FIRST SITTING ============= Tuesday, 20th April 1993 ______ (The sitting was opened at 9.42 a.m. with Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, in the Chair) Mr. SOELL (President of the Assembly). - In deciding to hold today's symposium on Europe's defence against ballistic missiles, the Technological and Aerospace Committee is responding to one of our Assembly's vocations: to anticipate events and open debates that have not yet been started by governments. On many occasions and in several areas, the WEU Assembly has thus been able to guide the Council's thinking and prepare its decisions. It is clear, however, that, in this particular matter, the Assembly is raising quite a delicate subject with the result that certain governments are somewhat reluctant to follow it. Now that the major threat that had been hanging over Western Europe for more than forty years seems to have disappeared, no external power seems to be threatening our territory and the economic difficulties we are now facing are leading our countries to make substantial reductions in the funds they earmark for military investment, it may indeed seem paradoxical to discuss an undertaking that is, in any event, very costly and does not seem essential. Yet, the very reasons which make the development of an anti- missile system covering Western Europe less topical encourage reflection here and now, without the constraint of events, on the way Europe can ensure its security in the coming decades. It will probably be several years before our governments make the choices they feel necessary and far longer before they implement them and it is not until the next century, at the best, that we can expect an effective system to be installed to protect Europe against any form of aggression. It is indeed very difficult to talk about major investment for setting up a defensive system without being able to say what threat it is intended to counter. This is no doubt one of the reasons why the governments hesitate to tackle this matter and they are certainly right not to wish to point to potential enemies just when they are carrying out controlled disarmament on which they wish to build a new security order in Europe. Our aim is certainly not to cast doubt on the intentions of one or other of them and still less to jeopardise all that has been done to set peace on new foundations, one of the most important of which being the limitation of armaments. Two points deserve our attention. The first is the existence and proliferation throughout the world of ballistic systems and weapons of mass destruction against which the treaties now seem to be nothing more than paper barriers. The second is the weakness of some of the political foundations of stability and peace in many regions of the world, some of which are on our doorstep. We are accusing no one of warlike intentions by noting these facts and asking ourselves what they imply for the future of our security. It will be all the easier for us to promote the controlled limitation of offensive armaments if we are in a position to face up to the danger such weapons may represent. It will also be less difficult for us to take part in operations such as humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention or crisis management if we are better able to protect ourselves against threats, blackmail and any action taken against us. We should also determine how autonomous Western Europe can and must be in this area. Can it have confidence in a global system such as the one the United States is now considering deploying outside the American continent or should it shoulder the burden of a regional system that would be under its control? This not just a question of technical data. The governments' decisions will obviusly have to take full account of political data that our symposium cannot analyse. However, the governments that now refuse to tackle them cannot be blamed, but a parliamentary assembly must not hesitate to take the risk. The fact that we have invited American and Russian speakers so as to have a better knowledge and understanding of the way they envisage the role their countries will have to play in a collective undertaking designed to ensure the security of everyone shows clearly the spirit of openness with which our Assembly is tackling the question of anti-missile defence. It is the privilege of a parliamentary assembly to be able to tackle, without constraint and without committing the governments, the problems that it believes to be important now and for the future. Our purpose is not take a decision on them but merely to bring them into broad daylight by calling on experts capable of revealing the full extent of the debate from the political standpoint and from that of the technology involved. The wish I express in opening this symposium is not that we culminate with a programme of action but, more simply, that we discuss the elements of a debate which, mark my words, will make itself felt in the years ahead and which the political authorities will no longer be able to avoid. It is with this in view and within these limits that I welcome the initiative taken by the Technological and Aerospace Committee under the firm leadership of its Chairman, Mr. Lopez Henares. Once again, we owe our presence here to the good will of the Italian authorities, on whom our Assembly has so often called in organising its symposia. Our decision to call on them once again did not stem solely from the charms of a Roman spring nor even from the fact that Italy is now exercising a particularly active Chairmanship of the WEU Council. It is also due to the fact that Italy, at the crossroads of continental Europe and the Mediterranean, was the first country to be awakened to the dangers of the proliferation of ballistic missiles and its industries, for long involved in a number of multinational projects, have always welcomed the prospects of broad European co-operation in armaments matters. I wish to express my particularly warm thanks to its Minister of Defence, Mr. Ando, and to the staff of his ministry who enabled this symposium to be held in the premises in which we now find ourselves. Without their support, that of the entire Italian Government, the Italian Parliament, its delegation to our Assembly and its Chairman, Mr. Foschi, we should have been unable to organise this meeting. Finally, I wish, in particular, to congratulate our colleague and friend, Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, who has done so much to guide the Assembly's thinking on anti-missile defence, a new area for it. It was he who, thanks to the report he presented to the Assembly in December 1992, guided our work in the direction it has taken. At our forthcoming session, it will be for him to draw political conclusions from the symposium so as to induce the Council to take account of a dimension of European security that has so far been too often neglected. Finally, I must thank the speakers who have agreed to come to introduce the topics that we are to tackle here, be they representatives of governments, experts on political matters or representatives of industry. I invite them to express themselves freely during this symposium. It will be for the parliamentarians to draw lessons from what they have to say and from the answers to questions and to reach political conclusions. We shall thus be able to give the full weight of sound argumentation and in-depth thinking to the recommendations that we are to adopt at our session next June after taking cognisance of the report that Mr. Lenzer will present to the Assembly on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee. I should like to bring this brief introduction to a close by expressing my very best wishes for a highly successful symposium and trust that, to an even greater extent than all those which have preceded it, it will affirm WEU's vocation as recognised by the Twelve in the Maastricht Treaty: to play a full part, in its own area, in the development of a European Union in which external and joint security policy will find an essential place. It is this wish that leads me, without delay, to declare our discussions open. Mr. FOSCHI (Chairman of the Italian Delegation).- First, I wish to thank the Minister of Defence, Mr. Ando, who, as Chairman of the WEU Council, has already organised, in this very place, the seminar on new defence models in which the parliamentary Assembly of WEU was able to play an active part. Mr. Ando is now providing the venue for the symposium which our colleague, Mr. Lopez Henares, was so anxious to hold and for which he has, moreover, been able to draw up a very full programme and bring together top-ranking speakers on the complex subject that is to be tackled during these two days of discussions. In reality, the subject corresponds to the order adopted by the WEU Assembly on the basis of a fundamental report, that of Mr. Lenzer. At its session last December, the Assembly instructed the Technological and Aerospace Committee to organise a symposium on problems relating to anti-ballistic missile defence, as President Soell has reminded us. This requirement emerged from the realisation that the rapid development of advanced ballistic missile technology and the proliferation of such technology in the third world meant new challenges for Europe and the entire world: the response to these challenges and their consequences still have to be analysed in full. The concept of is at present undergoing radical change, a change linked with this era, which is similar in character to the immediate post-war period. The "new security" must adapt itself to changes in technological conditions and also to a peril of a different type (we are now at a stage where the threat is scattered and unforeseeable) and to a financial situation which is forcing us to restrict defence budgets. In this context, the question of anti-missile defence has been partly left out of the debate on new defence models, perhaps also because it mainly concerned the two superpowers, actors in a political environment that was totally different from the present one. As a result of the Gulf war, we have been led to concentrate on other defence-related problems. Personally, I am convinced that this symposium will make an effective contribution to advancing the debate on a topic that is essential for the security of our countries and for the architecture of the security system that we are trying to build with WEU, in particular following the mandate stemming from the Maastricht Treaty. The American GPALS (global protection against limited strikes) programme, a subject on which, moreover, the new United States administration does not yet seem to have expressed its views, is a version of the SDI (strategic defence initiative) launched by President Reagan. The SDI's initial aim was to create an almost completely impermeable umbrella of protection against attacks by missiles that the Soviet Union might have targeted on the territory of the United States or its allies. In spite of progress with advanced technology relating to the implementation of the programme, in spite of the lasers, neutral particle beams, directed energy, guidance systems and satellite platforms that have, to a great extent, allowed the United States to prove its clearer superiority over the Soviet Union, it has become evident that the proposal to deploy an impermeable space shield would be almost impossible in the near future, even at very high cost. The nuclear disarmament programme and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, followed by that of the Soviet Union, made quite superfluous such an expensive project, which the United States Congress has always been reluctant to finance. The GPALS initiative seems, in principle, to be of interest to the European countries of WEU but more particularly southern European countries such as Italy, for various reasons. First, anti-ballistic missile protection, even limited, would be a significant guarantee against the proliferation of missile technology in the Mediterranean basin, whereas such proliferation is inevitable in the long term in spite of obstacles that may be placed in its way, particularly in the Near and Middle East. If the Mediterranean countries concerned obtained missiles, the absence of defence might, on the contrary, involve a clear risk, and an even greater one in the case of missiles with nuclear or chemical warheads. The implementation of the GPALS project also might help to maintain the link between European and American theatre strategy, thus largely avoiding the effects of the withdrawal of American conventional and tactical nuclear forces from our continent. It would also ensure the protection of remaining American (and allied) forces, thus facilitating the maintenance of the United States military presence in Europe. Positive effects would also be felt in the solidity of NATO integrated military structures, particularly as there is already a very high degree of integration in air defence. Extending cover to the Central European countries and to Russia itself would be a first form of worthwhile co-operation with those countries in the security area. With more particular regard to the policy of non- proliferation of missiles, stress should be laid on the growing importance, in this delicate sector, of the missile technology control regime (MTCR). Set up in 1987 on the initiative of the seven most industrialised countries wishing to intensify the control of transfers of missile systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads, the MTCR now has twenty-three members including, for once, all twelve countries of the European Community. At the plenary meeting in Oslo in July 1992, it was decided, in accordance with an initiative taken by Italy and other European countries at the previous plenary meeting held in Washington in November 1991, to extend the control regime to missiles capable of carrying not only nuclear warheads but also chemical and biological warheads. As a consequence, the application of this principle means modifying the parameters relating to range of action and payload (hitherto fixed in MTCR directives at 300 km and 500 kg respectively). Application of the control regime has thus been extended to all weapons of mass destruction. These measures are obviously of particular importance to Italy, whose geostrategic position exposes it to missile attacks, even by medium-range missiles, now being tested and which certain Mediterranean countries might obtain. As an example, I wish to underline that, at the recent plenary meeting of the countries belonging to the MTCR, held in Canberra last March, it was learned that a programme for a missile with a range of action of almost 1 000 km and capable of carrying a payload of 1 000 kg is believed to be at an advanced stage of development in North Korea. According to various sources, the first launching tests of this missile, the No-Dong 1, may take place at the end of 1993 or beginning of 1994. North Korea is also believed to have contacted countries that might wish to procure this type of missile. These countries include Libya, already in possession of the Scud-B system produced by the former Soviet Union (with a range of about 300 km) whose basic concept is copied in the No-Dong 1, with increased range and payload. In a more general framework, examining the programmes of countries with missile technology, it may be noted that Russia, Ukraine, China and North Korea are continuing to supply third countries - including Iran, Libya and Syria - with missiles that can carry nuclear, chemical and biological weapons with ranges between 300 and 3 000 km. It should be noted that, while recent contacts with Russia seem to have produced some result, i.e. improved control of its exports, China has given no assurances in respect of the sale of complete launching systems. The Ukrainian Government, for its part, has emphasised that it did not intend to renounce its missile industries, considered to be among the most highly-developed in the world, even though the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs recently affirmed that his country recognised the problem of non-proliferation and control of ballistic technology, which should rule out any form of co-operation with third countries. Recent approaches by western countries in Pyongyang do not seem to have been more successful: the North Korean Minister for Foreign Affairs curtly rejected these initiatives, describing them as interference in Korea's internal affairs, and adding that information about the export of North Korean missiles to Iran and current co-operation with Syria were merely figments of western propaganda. Egypt, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, together with the countries already mentioned, Iran, Libya and Syria, are at present carrying out independent missile development programmes. It is disturbing to note that, in view of the situation that I have just briefly described to you, the United States is at present the only country actively engaged in research and development for a system of defence against ballistic missiles -as Mr. Lenzer has already pointed out in his report - whereas, for geographical reasons, it is less vulnerable than Europe. It is increasingly urgent, from this point of view in particular, for WEU to develop the necessary co-operation in the framework of NATO. I apologise for having said more than necessary in welcoming you, at the risk of curtailing unduly the speaking time of the illustrious speakers who are to address us this morning. However, I felt I should explain the reasons for the importance of our subject. I wish, once again, to thank Mr. Lopez Henares, the Technological and Aerospace Committee and the organisers and also the Ministry of Defence for its hospitality and co- operation. In wishing you success in your work, I confirm the will of the Italian Delegation to the parliamentary Assembly of WEU to contribute, through its ideas, to anti-missile defence for Europe and to endeavour in the appropriate forums, during this year of Italian presidency, to translate the results of this symposium into action to be taken to promote the European dimension of security and defence that we have undertaken to set up through WEU. Thank you and good luck in your work. Mr. LOPEZ-HENARES (Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee). - After the opening address by our President and the warm welcome by the Chairman of the Italian Delegation, I wish to remind you briefly - and, I must confess, with satisfaction - that our committee, by organising this symposium on anti-missile defence for Europe, is continuing a valuable and useful tradition that it inaugurated in 1973 by holding regular symposia on topical matters in its area of responsibility. A particular feature of these symposia is that they bring together experts with very different backgrounds: universities and research institutes, industry and the armed forces, and also journalists and others interested in exchanging views with parliamentarians, representatives of governments and international organisations. The aim of symposia such as the one starting today is to allow a free and open discussion of the difficult problems raised by co-operation in military - and particularly aerospace - equipment. The success of earlier events of this kind organised by our committee allows us to note that they have given considerable impetus to the shaping of ideas and have also helped the governments concerned to decide what position to adopt and to take decisions. Thus, I would remind you that, in March 1988, our committee organised a symposium in London on European co-operation in armaments research and development. On the basis of conclusions drawn from that symposium, the Assembly recommended that the Council give impetus to the work of the IEPG (Independent European Programme Group) and establish a European advanced defence research agency. Today, it can be seen that the activities of the IEPG have increased considerably and that it has now been decided to incorporate this group in WEU. Furthermore, we hope that the WEU Council's decision to study