/pub/history/military/a-weu/documents File: 1388polc.bau Document 1388 8th November 1993 WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting ______ REPORT (1) submitted on behalf of the Political Committee (2) by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur ______ TABLE OF CONTENTS ================= DRAFT RECOMMENDATION on WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM submitted by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur I. Introduction II. What is at stake? (i) The enlargement of NATO (ii) NATO's commitment to peace in the world (iii) NATO and WEU III. Conclusions ______ Draft Recommendation on WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting The Assembly, (i) Convinced that one of the main aims of the NATO summit meeting to be held on 10th January 1994 is to put an end to the uncertainty over the manner in which the security of Europe will be guaranteed in future decades - a matter of concern both for the nations of the Atlantic Alliance and for the peoples of the countries that have regained their freedom; (ii) Stressing the crucial importance for European security of maintaining NATO's credibility as major guarantor of the defence of Europe and of keeping an adequate American military presence on the continent of Europe particularly after the recent announcement by the Russian authorities of a new military doctrine; (iii) Disturbed by the differences that have recently emerged between Americans and Europeans on economic matters and world trade and also on questions of security policy and crisis management throughout the world; (iv) Convinced of the need to establish a new credible and stable transatlantic partnership based on: (a) an American pillar which leaves no doubt about the importance it still attaches to maintaining peace in Europe and the security of the members of the Atlantic Alliance; (b) a European pillar strengthened by a WEU that has achieved full operational status; (v) Convinced that the NATO summit meeting must examine the feasibility of a new allocation of roles, risks and responsibilities between American and European members; (vi) Understanding that all Central and Eastern European countries wish to obtain reliable security guarantees; (vii) Convinced nonetheless that the definition of future relations between NATO and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe depends on: (a) defining a priori new goals for the alliance; (b) continuing the evolution towards democracy within the countries concerned; (c) the peaceful settlement of problems of coexistence between the countries concerned, particularly with regard to minorities and border disputes; (d) a closer definition of relations between NATO and a Russia which is still in internal upheaval and must not be placed in a position which it might believe to be a threat to its own security, but without there being any question of Russia being granted a right of inspection in Central Europe; (e) the evolution of policy in Ukraine and the other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and their relations with Russia; (viii) Considering therefore that it is too soon to extend to other countries the security guarantees which full membership of NATO implies, but believing that any increase in the threat to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would at the same time constitute a danger for Western Europe; (ix) Convinced however that it is necessary initially to use the framework of NACC to strengthen confidence between Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and to examine whether the American proposal for a partnership for peace and the French proposals for developing bilateral relations can contribute to this aim; (x) Welcoming NATO's decision to participate if necessary in peace-keeping operations under the mandate of the United Nations and of the CSCE in areas outside the North Atlantic Treaty area and particularly in the conflict in former Yugoslavia; (xi) Deploring nevertheless the difficulties encountered in implementing a concerted approach both inside NATO and between NATO and the United Nations on ways and means of interaction between the two organisations, with particular regard to operational command; (xii) Recalling the urgency of determining procedures governing interaction between WEU and NATO in peace-keeping matters, in accordance with the Petersberg Declaration, RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL Present joint proposals to the NATO summit meeting on 10th January 1994 for a new Atlantic partnership on the following basis: 1. In joint defence matters: (a) study attentively, in consultation with representatives of Russia, the significance of recent Russian statements on the use of nuclear weapons and examine their consequences for NATO's defence concept; (b) confirm the commitment of substantial American forces on the continent of Europe as an essential factor of European security and reassurance for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; (c) confirm the attribution to the United States of supreme command of NATO allied forces; (d) strengthen the process of consultation under Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; (e) urge NATO to acknowledge the efforts made by European countries within the framework of WEU to strengthen their defence contributions, specifically; - the inauguration of the European Corps; - the work of the