPI objects, and run the procedures described in Section 6.¶
The security considerations of [RFC6481], [RFC6485], and [RFC6488] also apply to the SiSPI object.¶