the conditions for setting up a European armaments agency will soon lead to concrete results. In March 1990, the Technological and Aerospace Committee organised a symposium here in Rome on observation satellites - a European means of verifying disarmament and, as a follow-up to an Assembly recommendation, the Council decided to create the WEU satellite centre in Torrejon, which is to be inaugurated officially in a few days' time, and to ask European industry to conduct a feasibility study of the development of a European space-based observation system. We meet today for our committee's seventh symposium since 1973 but I do not believe that we have ever tackled such a delicate or even controversial subject. I renew the thanks our President has already expressed to all the speakers. Allow me to stress, on this occasion, how much we regret having been unable to avoid a partial coincidence between the dates of this symposium and of the conference on systems of defence against theatre missiles being held in Washington. These unfortunate circumstances have caused difficulties for a number of participants, so we are particularly happy that experienced speakers from the United States - to whom I convey a warm welcome - are nevertheless in our midst. Allow me also to welcome the presence of two representatives from the Russian Federation. As you can see from the programme, we have a very full agenda for these two days, which compels me to ask all speakers to limit their addresses to fifteen minutes if they possibly can so as to allow sufficient time for the discussions. I hope the discussion will be a lively one - perhaps even controversial - and I invite all those present in the hall to play an active part. (Mr. Lopez Henares then announced that Mr. Ando, Minister of Defence of Italy, had been delayed and would speak after General Jean). Problems raised by the development and proliferation of advanced ballistic missile technology ---------------- Missile proliferation and analysis of the risks for Europe Dr. NATIVI (Editor-in-Chief, Rivista Italiana Difesa). - 1. The threat 1.1. Introduction and historical reference Surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) have been widely used operationally for more than fifty years but only recently, with the proliferation of these vectors in developing third world countries, has the SSM threat been given wider consideration after many years of examination in restricted military and specialist circles. This is quite surprising since SSMs proved their worth quite early during the second world war when Germany launched some 17 000 V-1s and 3 000 V-2s against the United Kingdom and continental Europe causing widespread destruction and the death of about 12 000 civilians. The V-2 experience was a starting point for the development of a number of ballistic missiles in both West and East. Scud-Bs can be considered as the latest development of the German V-2 rocket. Third world countries began very early to use SSMs operationally with effect from the late '70s. It should be recalled that Frog-7s and Scud-Bs were launched from Syria and Egypt against Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur war. A few years later, between 1980 and 1988, Iran and Iraq fought a fierce missile war with Frog-7s, Scud-Bs and Scud-B derivatives. Each side launched some 400 missiles against the other. For the first time in 1986, SSMs were launched from a third world country against a western country. The reference here is to the two Scud-Bs which Libya launched against United States military installations in the Italian island of Lampedusa. Although not so widely known, ballistic SSMs were used on a large scale in Afghanistan between 1988 and 1991, Scud-B again playing the star role. Western reports estimate that government forces launched more than 2 000 SSMs against the Mujahiddin. More recently and more widely known was the use of SSMs in the Gulf war two years ago when Iraq launched about 80 Scuds and the local development of this missile (Al Hussein) against Israel and the Gulf states. The proliferation of SSMs is increasing steadily. According to certain United States CIA reports, at least fifteen developing countries can now produce SSMs; there will be 24 countries with an SSM production capability by the end of the century. 1.2. The military value of SSMs One premise is mandatory. SSMs are a valuable alternative to more sophisticated offensive weapon systems, but the military value of these missiles, armed with conventional warheads, is minimum at the best. To elaborate further, an old generation SSM, typically a Scud-B, is capable of carrying at its maximum range of rather less than 300 km a 1 000 km warhead. The CEP (circular error probable)(1) is a function of the missile flight time: for the Scud it is about 900 m at maximum range. A 1 000 km high explosive warhead missing the intended target by about one kilometre is absolutely without effect. Any fighter bomber, with a far greater range, is quite capable of carrying at least twice as much explosive capability and delivering it accurately to within a few tens of metres. This does not take account of the capabilities of even first-generation smart weapons. Combat aircraft are far more accurate, flexible and can be used again and again. There are also drawbacks, which are most important for countries with limited resources. A fleet of combat aircraft is extremely expensive and has a high profile. To be effective it requires advanced operational tactics, complex maintenance and perfect crew training. These problems increase in proportion to the length of flight time or radius to reach the intended targets. Many air forces are capable of reaching targets on the battlefield, some can make more distant strikes, but for deep interdiction or strategic bombing only very few countries can deploy a credible operational attack force. The mere ownership of aircraft capable of conducting deep interdiction missions does not equate to a real military capability: this, for instance, is the case for the Syrian and Libyan Su-24 Fencers. Another point has to be addressed: even the fastest strike aircraft usually flies at a high sub-sonic speed during cruise time, then accelerates to slightly supersonic during the final attack run. For this reason, a target some 900 km from the airbase will be reached only after about one hour of flight time. On the other hand, a ballistic missile can cover the same distance in about nine minutes and thus truly catch the enemy by surprise. Furthermore, every day there is a greater proliferation of anti-aircraft defence systems, even within the less-developed countries, thus increasing the probability of attrition rates (the number of aircraft being shot down) and diminishing the effectiveness of an attack. Conversely, until only a few years ago an SSM launched against a target was safe from any attempt to intercept it and only a mechanical failure could have stopped or changed its course. SSMs have some valuable advantages: - they are quite simple to use; - they require a minimum of maintenance; - they can be produced or assembled by countries with basic infrastructures and technology using personnel with medium skills; - they can be mounted on mobile launchers, TELs (tractor erector launcher). TELs can be easily hidden, camouflaged, kept in protected shelters and then transferred to launch areas just prior to action. For these reasons, it is very difficult to locate and consequently to destroy TELs (2); - they are quite cheap to produce or to buy on the market. A Scud-B costs no more than $1 million. This sum may vary considerably depending on specific situations and whether the weapon is produced locally or procured abroad. It is evident that the older-generation SSMs with conventional high-explosive warheads and with poor accuracy are not suitable for attacking military forces except, perhaps, for large area targets such as air or naval bases at medium distances from the launch pads. (It was not by chance that Syria used their Frog-7s in 1973 against the Israeli airforce bases. This was a task that the Syrian airforce was unable to accomplish since it was too weak compared to the Israeli airforce). The situation changes dramatically when one considers more advanced or non-conventional (i.e. nuclear or chemical) warheads. For a long time, high-explosive warheads have been backed up or replaced by cluster warheads, armed with small anti-personnel or anti-tank bombs. SSMs such as the United States Lance or ATACMs have been in service with this kind of warhead for a number of years. The Block 1 ATACMs carry a cluster warhead containing 1 000 M74 bombs. The efficiency of these SSMs depends of course on the accuracy of the missile at the end of its flight. Although some countries have developed this kind of warhead, these devices are usually reserved for short-range weapons directly employed on the battlefield: the Egyptian SAKR-80 is a typical example. There are also rumours about the new FAE (fuel air explosive) warheads that might be under development in China, but FAE technology and operating conditions make it extremely complicated to produce missile warheads of this type. Initially, Russian Scud-type SSMs were planned for use with nuclear or chemical warheads. Considering the enormous destructive power of these warheads, the CEP had only marginal importance (3). Even an older-generation SSM becomes a formidable weapon when fitted with this kind of warhead. While military nuclear programmes or the procurement of nuclear warheads are fortunately restricted to a few emerging countries, the contrary is true for chemical weapons. Several dozen countries now have, or are about to obtain, chemical/biological weapons and, although perhaps not very sophisticated, chemical warheads for missiles are a widespread reality. This trend will surely increase in the next few years. My comments so far have been confined to the use of SSMs against military targets. History has shown that SSMs have generally been used, even massively, to fight a sort of cities war in which the targets were urban areas of varying sizes. This is just a reedition of the terrorist missile bombardments launched by Germany during the second world war. While allied bombers were able to destroy German cities, the nazis, unable to reach England and most of free Europe with piloted aircraft, retaliated with desperate missile launches. This lesson has been duly studied and today those who do not have the aircraft to conduct a strategic bombing campaign can adopt the less complicated and less costly alternative of an indiscriminate missile attack. A very high level of accuracy is not necessary for a strike to have a devastating impact. All that is needed is to reach a densely-populated area. The continuous expansion of urban centres therefore offers a number of easy and usually undefended targets. The same high-explosive warhead that appears to be so ineffective against military targets becomes a lethal weapon if turned against buildings and houses. A few images reached the West about the true situation in Iranian and Iraqi towns which were severely damaged in the never-ending war between these two countries, but everyone will recall the images of destruction and terror in Tel Aviv, struck by Iraqi missiles just two years ago. The destructive effect does not depend only on the warhead whose weight varies from 150-1 000 kg. Consideration also has to be given to the missile fuselage weighing several tons and the speed of impact ranging from 1 000 m/sec for an SRBM (short-range ballistic missile) with a range of 300 km to the 4 500 m/sec of an IRBM (intermediate-range ballistic missile) with a range of 3 000 km. If the warhead does not separate from the fuselage (i.e. a single stage missile) the destructive effects (mass x speed) are amplified and are even greater in the not-uncommon case of some of the fuel remaining unburnt in the tanks at the time of impact. Even without a warhead, a two-ton missile such as the Scud can leave a crater ten metres wide, several metres deep, and demolish houses, streets, shops and even reinforced concrete buildings. Many of the Al Hussein missiles which Iraq launched against Israel disintegrated before reaching the ground but the cinetic energy produced was more than enough to cause catastrophic effects. The launch of a few dozen missiles over an urban area can therefore kill several hundred civilians and at the same time gain relevant results at strategic level. To this end, relatively crude weapons easily produced in large quantities at low cost can do the job. If the missiles aimed at cities are armed with chemical or, even worse, nuclear warheads, consequences could be apocalyptic. Using the scale now in use, the 1945 Hiroshima bomb could be graded as a low-yield tactical device (13 kT), but it killed about 70 000 persons. In addition, there is the drama of the people who survived the bomb that were contaminated by radioactivity. The nuclear warhead of the original Soviet Scud-B has yield of some tens of kT. 1.3. The politico-strategic effects Even a limited SSM campaign against civilian targets can have significant effects in a very short time. Mere conventional warhead explosions are over-emphasised by the media, creating a disproportionate reaction from public opinion. People usually having a different opinion of a missile - considered to be a dirty, bad weapon against which there is no defence - than of an ordinary aircraft using bombs or artillery shells. The effects of an air raid are usually far more serious than those of a few SSMs, but from a purely psychological point of view missiles arouse greater indignation. One Al Hussein too many on Israel and the story of the Gulf war might have been quite different. The international coalition network set up by the United States with such difficulty might have been dissolved instantly and the outcome of the war jeopardised. Obviously the effects of SSM launches can vary according to circumstances: the 2 000 Scuds fired at the Afghan freedom fighters were unable to stop the fall of the old regime to guerrilla movements. The launching of SSMS with chemical or nuclear warheads can therefore determine the odds in a conflict, shorten a war or force an escalation. Lessons learned from the past and an assessment of the possible outcome of crises should not blind us to the fact that the principal value of SSMs does not depend on what these weapons are actually used for but on the mere possibility that SSMs might be used. So we emerged with the concept of deterrence. During the first world war, the strategic value of the German Blue Water fleet was not due to the real ability of this fleet to fight and win a number of decisive battles against the British fleet but to the mere existence of those grey battleships: a fleet in being. Today, SSMs in the hands of third world countries can be considered a credible, cheap, effective deterrent force. Take Syria, for instance: Syrian conventional forces are certainly inferior to those of Israel, numbers notwithstanding. What is perhaps more important is that Israel has a military nuclear capability, a number of vectors and the willingness to use nuclear weapons if the situation becomes desperate. Syria, on the contrary, has (for the time being) no nuclear warheads, but instead fields a powerful SSM force, capable of striking any part of enemy territory. Some of the missiles are equipped with chemical warheads. Syrian chemical SSMs, if not enough to defuse the Israeli nuclear threat, to some extent give Syria simple but effective insurance. Here, therefore, we have, on a lesser scale, a new edition of the MAD (mutual assured destruction) concept that, for decades, governed superpower relations. In the same way, Libyan SSMs, with an increasing range, made it more and more difficult for the West to attain or even threaten a new military showdown. In 1988, the only Libyan reaction to United States air raids was to launch a couple of Scud-Bs that fell into the sea without reaching the intended targets. If the situation were to be repeated today, Libya would probably be in a position to retaliate by firing SSMs fully capable of reaching Lampedusa... and not only that small island. The argument that about ten Libyan SSMs would cause little damage compared with what massive western air and missile raids can cause in Libya has only relative merit: at political level, the Libyan threat suggests that there is now a much more cautious approach. It is worth noting that it does not matter whether western intelligence can prove that a number of powerful operational SSMs exist; the mere probability that such weapons exist and could be launched is sufficient. The missile is a kind of absolute weapon, capable of covering hundreds of kilometres in a very short time. There is so far no credible system of defence against this threat. The existence of a missile arsenal, accompanied with declared willingness to use it when needed, is a valuable instrument for political pressure or blackmail. In any international comparison, an individual country that cannot threaten in some way the security of the opponent carries little weight. If, on the other hand, whatever the imbalance, both sides have a strike capability, it is possible to meet at the conference table on an equal footing. Stalin was quoted as saying that the relative weight of a country was measured in divisions. Today, a few old SSMs have just as much political value as powerful conventional armies. 