WEU Planning Cell; - the work of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG); - the importance of the work undertaken by the WEU Satellite Centre at Torrejon; 2. Within the context of a possible enlargement of NATO: (a) encourage all measures likely to strengthen confidence between Russia, Ukraine and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the framework of NACC based on the American proposals for creating a partnership for peace; (b) at the same time intensify WEU's relations with the countries involved in the work of the WEU Forum of Consultation, by seeking to achieve greater cohesion with the work of the European Communities in Central and Eastern Europe; 3. In peace-keeping throughout the world: (a) put the present consensus among the members of the Atlantic Alliance on a sound legal footing; (b) make proposals on ways and means of interaction between NATO, WEU and the United Nations, particularly as regards operational command; (c) reach an agreement with NATO for the latter to make NATO facilities available to WEU, as necessary; (d) promote the formation in the framework of NATO of a special force capable of providing WEU commands and NATO commands with the appropriate means for their tasks; 4. In disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation: propose a formula for task- and responsibility-sharing between WEU and NATO based on the past experience of the two organisations. ______ Explanatory Memorandum ====================== (submitted by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur) I. Introduction ================ The development of a European defence organisation in the framework of WEU, although foreseen in the Maastricht Treaty, has since been held up by the slowness and difficulty encountered in the process of ratifying the treaty and by continuing uncertainty over the way NATO should evolve. The January 1994 summit meeting should put an end to this uncertainty by defining: - new guidelines for NATO; - its relations with the former Warsaw Pact countries; - a European defence policy to face the threats that might re-emerge; - the political and military means of action NATO can place at the disposal of a peace-keeping or peace-restoring policy in Europe and perhaps, too, throughout the world. Clearly, WEU will subsequently have to take the measures necessary for Europe to be able to act in areas where NATO may not fully meet its security requirements. It is already necessary, however, for Europeans to concert their approach to the NATO summit meeting with the clearest possible views on the requirements of their security. For that reason, encouraged by the WEU Council, the Assembly has decided to include the present report in its agenda so that WEU will not appear merely as an organisation allowing Europe to accomplish what others are unable or unwilling to do as has so far been the case, but will confirm its position as the voice of Europe in its own particular domain, i.e. as the true European pillar of the alliance and the true defence organ of a Europe that wishes to play a political role commensurate with its economic capabilities, its place in the cultural life of the world and the requirements of its security. II. What is at stake? ====================== It was decided to hold the NATO summit meeting at the request of the United States Government. It is to be understood that President Clinton's main purpose was to achieve apparent success in his foreign policy by reaffirming the importance of NATO as an instrument of United States policy, particularly in the eyes of public opinion and the media. The European members of the alliance agree in considering that a United States military presence in Europe is an essential factor of stability and peace on the European continent. They are therefore all prepared to make a number of concessions to ensure that this presence is maintained. Will the western structures, which have ensured peace in Europe, security and the freedom of the peoples of the Atlantic Alliance for more than forty years, be able to provide such a reassuring response to the new challenges facing European security and transatlantic solidarity since the end of the East- West confrontation? There are many reasons for concern in this respect. What then is at stake? The vision of a new world order based on the rule of law that was believed to be almost achieved after the success of the Desert Storm operation following Iraq's attack on Kuwait is still a distant goal. On the contrary, the multiplication of regional conflicts and the crisis centres in many countries which are liable to affect the stability and security of neighbouring countries and also of an international community that is incapable of controlling them, obliges us to face up to the question of whether the world is not moving increasingly towards disorder and instability. In Bosnia, only a few hours from the capitals of Western Europe, fighting, killing, ethnic cleansing and indescribable suffering are still the lot of the population. Fighting in the Balkans might extend to other areas of former Yugoslavia and neighbouring countries and there is still a very real danger of hostilities being resumed between Serbs and Croats. The inability of the European governments and that of the United States to agree on the initiatives to be taken for re- establishing peace in that area in the more than two years of fighting is