1.4. Ballistic missiles Traditionally, when we discuss the SSM threat we think of a fusiform device powered by a rocket engine during a short initial acceleration stage. After the engine shuts down, the missile flies on a ballistic trajectory until gravity takes over. A short-range SSM can have an apogee of about 100 km while a long-range SSM can fly out of the atmosphere to an altitude of at least 600 km in the case of an IRB. A short- range SSM usually consists of a single stage, while longer-range missiles have two or more propellant stages. At the end of ballistic flight, during the re-entry stage, the vehicle can release one or more warheads. As I have just said, ballistic missiles fly at very high speed. During the terminal stage a speed of about 500 m/sec can be given for very short-range weapons, ranging up to 1 000 m/sec for 300 km weapons, 1 500 to 2 000 m/sec for an Al Hussein class SSM and to 4 500 m/sec and more for a typical IRBM. These data show how the problem of intercepting an SSM at the stage of descent towards the target becomes increasingly difficult as the range of the weapon increases. Developing countries' initial procurement abroad and subsequent independent or semi-independent development of SSMs was a step-by-step process. They all started with large artillery rockets in the Russian Frog-7 category. Then came Scud-B, with a maximum range of just under 300 km, followed by Scud-C (500 to 600 km) and the local version of Scud-B. Now there is proliferation and the first programmes for developing or procuring a new weapon with a range of 900 to 1 200 km. Fortunately, the proliferation of single- and two-stage long- range weapons is still in the early stages, e.g. the CSS-2 which China sold to Saudi Arabia and the Israeli-developed Jericho-1 and 2. Analyses by western intelligence services foresee another round in this missile race in the medium/long term. The first step will be the full operational capability of weapons such as the North Korean Ro-Dong 1 (Labour-1), never yet tested but probably already being mass-produced. This weapon has an optimum range of 1 000 km but is capable of a range of 1 200 to 1 300 km. The number "1" clearly suggests that there is a potential for a more advanced Ro-Dong 2 with enhanced performances. India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa have designed or are in the final development stage of missiles in the 1 000 to 4 000 km range. According to a recently-published CIA report, commented on publicly by R. James Woolsey, the head of the CIA, in a few years' time several developing countries will have missiles with a long enough range to reach most of Europe, while, within a decade or so, we might see the first ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) really capable of reaching the United States. According to some western assessments, in the early years of next century there will be some five or six developing countries with SSMs capable of reaching targets 3 000 km away and at least three countries will have 5 000 km class SSMs. The race towards increasingly capable SSMs makes the user capable of reaching enemies hundreds of kilometres away and of placing launchers in protected sites well inside his own territory, thus safeguarding SSMs from the long range of most combat aircraft. The main components of an SSM are the propulsion system, the guidance system and the warhead. For propulsion, the principal choice is between solid or liquid propellants. The older short- and medium-range missiles can usually rely on liquid propellants, which are easy and cheap to produce, while more advanced and, as a rule, Chinese weapons are equipped with solid-propellant rocket engines. The technology involved in solid propellants is still controlled by a very small number of firms and this makes the task of international agencies trying to stop proliferation slightly easier. Another advantage of liquid-propelled SSMs is that it is a simple task to modify the missiles by enlarging the fuel tanks while reducing the weight of the warhead, thus achieving a longer range. This, for instance, is exactly what Iraq did with Scud-Bs. Liquid propellants have some disadvantages, of course, both operational and technical. Pumping the liquid fuel into the tanks is a very delicate, time-consuming operation since these are highly corrosive chemicals that have to be handled very carefully, to say the least. Conversely, a solid-propellant SSM can, to a certain extent, be handled more or less like an artillery round, ready for use. Another aspect that should be underlined is the rapidity of launching operations. During attacks on military targets, in particular, speed of firing is vital as is the ability to reload the ramp with a new weapon. It should not be forgotten that, even from a psychological standpoint, a missile attack by one or two SSMs a day does not have the same impact as a concentrated bombing raid using scores of weapons over a short period. Older-generation weapons had lengthy launching procedures taking more than an hour. In point of fact, no country has ever launched more than a dozen missiles a day. Remarkably, the only exception was the massive use of Scud-Bs in Afghanistan. The advent of solid-propellant rocket engines will allow launching operations to be speeded up, exposing the launcher for less than thirty minutes and also allowing an intensive, prolonged rate of firing and missile launching of valuable intensity. The guidance system of an SSM is usually based on a number of gyroscopes and accelerometers integrated in an inertial unit. The accuracy of the systems depends on the working time of the system (i.e. flight time): the greater the range, the greater the drift rate. The accuracy of a missile declines quite substantially as it reaches its maximum range. First- generation weapons (Scud-Bs) were equipped with fairly inaccurate navigation system that made use against military targets uncertain, to say the least, unless the massive destructive power of a nuclear or chemical warhead was used. The CSS-2s which China sold to Saudi Arabia can, on paper, be considered a redoubtable weapon. They have a range of more than 2 800 km and a warhead weighing over 2 000 kg, but the CEP is no greater than 2 000 m at maximum range). In fact, without a nuclear warhead, the CSS-2 is hardly usable against targets with a large area such as a medium-sized or large town. Fortunately, improvements in the range of SSMs derived from the new Scud-B were not achieved at the same time as improvements of the same order in accuracy, but one cannot hope that this situation will last for ever. The Chinese M-9 is credited with a 650 m CEP (compared with 1 000 m for Scud-Bs). Current technological developments mean that greater accuracy can be expected in the near future: the Russian short-range SSM SS-21 (Tochka) can carry a 480 kg warhead over a maximum range of about 120 km with a CEP as low as 75 mm. (Western estimates, which are less optimistic, should be corrected.) The United States SSM ATACMs are even better. Generally speaking, it can be considered that most countries' short-range SSMs have a CEP of 50 m, while, for missiles with a range of up to 500 km, an average of about 100 m can be expected. In any event, it should not be forgotten that the United States INF Pershing II was credited with a CEP of only 40 m after a 1 800 km flight. With accuracy of that order and a medium-weight warhead, it is no longer essential to use nuclear or chemical warheads to attack military targets or a specific target within an urban area. Obviously, if we combine the accuracy capabilities of advanced SSMs with non-conventional warheads, we can expect terrific results. It is only a matter of time before advanced guidance systems are available for equipping SSMs produced by developing countries. We have spoken about warheads before. It should be added that reducing the weight of the warhead is one of the easier ways of boosting the range of an SSM: the politico-strategic use of SSMs is not related to the destructive power of the warhead. Some Scud derivatives are armed with light 150 kg warheads compared with 1 000 kg for basic Scud-Bs. It may also be added that the increased accuracy of new SSMs makes a warhead weighing a few hundred kilogrammes more than enough for military roles. Turning to non-conventional warheads, the weight can be further reduced without losing any destructive power: a chemical warhead can weigh an average of 200 kg. To sum up, missile developments will soon allow developing countries to field a number of SSMs with different ranges, degrees of accuracy and warheads. In the medium/long term, it will be possible to produce large numbers of low-cost solid- propellant SSMs. New-generation, more powerful and accurate SSMs will make high-intensity, terrifying missile attack a reality, thus reducing to some extent in military terms the disadvantages as compared with piloted attack aircraft. 1.5. Cruise missiles The missile threat has so far been seen in terms of the ballistic SSM. This does not mean other weapons systems cannot be deployed alongside traditional SSMs and here we are referring to cruise missiles. The devastating effects of the cruise missiles launched by United States naval surface vessels and submarines and air force bombers during the 1991 Gulf war certainly attracted the attention of many countries which are now actively pursuing the aim of procuring or, better, developing weapons similar in design independently. A cruise missile is essentially an aircraft without a pilot, usually equipped with its own guidance system. Compared with a ballistic missile, a cruise missile relies on an engine similar, albeit on a reduced scale, to the propellant system of an aircraft. All cruise missiles are powered by an air-breathing engine that usually works throughout the flight. The speed of cruise missiles is, on average, in the high subsonic range (about 900 kph), but some are much faster and have a speed well above the sound barrier. Ranges vary from a few hundred kilometres to 2 500 or 300 km. Cruise missiles can be launched from the ground or from ships, submarines or aircraft. The usual weight of warheads ranges from 500 to 1 000 kg. In the last few years, several types of warhead have been developed: high explosive, chemical or nuclear with a choice of sub- munitions or special conventional unitary warheads. The miniaturisation of nuclear devices allows countries such as China to develop small nuclear warheads compatible with the stringent requirements of a typical cruise missile. The guidance unit is based on a unit pre-programmed before launching that stores target co-ordinates and a flight plan. This unit can be used for cruise navigation. In some missiles, it is possible to update navigation data through a data link or radio command. During the terminal stage of the flight, with the missile moving towards the target, a dedicated terminal guidance unit, either active or passive, can be used to increase accuracy. Cruise missiles have a high degree of accuracy with a CEP ranging from 300 down to 10 m. While the low speed facilitates the work of air defence radar and interception by surface-to-surface missiles and fighter aircraft, in reality the small dimensions of the missile, the low-level flight profile, the use of ground features to conceal the weapon from radar, the use of stealth technology to reduce RCS (radar cross section) as well as IR signature and the great flexibility in preparing the flight plan and penetration run make cruise missiles very difficult targets, even for integrated, modern air defence systems. The score achieved by United States Tomahawks in the Gulf confirms this statement. While it is true that the low speed of most cruise missiles increases flight time, this does not rule out the surprise effect that can, in any event, be achieved by careful planning that takes advantage of the technical characteristics of cruise missiles. Simple cruise missiles can be cheaper to produce than ballistic SSMs. They are also easier to use and deploy and it takes less time to prepare them for launching. For a number of years, cruise missile development was a matter for the superpowers alone, but today several development projects are under way in a number of countries, including India and China. To be more detailed, China's scheduled procurement of the technology and production tools (this is a typical turnkey contract) needed to produce small turbo-fan engines from the United States firm Garrett should be considered part of this picture. The crisis in the former Soviet Union now makes it easier for Russian cruise missiles to proliferate in several countries. It is estimated in the United States that, by the end of the century, both Iran and Iraq will be able to deploy this type of weapon. During the IDEX military show in Abu Dhabi (UAE) a few months ago, Russia, for the first time, exhibited the air-launched cruise missile AS-15 (X-65CE) in an anti-ship version armed with a conventional warhead and a redesigned fuselage embodying stealth technology to reduce RCS. Even in this version, the Russian cruise missile, weighing 1 250 kg and 6 m long, armed with a 410 kg warhead and having a range of 280 km, is quite interesting, but it should not be forgotten that its strategic version is credited with a range of 2 500 km. This is only one example of the noteworthy Russian cruise missile design range. The Russians considered AS-15 technology to be obsolete and a new-generation weapon was being developed: the AS-19 Koala, which is to be 10 m long with a range of 4 000 km. This programme has now been stopped, as has work on the SS- N-24 Skorpion, but the SS-N-21 Sampson, with a range of 1 700 km, has been in service for a few years and is considered to be the Russian equivalent of the United States Tomahawk. Several countries are currently working on stand-off long- range missiles as well as self-propelled launchers, not to mention surveillance RPVs and even some target drones that can easily be converted into a type of cruise missile. The guidance system is of course the main problem but the deployment of navigation satellite networks (GPS - global positioning system - by the United States and the Soviet equivalent Glonass) was followed by availability on the market of terminals and guidance systems that are very accurate and, at the same time, very cheap: a few thousand United States dollars. It is not difficult to foresee the militarisation of those systems: weight, dimensions and reliability make incorporation in a missile fuselage very easy. Even if these terminals are not capable of receiving the high-accuracy signals reserved for military users (4), they will in any event be able to guarantee a CEP of about 100 m after a 100 km flight: this is more than enough to meet the requirements and ambitions of a developing country. It is worth remembering the discussion going on in the United States about the priorities of SDIO (strategic defence initiative organisation) programmes: ballistic SSMs were always considered top priority, but today several analysts think that an anti-missile defence system must be designed to cope with cruise missiles, too. Consideration is therefore now being given to a system architecture with several parts (fighter aircraft armed with long-range air-to-air missiles, surface-to- air missile batteries, E-3A and E-2C AEW aircraft, etc.). At the moment, the proliferation of coastal defence batteries armed with anti-ship long-range cruise missiles is being taken very seriously: weapons of this type will have a long enough range to reach distant ground-based targets. It is essential, therefore, that the system architecture of a missile defence system should be focused on both ballistic SSMs and cruise missiles. If the immediate threat alone is considered, i.e. ballistic SSMs, there is a risk of our developing a system that is obsolete before it is deployed. 1.6. Where is the threat coming from? Before identifying in detail what the most dangerous missile threat to Europe is and where it is coming from, we need to define what we mean by "threat". We should consider only those countries that have missiles capable of reaching any part of Western Europe. Today, this capability is limited to a few Mediterranean and Eastern European countries. However, if we try to take into account probable medium-term prospects, other countries must be added to the list. To consider missile capability alone, with no strategic or military assessment, we must also examine the missile capabilities of some of the countries usually not on the list of "threatening" countries, e.g. Israel, which now has operational ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads and a range well over 1 500 km. Israeli missiles probably do not need to be considered a danger for European security. The extreme uncertainty of the international situation and the number of "hot" areas suggests that we adopt a more cautious approach when turning our attention to other facts. The old saying that today's friends may be tomorrow's enemies was never more topical. Give a few moments' though to Algeria and Egypt: pressure from Islamic fundamentalists is growing in those countries and, if an extremist government were to take over, these countries, too, might be added to the "threat" list. Clashes and bloodbaths in Algeria and terrorist actions in Egypt, the direct outcome of Muslim pressure from the Sudan, with proven Iranian involvement, make such fears legitimate. It is not known whether western intelligence is currently devoting more resources to keeping a watch on political developments in countries exposed to the fundamentalist threat and, obviously, on their respective missile programmes. Just a few words about Eastern Europe: the problems are linked with the fate of the missile arsenals of the new powers emerging from the former Soviet Union. Although Russia is actively limiting all strategic weapons, as well as short- and medium-range missiles, the process is a lengthy one and is encountering serious resistance from newly-independent republics such as Ukraine. Turning to the former Warsaw Pact countries, it must be admitted that the stringent policy of limiting weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union has made the problem far less serious. Missiles available to those countries, in small numbers, are a few SS-21s, old Frog-7s and Scud-Bs. There have been no reports of new local missile programmes. Rather than a direct threat, there are reasons to fear the spread of these weapons on the open market. According to some sources, some Scud-Bs were sold and transferred from Eastern Europe to Serbia, a development whose consequences need no further explanation. The overall situation in Eastern Europe may therefore be considered less threatening than the situation in the Mediterranean basin. From what has just been stressed, it may be concluded that there is a positive need to look very carefully not only at the missile ambitions of all countries that may represent a direct threat for Europe but also at all the countries that are offering or may offer missiles or missile technology: North Korea, China, India and Pakistan. 2. Proliferation 2.1. Analysis and evolution of the problem In paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3, we described a number of reasons that might induce a country to acquire missile capability. Two other factors can also be identified in addition to the political and strategic ambitions referred to above: the so- called prestige and emulation factors. I do not think there is any need to speculate further about the latter but I would say a few more words about the former. The acquisition of a weapons system by a developing country usually triggers a similar response from neighbouring states; examples of this are well known in the aerospace and naval armaments fields. Similarly, the acquisition of an SSM capability can be considered as a self-explanatory show of power. Even more important is the autonomous production of such weapons. The missile thus becomes a status symbol that disregards logic, military or economic rationale. A good example of this is Saudi Arabia's procurement of CSS-2 IRBM missiles. In the mid-eighties, the Royal Saudi Arabian Air Force was one of the most powerful air forces in the Gulf and Middle East thanks to the British Tornado interdiction aircraft and United States F-15 fighters. When Iran started the war on cities, launching Scud-B missiles over Iraq, the Saudi Government immediately felt there was weakness in its military posture and status as a regional power. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that most countries in the area were equipped with some sort of SSM. The United States was first sounded out about the possible delivery of Lance tactile missiles and the Saudis subsequently turned to China, which ensured the sale of SSMs. In 1988, when Iraq had been launching Al Hussein missiles for a year, the first CSS-2s started to reach Saudi Arabia. Although technologically obsolete, not very accurate and difficult to use, the CSS-2s were the first IRBMs to enter service in a country which did not belong to the superpower club. The widespread angry international response and the even more alarmed reaction in the United States were disregarded and deliveries were completed. The fact that the some sixty CSS-2s buried in hardened silos in the middle of the desert had no real military value and that the cost of the programme rose to about $3 billion was irrelevant for Saudi Arabia: the government was able to fulfil its ambition and achieved undeniable prestige that its neighbours could not challenge. There are a number of reasons underlying the ongoing race for SSMs among developing countries. Historically, this phenomenon developed in different ways that became increasingly sophisticated over the years. The first phase can be considered as horizontal proliferation, i.e. direct sales of ready-to-use SSMs, with a minimum support and maintenance package. Until the late seventies at least this was the most common form of missile proliferation. A country agreeing to sell SSMs achieved a twofold result: first it was able to establish privileged relationships with the procuring country at both strategic and political levels and, second, it was was able to obtain payment in hard cash. These two advantages were not always achieved. The former Soviet Union, for instance, was very ready to sell its allies and friendly governments artillery rockets such as Frog-7 and SSMs such as Scud-B, but in some cases the transfer of these weapons was regarded as a special premium to reward a truly loyal government. Not always, therefore, was the sale or transfer of missiles a way of raising huge sums of money (5). The United States and other western countries traditionally applied strict controls and a self-limitation policy to sales of SSMs. China was not concerned with the political aspect alone but regarded the sale of SSMs as a practical way of helping its ailing economy: buyers wishing to shop at the Chinese missile market had to be prepared to pay cash and could not be sure of bargain prices. Developing countries soon understood the importance of acquiring an at least partially independent capability in missile technology. The example of North Korea, which with the years moved from the simple procurement of SSMs to local production and subsequently exported SSMs and related technology, is a symbol of the ideal path that a number of other countries might try to follow in the next few years. There is also the instructive case of the Iranian Isfahaan plant, at first a mere warehouse for SSMs bought from various suppliers, then an assembly plant and today a real production plant. A first step towards missile independence usually consists of the ability to assemble locally parts and components bought abroad. Then comes a mix of local production and foreign purchases. This phase is defined as SCKD (semi-complete knockdown). The final target is obviously the full ability to produce a complete SSM locally. That is complete knockdown. Initially, this can take the form of local production of an existing SSM design, which is what happened with the Scud-B. However, the new SSM power soon tries to develop its own designs. Sometimes a weapon of foreign design is chosen through a reverse engineering process or bought straight from another country. In other cases, an original project is transformed into an operational weapon, perhaps through co-operation with another country. Missile co-operation among developing countries is certainly one of the worst things to have happened in recent years. Think, for instance, of Egypt, which reportedly sold North Korea the first Scud-B that was then cloned, modified and spread throughout the Middle East. Even the simple production of components requires some know- how, appropriate infrastructure, tools and specialised staff. Such production factors may be acquired from one or more countries. In some really alarming cases, we have witnessed turnkey sales of manufacturing plants; this, for instance, is what happened in Syria thanks to North Korea. Such technology transfers, real vertical proliferation, are truly dangerous because, within a short lapse of time, they can establish a new missile power potentially capable of exporting its own products. In North Korea, this development was very largely the result of the need to increase the cash flow in order to help a weak economy. Vertical proliferation and local technical assistance guaranteed by North Korean technicians and scientists are well rewarded. Usually, the outright transfer of machinery and technology is too obvious and cannot be easily concealed, thus causing alarm and bitter international reaction. A number of different solutions have been worked out by developing countries to cover the growth in their missile industries and, gradually, more subtle tricks have been used to avoid restrictions and bypass controls imposed by the western powers. Initially, the country concerned could entrust a foreign industry with a whole turnkey programme: against payment of huge amounts of money, the firm, usually a well-respected firm, prepared a complete plan, including the design of the missile system, industrialisation, identification of the required machinery and tools, transfer of those items and training of technicians responsible for assembling the plant and starting production in the client country. Obviously, in order to avoid suspicion, the firm responsible, resident in a given country, ordered various parts and components in different countries for later separate shipment to the final destination at different times. Usually the goods involved were not included in a restricted list and there was therefore a good chance of avoiding verification. The main disadvantage of this method was that the entire project and related know-how remained in the hands of the initial firm and were not transferred to the client. In the next phase, developing countries tried to run their missile programmes themselves. Over the years, some experience was acquired, better-trained scientists and technicians were hired or trained abroad and key technology was obtained in various but not always legal ways. In some cases, scientific or civil missile programmes were used to conceal military programmes: this was the case, for instance, of India, Pakistan and Argentina. Some countries started their own programmes: the project and itself and its implementation were carried out locally, but there was still the problem of obtaining certain materials, machinery and technology, primarily that relating to the guidance system. This task was usually assigned to a number of conniving firms, each of which was given only a small part of the shopping list. These firms were able to take advantage of the open market to buy what was needed from a large number of western companies, in the United States or Europe. These companies were usually unaware of the client's final goal. The goods were shipped to the end user country and, at this point, the industrial programme could start. The entire process took time, but it was very hard to identify and stop these legal smugglers. A scheme of this kind could be used not only for missile technology but, by extension, for nuclear and chemical technology, or perhaps the supergun so important in Saddam Hussein's dreams. A variation on this method calls for the use of different layers of shadow companies, joint ventures or import-export firms in one way or another linked to the end users. Even shipping companies, on land or at sea, can be controlled by the end user. Those responsible for procurement in the countries involved in the missile race are able to find new and more advanced systems and although some countries, such as Libya, are still rather naive and rely on workers, technicians and scientists of questionable skills, other countries, such as Iran, are able on their own to run very complex organisations and can also benefit from a technical and scientific basis that should not be underestimated. The best procurement services include that of Syria, with its ill-famed Syrian Scientific Research Council (SSRC), only recently officially banned, which for a number of years was very active in searching for dual-use western technology. A recent case illustrates the problem. A few months ago, the Italian authorities stopped the Waalhaven, a ship coming from Germany with Syria as its final destination. On board there were twenty-seven containers filled with machinery, subject to no control, that was officially intended for an automobile plant but was in fact urgently needed for a Scud-C missile production plant. The ship was registered in Estonia and chartered by a Dutch ship- owner. It left Hamburg, after loading the containers under orders from North Korean firms in Germany, made a stop in the Netherlands and then entered the Mediterranean, where it was stopped and forced to dock in the Sicilian port of Augusta. It was possible to stop this cargo ship only because of rumours that came to the ears of the German security services. From an official standpoint, it was obviously all perfectly legal, so the ship was allowed to leave port, but the containers were sent back to Germany and the German Government compensated the German companies for the loss of the contract. This was a really complex operation that managed to stop Syria's missile ambitions. 2.2. The principal missile programmes of concern to Europe On the basis of what was said in paragraph 1.6, our analysis will be limited to projects and countries that are the most important in terms of European security. While, in the case of Algeria, there is still nothing worthy of note, Egypt, on the contrary, has never forgotten its missile plans and is endeavouring to obtain an autonomous capability. Although some projects (e.g. the Condor-BADR-2000) have now been finally stopped, Egypt has noteworthy potential and technology. There are, for instance, two main projects, although these are progressing very slowly, the first relating to a 450 km range weapon with a 1 000 kg warhead (Project T) and the second a 600 km range weapon with a 450 kg warhead (Vector). Project T could take as a starting point Scud-B, as modified by ABD (Arab British Dynamics), with enlarged fuel tanks and the use of lighter, more advanced materials. Vector could be broadly equivalent to Scud-C. Egypt is also producing Scud-Bs locally, in a plant near Heliopolis. The current state of international relations between Egypt and western countries is certainly facilitating the transfer of and access to the most advanced technology, but equipment and materials can also be obtained through Russia. The most serious concern in the Mediterranean basin is centred on Libya and Syria. A few years ago, Libya made an effort to deploy SSMs capable of striking Israel and Europe. Scud-Bs are considered inadequate and there are thus sound reasons for a massive effort to acquire more powerful weapons. The first programme was aimed at the development of a 600 km missile in the same class as the Scud-C produced by North Korea or the Chinese M-9. These efforts have never progressed beyond the initial stages. There are also a number of programmes aimed at modifying Scud-B or developing new weapons with solid or liquid propellant with a range up to and well in excess of 1 000 km. The most famous of these projects is certainly Al Fatah, a liquid propellant missile, with a 500 kg warhead and a range not far from the target of 1 000 km. All these autonomous programmes are far from the operational stage. To fill this gap, also taking account of the many problems encountered with national programmes, Libya has knocked on North Korea's door, asking for the Ro-Dong 1. According to some western sources, this missile, capable of carrying a 1 000 kg warhead with a 1 000 km range, might be in Libyan hands. Syria is conducting several programmes, mainly aimed at Israel, but today alarmingly dangerous even for Europe. Large numbers of Scud-B SSMs and SSC-1B anti-ship Sepals were procured from the Soviet Union. Subsequently there was the short-range tactical SS-21, followed by the Chinese M-11 (solid propellant, 300 km range, 500 kg warhead) and the more highly-capable M-9 (600 km and 500 kg). The most threatening development is the acquisition of autonomous production capability for Scud-Cs (600 km and 500 kg) thanks to the help and assistance of North Korea which, apart from the SSMs, supplied technology and plant. There are also rumours of national programmes for developing SSMs with a 300 to 500 km range. There may be an underground production facility near Aleppo while, in Hama, there may be a factory working on the production of guidance systems. While not of immediate concern for Europe, the Iranian missile programmes are so ambitious that they require detailed analysis. This is not just because the weapons can or could in a matter of years reach every target in the Middle East but also because missiles and technology could be transferred to friendly Islamic governments in the Mediterranean, not forgetting that the final objective also involves long-range missiles. In the short-range SSM area, there is a fully autonomous production capability, symbolised by the experimental Fajr-3 with a 150 km range and the Chinese CSS-8, which is operational and locally produced. A substantial number of Scud-Bs were procured from North Korea and the Soviet Union and M-9s from China. Co- operation with North Korea has grown, allowing the local assembly of the 600 km Scud-C, while there is a total knock-down capability to produce Scud-B. Some reports suggest the existence of a project, with the co-operation of China or North Korea, aimed at a 1 000 km, 400 kg warhead Tondar-68. On the basis of this information, transatlantic alarm seems fully justified, as is the call for the application of several controls on the export of goods to this Islamic regime. 2.3. How to counter proliferation What possibilities do Europe and the West have to eliminate the missile threat? From a purely military standpoint we can discuss the merits of a pre-emptive, Israeli-style solution: precise air and/or missile attacks targeted on the destruction of missile ramps, warehouses, assembly centres and production plants. Unfortunately, even if such a solution were politically acceptable, the real effect of even massive attacks is questionable because there are too many targets and many of them are heavily defended by air defence systems or placed in reinforced bunkers or even underground facilities. Another option is deterrence, confronting the aggressor with a sword of Damocles in the form of devastating retaliation. In any event, we must not make the mistake of adopting western criteria for assessing the hypothetical behaviour of countries whose culture is totally different from that of the West: people believing they can go to heaven by falling in battle against hated infidels are not really scared by this kind of threat. An active defence system capable of detecting, identifying and destroying missiles en route for Europe will, admitting that such a system is ever developed, have reduced capabilities in terms of efficiency and coverage. If the enemy could field SSMs with chemical or nuclear warheads, the few missiles evading the defences would be capable of inflicting enormous damage. An active defence system is, in any event, activated once the missiles are launched into the sky. It is even more difficult to plan a passive defence system which is adequate to shield the entire civilian population: here we are talking of a gigantic infrastructure effort involving astronomical expenditure. In Europe, probably only Switzerland can rely on a scattered network of effective shelters. The process of missile capability procurement must therefore be made as difficult as possible. For this purpose, political and economic instruments and a number of stringent control rules can be applied in order to avoid the technology concerned being exported to developing countries. The West cannot be said to have reacted to the missile proliferation threat in time. The MTCR (missile technology control regime) was signed only in April 1987. This was not a formal treaty but an agreement calling on signatories not to export certain goods, complete missiles and technology and to stop trade in them. Seven countries signed the agreement in 1987: the United States, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and Italy. Twenty-three countries are now participating in the MTCR agreement and discussions are being held with several others. The MTCR regime is limited to systems with a range of not less than 300 km and a payload of 500 kg or more. Thanks to the MTCR, it has been possible to set up an international forum to co-ordinate the fight against proliferation and to exchange information. Satisfactory results have been achieved, but the sophistication of procurement structures and the broader base of suppliers makes controls more difficult every day. Today those who are shopping for technology and materials are looking for sub-components that are freely available on the market, not included in MTCR lists and not easily connected with missile programmes. Furthermore, general economic progress now makes it very easy to diversify sources of supply, the United States and Western Europe having, at least to some extent, been abandoned in favour of Asian or Eastern European countries which are most industrialised. Too many countries are not acceding to the MTCR and will never accept any restrictions on their imports. Steps are being taken in reaction to this. In particular, there is a move towards extending the boundaries of the treaty to include warheads of over 150 kg. (A lot of SSMs effectively have a range over the 300 km ceiling but are excluded from the MTCR because they have a payload of less than 500 kg.) It would be most appropriate if not just ballistic SSMs but also cruise missiles were regarded as equally dangerous. Blocking the transfer of such systems and technology is even more difficult, but paying attention to ballistic missiles alone is counter- productive: there is a definite risk of producing a new form of the same, traditional threat to global security. Another major instrument might be the introduction of a special provision in commercial law in MTCR countries allowing governments to stop the transfer or sale of any material whatsoever, even if it is not subject to any mandatory export authorisation, if there is a risk for state security. This sort of catch-all clause could be very effective; if we review the Waalhaven case, we can see that the ship was stopped only thanks to the new ruling under German export law which introduced this kind of legal provision just in time, in 1992. The introduction of a new system to take the appropriate decisions within the MTCR framework is also really important: there is a definite need for a mechanism that allows the MTCR nations to order (by a majority vote) a stop to the export of specific systems and technology from a member state to a third country if there is a real risk of missile proliferation. Today, every partner in the MTCR is able to decide autonomously in cases of different interpretations of systems of clauses and rules which are not really stringent. There are good examples of what could be done. We can, for instance, look at what is done in respect of the proliferation of nuclear technology. The MTCR countries should also be able to apply common sanctions against countries anying to obtain missiles or forbidden technology illegally: we suggest that consideration be given to a system of commercial sanctions (including a selective ban on exports towards the country concerned) along the lines of the sanctions ordered by the State Department of the United States in July 1992 against Syria and North Korea for a two-year period. The effect of these sanctions might have been greater if they had been adopted not only by the United States but by all the MTCR countries and given adequate publicity. The United States is also calling for the application of even more punitive sanctions against countries such as Libya and Iran, going as far as a general commercial and technological embargo. Stopping all commercial relations would prevent sensitive technology and components from falling into the wrong hands, at least where western countries are concerned. This would be perfect, but we know that there are a number of alternative suppliers and every sanction and the level of pressure to be applied have to be decided after a case-by-case assessment. For United States industry, losing the Libyan or Iranian markets is probably not too important (and it will be interesting to follow United States decisions on the proposed sale of Boeing 737 airliners to Iran) while, for many Western European countries, trade with those countries is not at all marginal. On the contrary, the United States has very good reasons not to punish a number of countries that, from a European standpoint, could, without hesitation, be punished by a global embargo. It is admittedly difficult to find a solution palatable to all those concerned without affecting the special interests of one or another. 