the main cause of the failure of the United Nations, the CSCE, twelve-power Europe, NATO and WEU to bring hostilities to a halt. This has seriously undermined their credibility, including that of NATO and of WEU, in spite of the effectiveness of the military measures taken by these two organisations to ensure that the embargo decided by the Security Council in the Adriatic and on the Danube is respected. This situation might jeopardise the reciprocal confidence of Europe and the United States in that one might wonder whether the hesitant position of the United States in the Yugoslav crisis is not a tangible sign of its intention to be more selective in its commitment to security in Europe insofar as the threat to Europe of a regional conflict is not considered as a significant threat to the United States. Any great divergence between Europe and the United States in assessing the threat would be particularly disturbing at a time when commercial differences between Americans and Europeans in the framework of GATT might have repercussions on political relations between the opposite shores of the Atlantic. Any such tendency would also affect the cohesion of NATO in its recent efforts to extend its field of action outside the area defined by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty to allow it to take part in maintaining and/or re-establishing peace in other areas of the world. (i) The enlargement of NATO The western governments' loss of credibility as a result of the fighting in former Yugoslavia is a source of perplexity among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which are endeavouring to establish as quickly as possible links with the European Community, WEU and NATO, the only organisations they feel can guarantee their future security. WEU's relations with these countries are examined in the report presented by Mr. Wintgens, which shows clearly the possibilities of strengthening the co-operation WEU can offer the countries that are interested. It also shows, however, that these countries are trying to obtain security guarantees that WEU alone is incapable of offering them: the guarantee of an alliance backed by the strength of the United States. Some members of NATO, including Germany, have expressed support for allowing the Visegrad countries to join NATO. The latter, however, has been faced with a difficult choice since the President of Russia sent the signatories of the 2+4 treaty (governing the conditions of the reunification of Germany) a letter warning against any integration of former Warsaw Pact countries in the Atlantic Alliance. This did not correspond to his statements in Warsaw and Prague to the effect that Russia had no objection to the wishes of these countries in this respect. Other factors bring further complications: uncertainty regarding the internal and external evolution of Russia after the events in Moscow on 3rd and 4th October is still not dispelled and this raises the question of how NATO can develop its future relations with that country. Some advocate a kind of strategic partnership with Russia, but what does this mean in practical terms? The recent American offer of a partnership for peace including the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, together with Russia, might perhaps satisfy the Russians, but it will inevitably increase doubts among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Even if there are no legal obstacles and even if it may be a factor of stabilisation for Central and Eastern Europe, any enlargement of NATO would involve a number of drawbacks: (a) If limited to the Visegrad countries, it would constitute a new iron curtain in Europe and would exclude countries that are seeking to develop relations with Western Europe (Romania, Bulgaria, Baltic countries). (b) If extended further, it would lead to the isolation of the successor countries of the USSR and add to their feeling of being surrounded by hostile forces. (c) Enlargement exending to the successor countries of the USSR would deprive the Washington Treaty of its content since it would subject its application to the goodwill of countries whose present is uncertain and future unforeseeable. It would raise the very difficult question of whether the countries of NATO are prepared for Russia or Ukraine to take part in possible peace- keeping operations in former member countries of the Warsaw Pact and whether the member countries of NATO are prepared to take part in similar operations in the CIS countries alongside Russia, which would clearly exercise a preponderant political and military role in these matters. Elections in Poland on 19th September and the putsch attempted by the Supreme Soviet in Russia showed that it is neither desirable nor possible to open the alliance to countries whose regime is not stabilised or is not homogenous with that of the members of NATO. Russian hesitation towards the action of the United Nations in the Yugoslav affair arouse fears that participation by these countries in alliance decisions might lead to paralysis in any deliberations on measures to maintain or re-establish peace. As matters now stand, it would seem wise to defer any enlargment of NATO but, pending more favourable circumstances: (a) to strengthen the activities of NACC, whose aim is to develop co-operation with countries of the East and possibly with former neutral countries which may so wish on questions