2.4. Conclusions and prospects Missile proliferation today is a dramatic source of concern. It is not wise to place much hope in control structures since proliferation would, at the very best, be slowed down slightly but not stopped. History teaches us that efforts to prevent "minor" countries having access to advanced weapons systems have, in the medium term, been regularly frustrated. This is not meant to suggest that nothing can be done. It is always important to co-ordinate and share intelligent approaches to be followed and to stop the efforts of countries trying to obtain or increase their missile capabilities. The end of the cold war is now releasing large reserves of personnel and resources that can be redirected to cope with new threats. Disarmament and arms control agreements need to be strengthened and made mandatory, while time-wasting interpretative discussions should be abandoned. We need to maintain a credible military potential that can, at least partially, act as a deterrent and dissuasive instrument against potential aggressors. Military capabilities have to be maintained at a level that makes a missile attack inconvenient or definitely disadvantageous. Obviously military power has real value only if there is definite, generally recognised willingness to retaliate in the event of an aggression. Political and economic pressure can be used to try to slow down or stop missile proliferation. Active defence systems are to be regarded as another option, but the cost and complexity of these systems is so great that an operational system will be unable to ensure global coverage or a high degree of probability of stopping a possible missile attack. There is no ideal answer to the problem; it is better to try to implement a range of measures simultaneously that will, in any event, reduce but not eliminate the threat. To forget the whole problem might have dramatic consequences in a few years' time. Something can be done immediately and at relatively low cost and a serious, co-ordinated approach may suffice. Active defence systems can instead be aimed at the medium and long term and will require tremendous investment that only an international framework of co-operation will make possible. Perhaps even more important is the need to make public opinion and governments aware. Without crying that Armageddon is at hand, the phenomenon should be analysed and fought to the greatest possible extent: the danger is a real one. ------------------ The new international order and problems south of the Mediterranean General JEAN (Italy) 1. The new world order It is almost paradoxical to speak of a new world order. The order instituted by Yalta has given way in Europe to the disorder of nations. States in greater numbers have increased their independence. This can be explained by the disappearance of the strategic constraints which the American guarantee granted to Europe imposed on the geo-economic competition between the two shores of the Atlantic. The disintegration of the East makes the process of European integration more difficult. The South no longer counts as much as in the past: it has lost the strategic importance it used to have for the West when Soviet penetration had to be checked, for instance in North Africa, when there were fanciful fears of NATO being circumvented from the South. Furthermore, the South is competing with Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR for obtaining western economic assistance while lacking the latter region's economic importance and politico-strategic weight. It is sufficient in this respect to think of the ethnic conflicts in Europe and the enormous Russian nuclear arsenal which make the stabilisation of the East a priority for the West. The leading classes of the third world have lost their power of blackmail over the West and can no longer seek its assistance in exchange for their opposition to Soviet penetration. Instead, they offer to oppose Islamic fundamentalism, but this approach is less and less credible, although it is still very frequent: President Najibullah of Afghanistan himself adopted this approach with the United States. The only blackmail arguments that can still be used are the danger of massive and uncontrolled immigration in Europe and the propagation of ecological damage and underdevelopment. We had this experience in Italy in the summer of 1991, with the second wave of Albanian refugees which Tirana subsequently exploited to obtain economic assistance. A more fragmented world system is thus taking shape, with competition and conflicts at local and regional levels. New regional poles are forming around leading powers such as Germany in Europe and Japan in the Far East, whilst new antagonisms, in addition to internal struggles of the type ethnic, nationalist and religious, are appearing around the periphery of these geopolitical poles; this is true mainly for states which, like Turkey, belong to different geopolitical regions. It is in this context that we have to analyse the impact of the collapse of bipolarism on the geopolitical stakes in the Mediterranean and the threats to politico-strategic stability in the region and to western interests in order to define possible responses. 2. The incidence of the disappearance of the bipolar system in the Mediterranean area The incidence of the collapse of the Soviet empire on the situation in the Mediterranean has been considerable although less far-reaching than in Central Europe. Less far-reaching because the whole of southern Europe has always had a place in the overall security policy of the United States both within NATO and out-of-area. The bipolar world also had problems such as the awakening of Islam, the Arab-Israeli conflict or the repercussions throughout the Mediterranean of antagonisms between other regions. It is not by chance, moreover, that the scope of the USEUCOM extends far beyond the southern limits of NATO. The incidence of the collapse of the Soviet threat is far from negligible in the Mediterranean too. The incidences are both direct and indirect. The main direct incidences include the radical transformation of Turkey's role, increased fragmentation in the region and the start of a race between Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean countries for obtaining priority in western policies of economic assistance. Direct incidences are the slackening of links between southern and Central Europe, the rise of internal antagonism, greater opposition to the West - mainly because the non- alignment of Islamic countries between the West and the Soviet bloc has lost all significance - and finally the appearance of divergences between Europe and the United States, the latter having become less indispensable for ensuring European security in face of the Soviet threat, on the one hand, and the old continent having lost its importance in the eyes of Washington, on the other. 2.1. Direct incidences (a) The transformation of Turkey's role In the era of bipolarism, Turkey was a bulwark of NATO's eastern flank with the task of stopping the advance of Soviet expansionism towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East. This role suited perfectly well the political line traced by Kemal Atatuerk: secularity of the state, progressive Europeanisation of the country and first priority fr its internal problems. The collapse of the Soviet empire created a power vacuum in the Black Sea, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Khomeini revolution first, then the defeat of Iraq, also gave Turkey increased weight in maintaining a balance in the Gulf and more generally throughout the Middle East. Finally, fighting in ex-Yugoslavia led Turkey to shoulder greater responsibility in the Balkans, as testified by the agreements concluded between Ankara, Tirana and Sofia. This evolution of Turkey's geopolitical role is also reflected in the internal political balance. The process of European integration, mainly political and strategic, is steadily moving Turkey away from Europe. Ankara is beginning to see new possibilities for playing an independent role in the East and in the South by giving priority to goals which increasingly seem to be different from those of Europeans, if not divergent. This process has been accentuated by several factors: Turkey's frustration in regard to Europe, accused of having paid, through greater assistance and integration, the price of the support Ankara gave to the anti-Iraqi coalition; the feeling that Europe is attaching greater importance to integrating EFTA countries and penetration in Central and Eastern Europe; the hesitation of certain European countries about bringing into play the Allied Command Europe air-mobile force during the Gulf crisis; the absence of protection offered to Muslims in Bosnia; the persistence of the dispute with Greece which has been allowed to join the EC and WEU; the anti-Islamic xenophobia of many European countries and the criticism of Ankara in regard to respect of human rights in the context of the Kurdish and Armenian problems. In spite of its economic development and the strengthening of its military apparatus, Turkey cannot act in a totally independent manner, however. The maintenance of internal political balance, moreover, implies maintaining priority for integration in Europe. However, this goal seems more difficult to achieve and less attractive than in the past. (b) The disintegration of the Mediterranean area Since the end of the Roman empire, the Mediterranean basin has never constituted a unitary geopolitical system and relations with outside powers have played a predominant role there. In the era of bipolarism, confrontation between East and West and opposition between the Sixth Fleet and the Fifth Squadron gave some strategic unity to this area, even if bilateral relations with the United States held sway over multilateral contacts in NATO. The disappearance of the Soviet threat brought out specific sub-regional and local characteristics. Only the American presence in the context of the problems of the Arab-Israeli conflict allows some cohesion of the system to be preserved around the United States. In the event of the conflict being settled or the consequent withdrawal - although improbable - of the United States, a completely different situation would be created calling for new solutions to ensure stability and security. An attempt was made in this direction with the proposal to apply a CSCE-type approach to the whole of the Mediterranean. However, the CSCM, which was to establish rules and joint principles starting with a system of regional security and stability, has not managed to prevail due to the instability in the countries of the region, their lack of homogeneity and the conflicts between states which make it impossible to maintain the status quo which is essential for any mutual security agreement. There is another reason, however. This proposal ran counter to the politico-strategic interests of the United States in the region and its irreplaceable task of balancing the instability which the national forces of the region itself could not manage to do at the present time. The unifying influence that used to be exercised by the Soviet threat cannot be equalled by that of the Islamic threat which, as we shall see later, is quite different, in particular because Islam lacks the unity and the force that was characteristic of the USSR. (c) The race for development aid between the Mediterranean and Central and Eastern Europe The end of bipolarism and Moscow's regulating ability in the Soviet empire drew much of the West's financial resources towards the East. The South is feeling the brunt of the world economic crisis and is finding itself pushed increasingly towards the sidelines. Pro-western governments in particular, which to some extent base their internal support on their ability to obtain western aid, feel they are being abandoned. Their only weapons for blackmail and pressure are the so-called Islamic peril and the prospect of uncontrollable waves of immigrants. This situation led to a fragmentation of the Mediterranean region and made a Euro-Arab dialogue more difficult, in particular because, while Europe is moving towards greater unity, the Islamic world has been deeply divided by the war in the Gulf which destroyed the little unity that had existed before. 2.2. Indirect incidences (a) The slackening of southern Europe's links with Central Europe The Soviet threat and the presence of the United States from the North Cape to the Mediterranean linked the West strategically to Central Europe. These links have now slackened. Several states in the centre and north of Europe are inclined to consider the problems of security in the Mediterranean as being problems for the countries of southern Europe. This withdrawal can also be seen, at least potentially, in certain countries such as Italy where a divergence has appeared between continental interests which are subject to the attraction of unified Germany and Mediterranean interests which pull in another direction. Many measures have, in fact, been taken to minimise this split. Germany is taking a more direct interest in security in the Mediterranean, as can be seen from the presence of growing numbers of German naval units. The EC and WEU, each in its sphere of responsibility, have paid growing attention to Mediterranean problems. The accession of Portugal, Spain and Greece to the EC and to WEU has given greater weight to countries of southern Europe in the Community. The extension of the Five plus Five Group to include the EC and Germany and the build-up of the NATO rapid reaction force and NATO's permanent naval force in the Mediterranean with the participation of navies from countries of Central and northern Europe and other such steps are so many positive signs, even if a real crisis would be necessary in order to verify their true significance. Many experts are somewhat sceptical about this because of the hesitation already mentioned in regard to the deployment of the air-mobile force in Turkey during the Gulf crisis and the impact of the disappearance of the Soviet threat on the reliability of the collective western security system. The static arrangements for forward defence included an automatic anti-defection mechanism which guaranteed the cohesion or, if one prefers, the linking of the alliance. Conversely, outside interventions are optional and imply prior political decisions by the various member states. Security being indivisible, allowing a country to benefit from it without paying production costs, there will always be a doubt about the possibility of truly collective retaliation, particularly in the event of a major crisis. The creation of multinational forces is not a cure for such a fundamental political weakness, particularly because there is no true specialisation of their roles. At the present time, only American leadership is capable of guaranteeing western cohesion. As long as this is ensured, Europe will not be absolutely obliged to adopt alternative measures to ensure its security and defence independently. (b) The rise of internal antagonism and instability in Islamic countries The political presence of the USSR and the adoption of a planned economy had stabilised the internal situation of countries such as Algeria, at the same time making the system rigid and creating the conditions for the present collapse. Only one country, Syria, quickly abandoned alliance with the USSR to complete agreements with the United States, profiting by the Gulf crisis and the need to settle the Lebanese conflict. In other countries, the situation has deteriorated, the leading classes trained in Moscow having lost their legitimacy. It is not by chance that leaders of the Algerian FIS have been to French universities. The weakening of Arab nationalism has left the way free for fundamentalism and Islamic solidarity programmes intended to fight against the inefficiency and corruption of the leading classes and against the West, which has been accused of being the true cause of the difficulties throughout the whole of the Islamic world and which is suspected of wishing to maintain the latter in conditions of exploitation and subjection. Even if such anti-western feelings are based on memories of the colonial era, the West's support for Israel and the economic and demographic crisis, it is beyond doubt that the end of bipolarism exacerbated the feeling of frustration throughout Islam. (c) Less cohesion between Europe and the United States The Soviet threat had a unifying effect. Europe's strategic dependence put a brake on geo-economic competition between Europe and the United States and toned down the divergences between European policies and those of Washington towards the Arab world and the conflict in the Middle East. Although European euphoria was considerably dampened by the crisis in the Gulf and in former Yugoslavia and by the difficulties encountered in the process of European integration, there is a possibility of a progressive divergence of interests and policy between Europe and the United States, particularly with regard to Mediterranean problems. 3. The problems of security and stability in the Mediterranean basin: threats and retaliation The problems of security in the Mediterranean basin are only marginally attributable to direct military threats against Europe. Such threats are limited to terrorism that might spread through the millions of Muslims who have emigrated to Western Europe or may lead to air and naval techno-terrorism against the maritime lines of communication in the Mediterranean. Even more serious are airborne threats from missiles and weapons of mass destruction, such threats being at present limited only to southern Europe but in the next ten years will also concern the rest of the continent. Instead of being directed against independent targets, these threats will materialise in regard to western interventions to protect their nationals and economic interests or will take the form of retaliatory measures against humanitarian interventions destined to put an end to massacres and to restore the stability compromised by action by radical Islamic groups. Turkey and Israel are an exception to this analysis. The former may be involved in conflicts either with Iran because of disputes in Central Asia, the Caucasus or Northern Iraq, or because of the backing Tehran accords to Kurdish terrorism. It may also have to face up to Russia, should there be an extension of the conflict between Azeris and Armenians, linked to the Russians by the Tashkent treaty of mutual assistance and security. Israel, for its part, might be dragged into further fighting with the Arab states in the event of the failure of the peace talks and above all of the destabilisation of Egypt and the assumption of power in Cairo by fundamentalist Islamic groups. The West may also be caught up in action to restore peace and to ensure the maintenance of peace throughout the region, for instance, following fighting in the Maghreb or a resumption of Libyan activism against Chad and Tunisia or again if Iran launches an attack against the Gulf states. Apart from military-type threats which fundamentally find their roots in the internal destabilisation of countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, i.e. in the economic and social crisis that might lead to fundamentalist Islamic groups assuming power, the security of the West is threatened by the possibility of a massive influx of immigrants, who might be of two types: either large numbers of poorer classes looking for work or the westernised social classes of North Africa and the Middle East fleeing their country after Islamic revolutions. Again, a blockade of energy supplies by Libya and Algeria might affect important western interests. The impact would be considerable for Italy because of the structure of the network of gas pipelines which makes it difficult to reverse the South to North flow and also the chemical characteristics of Libyan oil which alone can be used by many industries in Italy. One way or another, except in the event of a permanent blockade, which would seem difficult in view of the dependence of the Libyan and Algerian economies on oil exports, the effects could neutralised, although with difficulty, and would certainly not call for military action. This being so, security in the Mediterranean is therefore guaranteed mainly by measures of the preventive type such as development assistance, immigration policies, backing for the political stability and progressive democratisation of the region, with all the limitations that the adoption of a western democratic model may involve in non-secularised Islamic societies based on the Sharia and not statute law. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the interests of short-term stability are in opposition to longer- term interests. Democratisation and political pluralism would in the short term help the accession to power of fundamentalist forces which openly declare that, once in control, they would eliminate the democratic institutions imported from the corrupt West in order to restore the purity of Islamic law. On the other hand, repression can only be a temporary measure. With a state of siege policy, the army and the pro-western political classes would quickly become prisoners of their own society unless they can considerably improve the economic and social living conditions of ever-poorer populations and galloping demography. The risk is always there of the instruments of repression, i.e. the army and the police, sooner or later splitting into opposing factions leading to the outbreak of civil war. Internal instability increases the political danger for western investment and, by limiting such investment, puts a brake on development. In parallel, the corruption of the leading classes increases since they are inevitably induced to transfer money abroad in order to guarantee their future. In brief, the situation is explosive. Explosions of violence will probably occur as will massive emigration towards Europe which will be obliged to repulse these boat people, if only to avoid giving a foothold to right-wing xenophobic movements. The example in Italy of the second wave of Albanian refugees is symptomatic of the situation that might arise; in the event, it was a mini-crisis compared to what might follow and fortunately, not only in Italy but more generally in Europe, those who had to handle the crisis were people of considerable ability who could link firmness with moderation. The so-called Islamic peril is above all an internal peril for Islamic states, but - except for the Gulf region, where it is critical because of essential oil supplies - it is only marginally and indirectly a threat to Europe. The creation of an Islamic bloc and the threat of southern Islam towards christianity is pure invention. Furthermore, western military superiority in the conventional field is total, although firmness and the political determination to use its means in an appropriate manner, i.e. quickly, is less so as has been seen in the case of Yugoslavia. The only real danger is that a progressive radicalisation of the situation, in particular if the Islamic populations residing in Europe are mobilised, might lead to an intense terrorist campaign. The West would have difficulty in reacting with conventional means against states encouraging such a campaign if the latter had missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986, so effective in halting Libya's support for international terrorism, could not be repeated and, in any event, would raise far more problems. Proliferation is, therefore, the main threat and it must be considered as a reality. It can be slowed down but not stopped. Military planning must take it into account here and now. Not that it is desirable to resort systematically to preventive surgical attacks like the Israeli attack against the Iraqi nuclear reactor Osirak, the influence of which was very positive at the time of the Gulf crisis, since it allowed operations against Iraq to be limited. In this respect, however, it is essential for all countries guilty of proliferation to be aware that the West may react in an extremely tough manner, either preventively or by attacks such as the one made against Lampedusa. In this respect, a firm reaction by the international community vis-a-vis North Korea, which has denounced the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, might have beneficial preventive effects on stability in the Mediterranean. Such an initiative would illustrate the danger for any state wishing to procure arms of mass destruction which might constitute a threat to regional and world balance. In this context, Europe should equip itself with operational and information means allowing it to react in the event of proliferation. The existence of American and possibly Franco- British nuclear deterrents - which might be associated with a no first use strategy so as not to appear unduly threatening and aggressive towards the Islamic world - being a fact, it is necessary to procure offensive and defensive conventional capabilities. The offensive capability, that might be either NATO or European, should include an air component, a naval component and a land component capable of using the American Imint and Elint satellite network pending a European capability. The air component should be multinational of the Desert Storm type and, in addition to heavy fighter bombers equipped with precision- guided weaponry against land targets for the suppression of air defences, it should include interceptor and supply aircraft, AWACS and SAR combat aircraft. The naval component should include cruise missiles with conventional warheads in the 600 to 800 km range. The land component should be formed mainly of special forces. The necessary land and air capabilities are already available. Through ad-hoc agreements, WEU should also be able to use NATO's integrated command structure to which it should also be possible to add Spain through more organic links. The air command and control system should be reviewed in the light of the above requirements and NATO's infrastructure programmes should be adapted accordingly. The introduction of means of defence against ballistic missiles encounters major difficulties, particularly in view of the cost. Sooner or later, such means will be essential in view of the uncertainty of a political decision authorising a preventive attack and the disastrous consequences of a nuclear or biological explosion over highly-populated regions of Europe. The anti-missile system linked to the American GPALS should be jointly financed in Europe since the threat and the defence systems for responding to the threat are identical except for terminal, zonal or theatre defence systems. We shall not examine this question in greater detail in the framework of this address since other speakers will develop it further. It is enough to emphasise here that such an initiative, even taken independently from any other, has a usefulness of its own and would also be a stimulant and tangible encouragement for the European defence identity. Its political impact would perhaps be greater than that of establishing the future WEU satellite reconnaissance system. Even if implemented in co-operation with the United States, this European defence initiative would be specifically European and not NATO: in other sectors, as for conventional deterrence combat forces, European security might be ensured more effectively by NATO. 4. Regional organisations for security and co-operation in the Mediterranean In the Mediterranean area, there are no collective institutions such as the CSCE or NACC which bring unity to European security along the East-West axis. In spite of the efforts and progress made, WEU's capabilities are very limited, on the one hand because of the still low level of European political integration and the political differences already reported between the states of Central and Northern Europe and those of the Mediterranean, and, on the other hand, because the reduction of European defence budgets will not allow Europe to equip itself, in the near future, with the information, operational and logistic means now provided by the United States. The task of NATO is still therefore fundamental; its territorial limits laid down by the Washington Treaty clearly refer to the place where an attack occurs and not the origin of the attack. If, for instance, a missile launched from the Sudan struck Italy, NATO would certainly have the right to destroy the launching pad. There are other institutions for co-operation and security: the Euro-Arab dialogue between the European Community and the Arab League; the Five plus Five Group for the western Mediterranean to which the European Community and Germany belong; the MAU (Maghreb Arab Union) which has started a regional dialogue and which, at the Casablanca conference in October 1991, laid the foundations for its institutionalisation; the Mediterranean conference, which has taken interesting co- operative initiatives in ecology and civil protection. Finally, the CSCM proposal was made to adapt to Mediterranean countries a collective security system similar to that of the CSCE. All these organisations and initiatives are certainly useful for promoting co-operation, fostering development and dialogue and averting tension. However, the elaboration of an effective system of co-operation and mutual security in the Mediterranean based either on security- and confidence-building measures or on structural measures for reducing armaments is encountering considerable objective difficulties. In reality, acceptance of the status quo is an essential condition for any collective security agreement. The situation in the Mediterranean, on the North-South axis, is very different from that which prevailed in Europe between the two blocs. In the North is a stable, united, powerful alliance. In the South, on the other hand, there is instability and fragmentation. Furthermore, Islamic solidarity comes into play between peoples and not between governments which are nationalistic and believe they are in duty bound to defend themselves against each other and against external threats to the region. If Saudi Arabia builds up its armaments to defend itself against Iran, it automatically increases the threat to Israel and so on and so forth. Any global security agreement in the Mediterranean means, in the last resort, solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. For all these reasons, the Italian-Spanish proposal made in Palma de Majorca for the creation of the CSCM has not been very successful but it does not deserve to be abandoned. In the long term, it offers a general method and approach to local sub-regional and regional agreements. It will be possible to achieve such an agreement only with moderation and caution, as and when the conditions are determined; above all, care should be taken not to hamper the action of the United States which is fundamental for balance and stability throughout the region. In fact, it is rightly feared in Washington that the CSCM, as at the time, the CSCE, might push NATO to the sidelines and reduce its flexibility of intervention. One way or another, it would be possible to act in certain sectors: in confidence-building measures to avoid misunderstanding and the possibility of surprise attacks, in that of an agreement between countries which export armaments and sensitive technology to take account of the requirements of security in the region, in non-military sectors of security such as ecology and civil protection. For example, the installation of a system for monitoring the environment at regional level, with the European countries providing services to those on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, might be very useful for promoting collaboration in areas in which there is a broad convergence of interest between all the Mediterranean countries. This would be a regional programme which might be integrated, as was underlined by the Italian defence minister at the WEU meeting held in Rome at the end of March 1990, in the global IDNDR (International Decade for National Disaster Relief) programme of the United Nations. Thanks to the use of polyvalent satellites, it would be possible to help to increase links between the countries on the shores of the Mediterranean in the few sectors of co-operation which are acceptable to all and on which the Mediterranean basin shows considerable unity. Moreover, the provision of services and systems would guarantee the West against the proliferation of technology and the transfer of means of information which are critical for its own security. To sum up, Europe can tackle the problems of security in the Mediterranean in various ways. It might adopt the following measures: (a) installation of a multilateral safety belt to protect itself against the instability and crisis prevalent among the countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean, priority being granted, inter alia, to deterring clandestine immigration, at least until Europe has solved the problems of Eastern Europe and can concentrate its efforts on the development of the South; (b) mainly bilateral co-operation between the various western countries and countries of the South, the latter being divided into areas of economic influence; this would be supported by regional policing countries such as Egypt and Turkey backed by mobile reinforcements provided mainly by the United States; encouragement would be given to policies of co-operation and development directed initially towards the economic interests of each of the European countries; (c) multilateral co-operation in security, the economy, demography etc. centred on development assistance. The third solution, i.e. multilateral co-operation, particularly in terms of stability and security, is certainly the most effective and the one that would lead to the greatest stability. Co-operation does not exclude deterrence, however, which is, moreover, a necessary condition for the effectiveness of co- operation. In order to avert instability and conflicts, the West must ensure that there is a capability for intervention and deterrence and consequently must maintain its strategic flexibility. Clearly, security cannot take the place of a policy of co-operation. Apart from the fact that it is an obligation of states to guarantee the protection of their own nationals, the combination of deterrence and co-operation should not provoke negative reactions in the countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Just as the populations of Central and Eastern Europe are grateful to the West for not having bowed to Soviet threats, similarly the Arab nations would be grateful if it does not give in to the blackmail of Islamic fundamentalism, particularly if they manage to respond with moderation and without resorting to other forms of fundamentalism. In this context, a main fact of security in the Mediterranean is not so much a question of demonstrating strength; it is rather a question of deterring the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Since this can only be slowed down and not stopped once and for all, the creation of a conventional deterrent force, on the one hand, and a European anti-missile defence initiative, on the other, are the necessary components of security in the Mediterranean after the end of the period of bipolarity. --------------- Situating the problem Mr. ANDO (Minister of Defence of Italy) First I wish to welcome the members of the WEU Assembly to Rome and to express my approval of this initiative which will allow a question that is most important for Europe's security and future to be studied in greater depth. Events in recent years have considerably diminished the hopes of firm international stability raised by the end of the cold war. In spite of major changes in the politico-strategic situation in Europe, we have reduced the prospects of generalised conflict and, inter alia, restored to foreign policy a whole series of means and instruments that had been absent for more than forty years; however, in fact, far from diminishing, breeding grounds of conflict and regional and local tension, long-standing or born of positive transformations, have increased, also involving states possessing weapons of mass destruction or on the point of obtaining them. We can all see the consequences of the situation with our own eyes. This is, moreover, not unconnected with the delay in ratifying or fully applying major treaties aimed at enhancing the stability of the world order, an aim that we are all anxious to see achieved. Our continent is in fact in a transitional period which will probably last a long time, marked by great opportunities but also by the risk of new tension that a country like Italy feels especially, turned as it is not only towards Central Europe and the Balkans but also the Mediterranean and Middle East, regions that are by definition unstable. This fluctuating period of transformation must be cut short as soon as possible by giving shape to the new security architecture that was designed as the blocs fell and at last organising relations between the various institutions that will have to build it. To ensure that these efforts are effective, we must first oppose the proliferation of weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction or those using advanced technology. I am convinced that we must pay atttention as a matter of priority to these most disturbing phenomena and, in the relevant bodies, strive to set up the political and technical instruments that will allow proliferation to be mastered, limited and, it is to be hoped, eliminated. However, it must not be forgotten that it can also be discouraged by defensive means that would play a deterrent role vis-a-vis possible blackmail and convince countries in the danger areas of the uselessness of their arms race. This premise being made, in the new security architecture to which I have just referred the United Nations and the CSCE will have to be the principal political references. The United Nations is proving increasingly capable of intervention, although it is reasonable to think that, at least in the near future, it will continue to rely on the military means of member countries, in particular through collective institutions to which the latter belong. It is enough to think of the crisis prevailing in former Yugoslavia and the fact that the United Nations had to resort to NATO and, where the embargo is concerned, to WEU. For these various reasons, there is no doubt that the two western organisations will play a leading role by laying the foundations of a new system of European security. These organisations, a feature of which is the complementarity of their structures and resources, associated with a sharing of tasks and responsibilities that will avoid competition or mistrust, will truly become the pillars of a stable, peaceful Europe, while pursuing an intelligent policy of co-operation and dialogue with the Central and Eastern European countries, including Russia. WEU in particular will have to be able to back the political action of the Twelve by all appropriate operational means so as to make it possible for integrated Europe to bring its full weight to bear. I thought it useful to describe briefly the politico- strategic data marking this stage in international life and hence to help to circumscribe the question that is the subject of your symposium. Europe will have an even stronger political personality if it is able to act secure from the threat of tactical missiles carrying conventional weapons or, still worse, chemical, bacteriological or even nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, there is no denying that it is wise to study means of defending our territory and forces against the threat from this type of device. The growing effectiveness of means of delivery and the increase in the number of countries which have missiles have led to a change in the traditional concept of deterrence which no longer seems able to meet this type of threat at regional level. This was confirmed by the Gulf war. The contribution of WEU, encouraged by the Assembly, therefore seems most timely. It should be recalled that Italy, even before the blocs collapsed and as soon as a new type of East-West relations emerged with Gorbachev's rise to power, had advocated a strategic concept no longer based solely on the balance of offensive nuclear weapons. We believed, on the contrary, that it was possible to achieve strategic balance based on an appropriate mix of offensive and defensive means, at the lowest possible level. Our position was defined in the days when President Reagan was launching the strategic defence initiative, which heralded, at conceptual and technological level, the current debate and projects relating to anti-missile defence. Italy's interest in the United