of joint security; (b) to limit NATO to its present membership with the proviso that its enlargement can be examined when the time is ripe; (c) to ensure, in these conditions, the maintenance of a United States military presence in Europe; (d) to reserve for NATO all exchanges with the countries of the CIS whereas the WEU Forum would continue to develop exchanges with member countries and other former members of the Warsaw Pact; (e) to promote the progressive creation, through bilateral agreements with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, of the conditions for a global organisation of security throughout the European continent. The evolution of the member countries of the Community of Independent States and of their reciprocal relations is also uncertain. All attend the North Atlantic Co-operation Council together with the nine countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Finland, which has observer status. NACC's various activities are fairly similar to those of the CSCE with the exception that neutral and non-aligned countries (except for Finland) do not take part and its ultimate aims still have to be defined. (ii) NATO's commitment to peace in the world In this respect, the work of NACC's ad hoc group for co- operation in peace-keeping matters is worthy of special attention in view of present fighting in the Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The steps recently taken by Russia, which has asked for changes in the sections of the treaty on the reduction in forces in Europe which limit military equipment stationed in the Caucasus, are intended to strengthen its military presence in that area and have brought protests from Turkey. The role of NATO and NACC in peace-keeping matters is certainly of interest to the United Nations which has recently increased its efforts to invite regional organisations to play a greater part in such matters (reference is made in this respect to the report by Mr. Soell on political relations between the United Nations and WEU and their consequences for the development of WEU). However, ways and means of interaction between NATO and the United Nations in peace-keeping matters are far from being harmonised. NATO has declared its preparedness to use force in Bosnia if necessary, provided the operations are conducted under a United Nations mandate but not under the direction of that organisation. The United States, for its part, agrees to send armed forces on peace-keeping missions only if its vital interests are at stake and if these missions are placed under the direction of NATO or a coalition similar to the one formed for the Iraq operation. If NATO wishes to remain a credible actor in peace-keeping without thereby playing the full role of world policeman which belongs to the United Nations, it cannot be content to base its new role on an ad hoc consensus and on considerations of expediency which may differ from one case to another. A major aim of the forthcoming NATO summit meeting should therefore be to clarify the aim of that organisation with regard to the United Nations for strengthening its authority and not weakening it. Legitimation of any action for peace organised by NATO should remain a prerogative of the United Nations with the backing, if necessary, of the CSCE. An important characteristic of the Atlantic Alliance is the difference between the very limited commitments under the Washington Treaty, the development of political consultation and the remarkable proficiency of the military organisation. These arrangements were adequate when there was agreement between all members on the nature and importance of a threat. They are no longer so appropriate in circumstances where risk assessment is no longer clear-cut and each member has to decide whether or not to take part in any military operation. Proof is to be found in the considerable reduction in force levels and the difficulty the allies are having in agreeing on effective action in Yugoslavia. If NATO wishes to avoid political paralysis, its member states must accept more specific and binding legal obligations than those to which they subscribed in 1949. (a) In view of the United States' unswerving reluctance to enter into formal commitments by its forces, it is not very realistic to envisage its acceptance of a clause similar to the one in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. (b) Conversely, the scope of Article 4 of the Washington Treaty might be extended to oblige the allies to consult with each other on any threat to international peace wherever it might arise. In fact, such consultations have already been held on many occasions, but the solidarity of the allies would be strengthened by making them compulsory. (c) From the fact that NATO cannot be transformed into an offensive alliance, i.e. determine, on its own authority, armed intervention for goals other than the defence of the territory of member states, signatory countries should agree to fix the conditions and ways and means of possible joint action to fulfil any mandate that might be entrusted to them by the Security Council of the United Nations, with particular regard to humanitarian action or peace-keeping or peace-restoring operations. Obviously, the authority of the United Nations would be considerably strengthened if it were evident: (i) that, in specific cases, joint forces of the alliance could be permitted to show respect