States' proposal to its allies for setting up a global anti-missile defence system is in direct line with this initiative. What we find particularly attractive in the American offer is the prospect of opening the project to a whole range of countries, including Russia. We appreciate the stabilisation possibilities of this step. From the perhaps impulsive ambitious SDI to the more realistic GPALS, the various American initiatives have raised the very real problem of security, which has serious consequences for Europe and should also be studied from our point of view. I shall recall certain aspects of the problem later in my address, tackling briefly the aspects relating to: - the context of the threat to Europe, especially its southern flank; - the fight against the proliferation of armaments, particularly weapons of mass destruction; - the possible use of an anti-missile defence system as a confidence- and hence stability-building measure. Apart from those I have just mentioned, other questions are worthy of attention: - the effects of an anti-missile system for the alliances; - the possible consequences of space-based weapons, with particular reference to the ABM Treaty; - the importance of the industrial and financial aspects. I believe that studies in NATO and WEU, far from duplicating each other, are coming just at the right time if we are to tackle the various problems linked with anti-missile defence from a standpoint that is both Atlantic and European. The twofold role played by WEU should also be recalled; it is the European pillar of NATO and is destined to become the defence pillar of the European Community. This dual position is an advantage that should not be abandoned. It allows WEU to assess an anti-missile defence system first as a means of defending specifically European aims and second as part of the joint defence of the North Atlantic area. The vulnerability of the allies to the threat of tactical missiles may differ depending on their respective geographical positions on one side or other of the Atlantic; however, this difference must not be a reason for weakening cohesion in the area covered by the treaty instituting NATO. It is therefore legitimate to examine Europe's specific strategic-military situation as a region marked by very great instability, be it internal or due to events in far-off parts of the world. The Iraqi crisis showed the dangers inherent in the reckless policy of certain neighbouring states or states near to Europe's southern flank. According to reliable studies, in the late nineties there will be no less than fifteen Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries able to possess tactical or theatre ballistic missiles and some of them will be able to equip these missiles not only with chemical and biological but also nuclear warheads. This situation is a definite threat to Europe's entire southern flank and makes countries such as Italy extremely vulnerable: they are in the presence of a military threat fed by religious fanaticism, nationalist aspirations, adverse economic and social conditions and ethnic conflicts which, associated with growing over-population, might induce some regimes to behave irrationally. A very topical case will give us a revealing example. As a result of the conflict prevailing in former Yugoslavia, Italy naturally increased its state of alert in respect of its air space and anti-terrorist surveillance. However, one may wonder about the implications from a military security standpoint of the absence of protection against the possible threat of missiles, a threat which should admittedly not be dramatised but which cannot be ruled out completely. Without forgetting our obligation to give priority to the search for political solutions to crises, it would be prudent, in order to ensure our security and general stability, to acquire the necessary defensive means of facing risks and discouraging the arms race. As I said earlier, the fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the related technology must be pursued by appropriate means, be they national or international, if we wish to prevent the export or smuggling of such weapons. However, such means alone might prove inadequate. The difficulties certain countries have in controlling their own arsenals are well known just as we frequently see critical economic situations pushing many states to acquire strong currencies by all possible means, which hardly encourages some exporters to coanti-missile protection, mainly the detection and monitoring components, might be able to carry out some of the following essential functions: - observing, possibly with the assistance of its sensors, the proliferation of missiles in relevant areas; - deterring states intending to use their capabilities for terrorist intimidation purposes from taking any such action; - on a reciprocal basis, offering a guarantee to countries participating in the system. A defence system restricted to the North Atlantic or NATO Europe might fulfil the first of these two functions; conversely, if the system of protection were to be global and open to the participation of other countries, even if they had different levels of economic and technological means, it might fulfil all three functions. By this I mean that globalisation -and I use this word to indicate a tendency and not an immediately attainable goal - of such a protective network might encourage greater confidence and subsequently give rise to a mechanism allowing crises to be controlled. The need to increase confidence is confirmed by the growth, in and around Europe, of tensions and conflicts that are often marked by great violence. Of course, it would be hazardous and not very realistic to claim that an anti-missile defence system could, at a wave of the hand, create stability and avert crises. However, it would certainly be possible to curb attempted abuses of power or escalation of force to attain political aims by rendering such moves ineffective from the outset. The situation I have just described - and here I turn to the second part of my consideration - confirms what I said at the beginning: there may be two types of anti-missile defence, differing not by their architecture, which is essentially the same in both cases, but by the extent of participation in establishing them. Indeed, a system can be studied that would meet the requirements of the European member countries of NATO and WEU or a network bringing together a larger number of nations. In each case, there must be close co-ordination between WEU and NATO where an anti-missile defence system is now under study. As I said at the beginning of my address, it would be very dangerous for Atlantic circles and Europeans to move towards different security goals or strategic concepts. In the event of a defence architecture being considered for a wider geographical area than that of the members of the Atlantic Alliance, I believe it would be natural to think of the CSCE framework. However, one might go further and take a wider region as a reference. One might imagine setting up a system covering part of the African continent, where conflicts are almost permanent, or the Middle East, as a result of lessons learned from the Gulf war, or, finally, the Far East. In the latter part of the world a dangerous proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has begun which, associated with increasingly sophisticated ballistic technology, may lead to a perilous nuclear arms race, even in countries which had hitherto refrained from such a course. All these circumstances are liable to cause conflicts which, however far away, would inevitably have worldwide repercussions. I would suggest another subject for you to think about, i.e. the link between anti-missile defence systems and the possible modification of the ABM Treaty and the problem of the militarisation of space. The ABM Treaty is in principle a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, whose commitments were passed on to Russia and the other successor states of the Soviet empire having nuclear weapons (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine). This treaty was signed at a time when the number of countries able to procure ballistic technology or produce weapons of mass destruction was relatively small. Under the ABM Treaty, the purpose was mainly to make the major part of the territory of each of the superpowers hostage to the strategic missiles of the other. The situation has now changed. When talking of anti- missile defence systems, one now thinks of the threat of tactical means of delivery, normally with conventional warheads but which can be equipped with more devastating warheads - chemical, bacteriological or even nuclear - even of limited power. One also thinks of a more dispersed threat, not limited to the reciprocal threat between the only two countries which, at that time, ensured the balance of terror and world peace. The new circumstances should encourage the attainment of a consensus thanks to which it would be possible to achieve a different strategic situation: on the one hand, there would be greater recourse to the strategic arsenal than authorised by the ABM Treaty and, on the other hand, we should have to avoid a dangerous, pointless and costly space-based arms race that might at present be attempted by "risk" countries. The last but not least topic for reflection concerns the industrial, technological and financial aspects of establishing an anti-missile defence network. Such a network, whatever its concept and magnitude, will clearly require considerable investment, which is difficult in a time of generalised economic crisis. On the other hand, our security and the stability of the world are too valuable to be neglected on the basis of a simple economic calculation. Hence a balanced solution will have to be found that takes account of justified industrial and technological aims while being economically advantageous. Bringing together in this undertaking WEU countries that have homogeneous economic and industrial systems and closely converging interests would allow us to work on firm bases and provide an opportunity for reflection: if necessary, NATO should be allowed to benefit from it since it receives the flow of the financial, technological and industrial resources of the United States and Canada. Once again, Europe's legitimate industrial and technological aspirations will have to be reconciled with awareness that, at a time of serious economic difficulties, we must avail ourselves of all possible synergy. Larger-scale programmes in which countries with different economic and technological levels would also participate obviously raise various problems which can nevertheless be solved with strong political determination. A system of such magnitude, even if based on technology that is very advanced in relation to the capabilities of all possible participants, must allow each one to contribute actively within the limits of its respective possibilities while guaranteeing valuable economies of scale. Moreover, if we consider it probable - in view of the time required - to extend a future anti-missile defence system, how can we think of leaving out countries far from our own but technologically advanced such as Japan, for instance? Or other countries whose resources would allow them to make a valid, effective contribution not only at technological but also, and above all, at political level in view of the influence some of them exercise in certain parts of the world? These considerations underline the importance, to which I have already referred, of thinking about the dimension of a future anti-missile defence system. Without closing our eyes to the fact that there may be objections that are far from superficial, we must bear in mind the positive aspects, from the standpoint of stability and crisis prevention, of an "open" system and the advantages from which we would benefit by avoiding widening still more the present gap between north and south. To sum up, it must not be forgotten that an anti-missile defence system restricted to the NATO area or Western Europe in the light of the similarity of security interests, behaviour and technological and financial capabilities, might, in the outside world, be considered not as an instrument of defence and stability but as a means of aggression and coercion. Conversely, allowing countries with different orientations and geographical situations to use a protective shield is justified by the will to give them a means of observing each other and, in the longer term, increasing their mutual confidence and curbing the arms race. By this means, wealthier and technologically more advanced states and regions will be able to meet those which are less favoured. This system is therefore really one that can contribute to detente and stability. So we must now start to examine the aspects that will, in any event, require more detailed analysis later. The questions I have just raised will have a decisive influence in carrying out the project. Suitable solutions must therefore be sought through various types of agreement and co-operation (both bi- and multilateral) providing a fair return for each participant. In this context, I believe the WEU partners can and must play a decisive role in associating political prospects and necessarily diverse industrial and technological requirements. I have been able to mention only a few aspects of the topic to be discussed at the symposium today. I am sure the in-depth thinking that is to follow will allow very valid ideas to be contributed to the discussions. However, there is no doubt that the subject you are to tackle is vast and complex. As a representative of the WEU Chairmanship-in-Office, I can assure you that the governments will study attentively the conclusions you reach and they will draw upon them in pursuing their work. With that assurance, I express my very sincere wishes for the success of your initiative. ------------- The evolution of the military situation in Eastern Eurasia Mr. TAN ENG BOK (Charge de recherche, CNRS, France) There are three main aspects to the military situation in eastern Eurasia: the military and strategic consequences of the dismantling of the Soviet Union; the regional repercussions of the security options of the People's Republic of China; and the political and strategic facts stemming from North Korea's nuclear programme. Military and strategic developments as a result of the dismantling of the Soviet Union directly affect Western European security. They relate in particular to current changes in the European part of the former Soviet Union. But the evolution of the situation to the east of the Mediterranean also involves risks for European security. Because of the growing interdependence of advanced economies in the industrialised world to which Western Europe belongs, the latter can hardly ignore the repercussions of upheavals that may occur in eastern Asia. Military and strategic consequences of the disappearance of the Soviet Union The disappearance of the Soviet Union first led to the return of its principal successor state, Russia, to the international stage. It also gave birth to a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with an uncertain life span. For the Russian military, the major consequence of the disappearance of the Soviet Union, preceded by the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, can be summed up in the following remark by General Grachev. "On the basis of the Warsaw Pact, we created the first and principal strategic area... When the two German states were unified and the Warsaw Pact collapsed, the principal defensive sector shifted towards the frontiers of our state... Following Ukraine's immediate privatisation of the three military districts on its territory, we are now in an exceptionally difficult situation... That is not all. We are now in a wholly unprecedented situation. The Moscow military district has effectively become a frontier military district."(6) This being so, Russia retains considerable nuclear and conventional power while the reductions agreed to correspond mainly to three requirements: (i) continuing to possess only recent equipment to rationalise management and improve logistic support; (ii) releasing more resources in order to develop better-performance weapons systems; and (iii) ensuring, in principle as from 1999, the inevitable transition towards a necessarily "small", but entirely professional, army, which alone can master the advanced technology of new equipment demonstrated in the Desert Storm operation. Furthermore, certain Russian concessions such as the elimination, by 2003, of fixed SS-18 intercontinental missiles may be explained by the fact that their means of delivery are manufactured in Pavlograd and Dnepropetrovsk, i.e. in Ukraine. Conversely, for the armed forces so often described as prey to the most complete disarray, the withdrawal of former Soviet occupation forces from reunified Germany in accordance with the planned time-table makes one wonder about the Russian army's true state of cohesion. Similarly, in the military space area alone, in 1992 Russia launched practically twice as many missions as the United States while the present Russian space vigil project represents a capability equal to that of the former Soviet Union at the height of the cold war (7). Finally, Boris Yeltsin has announced an increase of 10% in expenditure earmarked for the production of new weapons in the 1993 budget (8). The 1992 draft Russian military doctrine also raises a number of questions. How can we interpret a text which not only continues, admittedly in veiled terms, to consider the United States and NATO as the major military threat but goes so far as to envisage, in certain conditions, the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons in response to an attack, even non- nuclear? Moreover, Russian armed forces will no longer be restricted exclusively to a defensive strategy; they must be prepared "to fight all kinds of military action, both defensive and offensive ... to bring down the aggressor ... and grasp the strategic initiative" (9). In other words, this text is well behind compared with that of the draft Soviet military doctrine issued in 1990. The result of two irretrievably opposing objectives, the CIS is but one stage in the break-up of the Soviet Union. The Russians consider the CIS should help to reconstitute the empire. For the Ukrainians, on the other hand, the CIS is merely a transitional stage on the way to complete independence and it is above all in this framework that should be set, in the absence of serious international guarantees, their parliament's reticence to ratify the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the strategic arms reduction treaty and the Lisbon Protocol to the latter (10). Parallel with these two aims, the CIS is in the throes of ethnic clashes and civil war. Among these ethnic conflicts, the fighting between Armenians and Azerbaijanis for gaining control of Nagorno-Karabakh brings risks of internationalisation involving Turkey (11), a member of NATO, and Iran. Regional repercussions of the security orientations of the People's Republic of China The disappearance of the East-West confrontation more or less led to that of the "great strategic triangle" between Washington Beijing and Moscow although, in practice, some triangular interaction has survived, but to a lesser degree. Conversely, new triangles have emerged or are about to do so, in the following terms: relatively good Sino-Japanese relations; fairly tense Sino-American and American-Japanese relations; and Russo-Japanese relations in the process of changing. This new security environment is helping to dispel the rigidity produced in the People's Republic of China following the disappearance of the "great strategic triangle" in international policy in general and in Sino-American relations in particular. Conversely, Beijing is starting to be concerned about the new trend in Japanese diplomacy towards a more active, not to say interventionist, role in the framework, admittedly, of "peace-keeping". Beijing considers that the basis of national security is still the preservation of internal political stability accompanied by the pursuit of economic prosperity (12). From this point of view, the Chinese Government has obtained satisfactory results which are not limited just to the growth of GNP. In twelve years of reforms, Chinese economic structures have changed considerably: in 1978, agriculture accounted for 42% of Chinese GNP, industry 38% and services 20%; in 1990, the proportions were 30%, 45% and 25% respectively. Modernisation of defence has not been forgotten, which is disturbing for its neighbours, particularly in south-east Asia. For the fourth consecutive year, the People's Republic of China has increased its military expenditure, at least in terms of nominal growth more or less covered by inflation. The two priority sectors are the air force and navy but, in this connection, the efforts should be set in a regional framework of overall modernisation (13). Thus, Beijing has ordered Su-27s and is exploring the possibility of producing MiG-31s under licence, but to date it has received only 24 Su-27s out of a total that is not to exceed 60 aircraft. In comparison Seoul has ordered 120 F-16s and Taipei 150 F-16s and 60 Mirage 2000-5s, to mention only those two countries. In the naval sector, the Chinese programme seems modest compared with that of its neighbours in northern Asia or the Republic of China (Taiwan), with 8 Oliver Hazard Perry frigates and 16 Lafayette frigates. Here, it should also be pointed out that Indonesia is considering procuring 39 surface craft - frigates, landing craft and mine-sweepers - from Germany. However, it is true that Chinese claims in the South China Sea cover a vast area and are a source of concern to other countries around its shores. The last point concerns the possible role of the People's Republic of China vis-a-vis nuclear and ballistic proliferation in the third world. Apart from the power station already delivered to Algeria, the People's Republic should be supplying Iran and Pakistan with a 300 MW nuclear reactor each. However, China has announced that these technology transfers will be carried out under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This appears to show a new tendency among Chinese defence industries, which are trying to offset the reduction in their arms exports by transfers of advanced civil technology. The part played by China in ballistic proliferation is more difficult to circumscribe. It seems certain that the People's Republic is supplying technical co-operation to Iran and Pakistan for the development of theatre ballistic missiles. However, Beijing agreed, albeit with some reluctance, to comply with the missile technology control regime (MTCR) in November 1991. It ought, therefore, to be ascertained whether China's co-operation with Iran and Pakistan predates its tacit acceptance of the MTCR. Generally speaking, however, it seems difficult for the West in general, and the United States in particular, to want China to ensure that it does not undermine western security by encouraging nuclear and ballistic proliferation in the third world when, according to Beijing, security is affected by sales of arms to Taipei by the western powers. Political and strategic facts stemming from the North Korean nuclear programme The various stages and components of the North Korean nuclear programme since the outset are relatively well known through the general press and specialised publications (14). The same cannot be said of the reasons that induced Pyongyang to launch and pursue such a programme. The North Korean regime has always proclaimed that it was seeking to denuclearise the peninsula, i.e. in concrete terms the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons deployed in the south (15). Its aim was attained in 1991 with the American decision to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons deployed throughout the world and this was confirmed by President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea in a declaration of 18th December (16). North Korea subsequently signed the nuclear guarantee agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 30th January 1992 followed by a joint declaration for a non-nuclear Korean peninsula on 18th February. Pyongyang's latest U-turn would be surprising if data specific to the latest developments in North Korea's internal policy and strategic situation were not incorporated. In many respects, the Team Spirit manoeuvres mainly served as a pretext for Pyongyang to call in question on-site inspections and then its adherence to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Here there are four possible hypotheses. The first concerns the role played by Kim Jong Il in this matter in order to enhance his standing as the successor designated by his father in internal policy and at diplomatic level. The second is to stir up the population about the risks of war in order to divert its attention from growing economic difficulties. The third, a corollary of the second, tries to bring pressure to bear on the south to increase trade with and investments in the north. Finally, the fourth brings us back to the classic northern practice of always trying to deal direct with the United States since it considers the south to be merely an emanation of the latter. This last hypothesis brings us back to the wider aspect of the North Korean regime's concept of its legitimacy, a concept that rules out that of the south (17). The North Korean regime based its legitimacy on national reunification. Now that Kim Il Sung is in the process of handing over his power to his son, this question of legitimacy arises in an even more crucial context. The option of reunification by force has become less and less credible for the north, in particular the so-called "three-day war" strategy for crossing the demarcation line and taking Seoul (18). The same is true of prospects for a popular rising in the south, particularly now that discontent is rife in the north following shortages and conditions for exchanging bank notes (19). Finally, Pyongyang no longer has any allies to support it if it wished to launch another war against the south: Moscow has even gone so far as to propose selling advanced weapons to Seoul, in particular missiles with an anti-missile capabilty to intercept those from the north. Beijing has established diplomatic relations with Seoul, thereby completing the isolation of Pyongyang in the region. In the light of all these facts, both domestic and strategic, the latest developments in the North Korean nuclear programme take on another dimension. It is the only trump card of a hard-pressed regime for use mainly at diplomatic level in order to be able to negotiate direct with the United States: thus, Kim Yong Sun, a member of the Political Bureau of the North Korean Labour party, was able to hold talks with Arnold Kantor, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, in January 1993 (20). Similarly, following the meeting between Americans and North Koreans in Beijing last March, talks were held at the level of United States and North Korean Ambassadors in that city. Finally, the North Korean regime is also contributing to ballistic proliferation in the third world (21). Since the end of the war between Iraq and Iran, Iran procured between 100 and 170 Scud Cs from Pyongyang in 1991. Furthermore, a tripartite agreement between North Korea, Syria and Iran was concluded in June 1991 for assembling Scud Cs in Syria for Iran; a second North Korean shipment for Syria was detected in February 1992 (22). North Korean co-operation with Iran increased with the transfer of a more advanced missile, Rodong 1, which has not yet been tested, however. This missile might be delivered to the Iranians at the end of this year (23). Finally, a successor to Rodong 1, Rodong 2, with a range of 1 500 to 2 000 km, is now being developed (24). If, like the others, this new programme were to benefit from financing from the Middle East, it would be highly probable that it would appear in that region and, consequently, help to heighten significantly the risks of proliferation. Conclusion Faced with many Russian uncertainties, vigilance is still essential, as is the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. While the probability, not to say feasibility, of a head-on Russian attack seems slight, the same would not be true for nuclear risks resulting from the dissolution of political power in Russia. Such risks help to increase the need for anti-missile defence for Europe and, thanks to transatlantic co-operation in this area, this would be an opportunity to strengthen solidarity among members of NATO now that the alliance, the capstone of security and prosperity in Western Europe in the last four decades, is in the process of changing. Moreover, the present and future progress of nuclear and ballistic proliferation in the Middle East plead for the development, for European security, of defence against limited missile firings because Muslim fanaticism will not necessarily be receptive to the principles of nuclear deterrence. Finally, from a strictly military standpoint, such co-operation will enhance the interoperability of equipment and weapons systems among the allies because it should not be forgotten that the success of Desert Storm was due mainly to the highly-integrated nature of the armed forces of the principal coalition powers in the framework of NATO. A stable, prosperous China would do more good for international security and the common interests of the West as a whole than a new outbreak of disorder. China's political stability is still fragile because of post-Deng Xiaoping uncertainty and, paradoxically, the success of economic reforms without a political quid pro quo. This precarious balance should not be jeopardised by openly encouraging democratisation which is certainly necessary but might lead to the reversal of a progressive evolution. Finally, Beijing's isolation on the international stage would remove any reason for it to take part in limiting nuclear and ballistic proliferation in the third world in general and in the Middle East in particular. Finally, vis-a-vis North Korea, the necessary firmness should not rule out the continuation of some form of dialogue accompanied by minimum but conditional assistance. In parallel, there is great uncertainty about Pyongyang's nuclear and ballistic programme. The development of anti-missile defence in eastern Asia is therefore preferable to an arms race for Japan and South Korea. These two countries, which already benefit from United States extended security, are also taking part in the American strategic defence research programme to which the new risks brought about by North Korea give further justification. However, the development of defence systems, even against limited firings of ballistic missiles, are a heavy burden, particularly in a period of cuts in military spending after the cold war. Co-operation - both transatlantic and transpacific - in this area will therefore be particularly fruitful since it will allow a reduction in the cost of research and development and enable a coherent system to be set up in face of a threat that will very likely be of a similar kind - North Korean technology available to Islamic powers in the Middle East. Mr. SCHEER (Germany) thought not enough attention had been paid to the philosophy behind a missile defence system. The matter had often been discussed in the Bundestag where the attitude was quite negative towards anti-ballistic missile defence systems. The Gulf war had shown that the military capability of the West was more than adequate and it would be difficult to justify the high cost of increasing capabilities. Who should have political control of such a new system? The European sector of NATO had five times more military potential than the other countries of the Mediterranean basin. Proliferation had to be avoided. Traditionally, nuclear deterrence had been necessary because of the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact. This argument, however, was not valid as a means of defence against possible weaker opponents since it might encourage them to seek more sophisticated means. Political initiatives should be taken to preclude the possibility of such regions having legitimate arguments for resorting to nuclear means. A goal might be to have armaments control agreements covering the whole Mediterranean area, instead of seeking new armaments superiority which could but lead to a new arms race which public opinion would never accept. Mr. BAUMEL (France) did not agree with the previous speaker. He wished to concentrate on three questions: first, how could an anti-ballistic missile defence system be reconciled with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty - were the two ideas compatible? Second, regarding the possibilities of an anti-missile system, it was essential to be able to identify the attacker and this called for an extraordinarily sophisticated system of satellites and early-warning devices. Third, it was necessary to face up to the options of protecting the whole population or only certain military targets or overall protection from a distant threat. It was necessary to define these options. General JEAN (Italy) also disagreed with Mr. Scheer. The public opinion he mentioned might be valid in Germany but not in Italy which had been aroused by the launching of two missiles on Lampedusa. Knowledge of Mediterranean countries and Arab mentality implied that it was necessary to seek positive solutions through co-operation from a position of strength. A reasonable defence system was necessary to protect the populations. A suitable framework for co-operation would be the CSCM extended from the Mediterranean to the Gulf, the idea being a reciprocal rather than multilateral defence programme. Complications arose in regard to relations between Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel, for instance. Saudi Arabia was building up its defences to improve its security vis-a-vis Iran and this was a source of concern for Israel. It was difficult to find an acceptable status quo in the third world but a reasonable level of security had to be maintained, at the same time avoiding the instability that might result from overall disarmament. -------------------------- (The sitting was closed at 12.20 p.m.) 1. CEP is defined as the radius of the circle having as a centre the target on which 50% of the missiles fired will fall. Obviously, accuracy data for different SSMs are highly classified and are therefore approximated in this study. 2. The substantial failure of the giant Scud chase launched by the allied air forces during the Gulf war, withdrawing precious air assets from the ongoing attack campaign against Iraqi forces, proves this point. At the end of the war, 2 493 sorties were devoted to the impossible task of tracking and finding the TELs based in hiding. Needless to say, while fixed launching ramps were soon found and destroyed, TELs were generally able to escape this fate. The United States Special Forces and British SAS teams were more successful in this job. 3. Imagine a Scud-B being launched armed with a chemical warhead filled with a quite basic nerve agent, Soman. The effect and contamination levels depend on a number of factors and on weather conditions, but if we assume slight wind conditions, a single warhead is sufficient to cover an elliptical area of 2x0.5 km with an agent concentration dense enough to affect exposed people seriously; in an area of 330x500 m there could be a substantial number of dead, chances of survival could be minimal, if any. The explosion of a low yield tactical nuclear warhead can kill people exposed without cover within a range in the order of 1 km, with a different level of contamination as the distance from ground zero increases. 4. Navigation satellites transmit a low-accuracy signal, for general users, known as C/A - course/acquisition - at a frequency of about 1 MHz. The high-accuracy signal, known as P, is transmitted at ten times the rate of the C/A and can be decoded only by dedicated military terminals. P signals are said have an accuracy of 16 m, but in practice this figure is closer to 10 m. The C/A was intentionally downgraded to achieve an accuracy of just 100 m. It is interesting to note that, thanks to dedicated transmitter networks and DGPS (differential GPS) techniques, it is possible, in smaller areas, to correct transmission and atmosphere distortion errors, obtaining increased accuracy in the 4 m range, both with P and C/A signals. 5. It should be explained that the initial generous shipments of Scud-Bs was not followed by a similar transfer of more modern missiles from the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia. Today, Scud-Bs are technically obsolete and a number of countries still have to rely on weapons dating back twenty or more years. The need to replace these SSMs with more modern weaponry has made it necessary to diversify suppliers and start independent programmes. 6. Izvestia, 1st June 1992. 7. Craig Covault, Russians rejuvenate military space assets, Aviation Week and Space Technology (4th January 1993), pages 54 and 55. 8. Russia 'will spend more on weapons', Jane's Defence Weekly, Volume 18, No. 23 (5th December 1992), page 5. 9. See Georges Tan Eng Bok, Projet de doctrine militaire et developpement des forces armees : le poids du passe sovietique dans le present russe, Strategique, No. 56 (fourth quarter 1992), pages 81-96. 10. Leonid Kravchuk, address to the World Economic Forum, Davos, 30th January 1993. 11. For instance, Turkey moves to shield faltering Azerbaijanis, International Herald Tribune, 6th April 1993. 12. See, for instance, David Shambaugh, China's security policy in the post-cold war era, Survival, Volume 34, No. 2 (Summer 1992), pages 88-106. 13. Michael Richardson, Arms race feared in east Asia if United States leaves too quickly, International Herald Tribune, 10th-11th April 1993. 14. For instance, Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea's nuclear programme, Jane's Intelligence Review, Volume 3, No. 9 (September 1991), pages 404-411. 15. See Kongdan Oh, North Korean views on a nuclear-free Korea in Background and Options for Nuclear Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula, a Rand Note, N-3475-USDP (Santa Monica, Rand, 1992), pages 17-20. 16. Details in Georges Tan Eng Bok, Nuclear proliferation in the Far East: the case of North Korea, paper delivered to the Workshop on Nuclear Proliferation, Department of War Studies, King's College, London, 8th January 1992. 17. See Rhee Sang-woo, North Korea's unification strategy: review of military strategies in Kang Young-hoon and Yim Yong-soon, editors, Politics of Korean Reunification, Seoul, Research Centre for Peace and Unification, 1978, pages 127-157. 18. Choi Young, The North Korean military build-up and its impact on North Korean military strategy in the 1980s, Asian Survey, Volume XXV, No. 3 (March 1985), pages 341-355. 19. North Koreans protest shortages and Currency riots in North Korea, International Herald Tribune, 5th-6th September 1992. See also Nicholas D. Kristof, In North Korea, food is scanty but hatred of regime is plentiful, International Herald Tribune, 19th February 1992, and Hans Vriens, North Korea: Road to nowhere, Far Eastern Economic Review, 30th April 1992, page 22. 20. Kim Jong Su, Sticking to their guns, Newsweek, 19th April 1993, page 56. (Ambassador Kim Jon Su is Assistant Permanent Representative of North Korea to the United Nations.) 21. See Georges Tan Eng Bok, Les nouveaux risques nucleaires et balistiques, Strategique, No. 55 (third quarter 1992), pages 265-285. 22. Elaine Sciolino, United States tracks North Korean ship said to hold missiles - Scuds and equipment are headed for Syria, intelligence aides say, International Herald Tribune, 21st February 1992. 23. Douglas Jehl, Iran is near a missile deal in North Korea, United States says, International Herald Tribune, 8th April 1993. 24. Joe Bermudez, Ballistic ambitions ascendant, Jane's Defence Weekly, Volume 19, No. 15 (April 1993), pages 20 and 21.