for United Nations decisions; (ii) if the United Nations calls upon forces from the member countries of the alliance, they would have access to NATO infrastructure for intelligence, transport, logistics, etc. (d) Finally, the aim of the summit meeting should be to achieve, if not necessarily a revision of the Washington Treaty, at least a reinterpretation of its clauses with particular regard to the link between the geographical area it covers and the military obligations of its members so that it will be able to meet the new requirements of maintaining peace in Europe and throughout the world. This is what WEU managed to do when it adopted the platform in The Hague. It is now for NATO to do likewise. (iii) NATO and WEU Unlike NATO, WEU has no need to seek new legitimation nor new fields of action. The modified Brussels Treaty provides it with the necessary bases for launching action to counter any threat to peace wherever it may occur. The Maastricht Treaty merely confirms and strengthens this legitimation by giving WEU the mandate to act on behalf of the future European Union. This is already embodied, moreover, in the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty which invites the contracting parties to take the necessary measures "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe". Conversely, NATO has the necessary military infrastructure for the defence of Europe which WEU did not need to develop since Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty allowed it to resort to the military forces of NATO should it have to contend with major aggression on the continent of Europe. The development of WEU's own operational structures proved necessary from the moment the member governments started to apply in full the modified Brussels Treaty in areas extending beyond the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty. The more NATO is prepared to enlarge its area of action, the easier it should be for it to place its structures at the disposal of WEU. On the one hand, this would avoid developing conflicting structures and, on the other, NATO might thus take advantage of the means WEU has under the modified Brussels Treaty for exercising the necessary political control of peace-keeping operations. It is for the WEU Council to ensure that the NATO summit meeting recognises the advantages the Atlantic Alliance can derive from a true partnership with WEU on the basis of a credible definition of the risks, roles and responsibilities of both one and the other. Regarding roles, there is a danger that discussions on NATO's new tasks, on a broader interpretation of Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty and on the appearance of new notions such as partnership for peace, strategic partnership (with Russia) or even collective concept of security will add further doubts regarding the future direction of NATO and particularly future credibility in its primary task of defending Europe. It is essential for the summit meeting to reach a very clear decision on the direction NATO will have to take in order to have a chance of survival and to be understood by public opinion. The main purpose of the NATO military system was to deter any Soviet attack on Western Europe. This meant a certain deployment of forces, a certain dose of armaments, a certain breakdown of national strengths and certain command structures adapted to this goal. The maintenance of a powerful army and modern nuclear weapons in Russia and uncertainty over the future of that country preclude the complete dismantling of NATO's military apparatus and particularly its nuclear capability. However, the reunification of Germany, the forthcoming withdrawal of Russian forces from the former GDR, and the radical change of direction in Russian policy allow considerable reductions to be made. Integrated military commands can operate effectively only insofar as all the member countries of NATO take part in the operations entrusted to them. It is far from certain that this will always be the case in the event of peace-keeping or peace- restoring operations not covered by the Washington Treaty. However this may be, in view of the all-round reduction of defence budgets, the use of the forces of member countries in such operations will increasingly require them to have access to means of information, transportation and logistics that only NATO can provide. The members of NATO would therefore have to agree on the cases and the conditions in which the organisation would be able to afford its support to one or several member countries for such operations. These arrangements would obviously have to cover cases in which WEU would undertake action of its own. The conditions in which WEU vessels are deployed in the Adriatic show how necessary it is to have such arrangements. Regarding risks, it must be realised that threats to peace now weigh more heavily on the European continent than on the American continent. This situation is also the result of the end of the cold war during which solidarity with the United States was more evident. The United States' request to redistribute the burden of the joint defence of Europe is therefore understandable. It would consequently be highly desirable for WEU to be able to give its allies, at the NATO summit meeting, convincing assurances regarding the specific measures the Europeans are prepared to undertake in order to handle their own defence. This is not just a budgetary question, but one of co- operation in armaments, rapid air transport capability and the maintenance of credible armed forces in each member country. With the Torrejon satellite centre, WEU can already show that it has taken the first step, albeit modest, for equipping Europe with space-based means of observation. Conversely, the idea of setting up a European armaments agency has so far only produced a regrouping in the framework of WEU of the activities of the IEPG under a new name, i.e. the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), but no new mission has yet been defined for this future agency. It remains to be seen whether and to what extent the French proposal to set up a Franco-German agency for armaments will be able to give fresh impetus to this undertaking. However, burden-sharing cannot be confined to material contributions. It should also concern responsibilities. (a) It is clear that maintaining American forces in Europe implies the military command of NATO forces remaining in American hands. Any other solution, moreover, would mean appointing a European SACEUR and it would be very difficult for the European members of the alliance to agree on his nationality. (b) Conversely, application of the principles of transparency and complementarity between NATO and WEU should result in a very senior officer nominated by WEU being appointed SACEUR's deputy and at the same time he should be given the supreme command of any operation under a WEU hat. (c) France's return to the NATO Military Committee would help to find a new politico-military balance in the alliance. (d) Above all, it is in the political field that it is necessary to make Europe's voice heard, particularly in the North Atlantic Council. For its voice to be heard, Europe will have to be united. It is gratifying that, for the first time, the WEU Council has decided to make preparations for the NATO summit meeting. Even so, it will have to agree on how to express a joint position. It is also essential for Europe to be able to act on behalf of continental and international peace outside the framework of NATO. This means: (a) the WEU Council retaining the ability to take independent decisions; (b) having effective access to information, logistic means and predetermined armed forces which should be provided either by NATO, which would imply a prior and unconditional commitment by the United States, which is not very probable, or by member states on the basis of national decisions, which means building up European means outside NATO. Hostilities in the Gulf and former Yugoslavia show that Europe is still far from achieving this. No true balance is conceivable between a power that uses its armed forces at will and a Europe that does not have any. It is for Europe to assert itself and make the necessary effort without which there could be no true reform of NATO. WEU is still the only organisation that might be able to mobilise the national means of European countries, including those assigned to NATO, to defend the security of Europe as a whole. To deny it this capability would be tantamount to refusing any balance within NATO and, hence, would condemn the NATO summit meeting to failure. III. Conclusions ================= NATO has recently been compared to a large ship equipped with a powerful engine but no rudder; one might even wonder whether it is not in the process of changing from the work of a warship to that of a pleasurecraft. To dispel uncertainty and to ensure that NATO remains the factor of stability it has been for the last forty years, members of the alliance must first re- establish order in transatlantic relations by putting an end to differences between the United States and Europe regarding present options in security and defence matters. The more the alliance asserts itself as a homogenous and stable entity in its inner workings, the more it will be capable of exporting this stability to the outside. In this respect, Europeans have a special responsibility to assume by showing their allies across the Atlantic that the European defence identity is becoming a reality that will strengthen the whole alliance. To achieve that, Europeans and, above all, WEU, still have considerable efforts to make. The defence of a European point of view at the NATO summit meeting will have meaning only if Europe decides at long last to pursue, in the framework of WEU, initiatives it has defined itself, but whose implementation is still far too slow and far too limited. One of the results of the NATO summit meeting should be to help WEU to give tangible shape to plans that have so far been little more than vague ideas and make WEU a truly operational organisation. ______ (1)1. Adopted in committee by 12 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions. (2)2. Members of the committee: Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Lord Finsberg (Alternate: Marshall), Mr. Roseta (Vice- Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Agnelli (Alternate: Ferrarini), Alegre, Andreotti, Benvenuti, Bowden, De Hoop Scheffer, Ehrmann, Fabra, Feldmann, Foschi, Goerens, Homs I Ferret, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Kaspereit, Lord Kirkhill (Alternate: Godman), MM. Kittelmann, de Lipkowski (Alternate: Baumel), Polli, Mueller, Pecriaux, de Puig, Reddemann, Rdrigues, Seeuws, Seitlinger, Soell, Vincon, Ward, Wintgens, Zapatero.