saag A. Tulshibagwale Internet-Draft SGNL Intended status: Informational 2 October 2024 Expires: 5 April 2025 Push And Pull Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery draft-tulshibagwale-saag-pushpull-delivery-02 Abstract In situations where a transmitter of Security Event Tokens (SETs) to a network peer is also a receiver of SETs from the same peer, it is helpful to have an efficient way of sending and receiving SETs in one HTTP transaction. In many cases, such as when using the OpenID Shared Signals Framework (SSF), the situation where each entity is both a transmitter and receiver is getting increasingly common. Using current mechanisms such as "Push-Based Delivery of Security Event Tokens (SETs) Using HTTP" or "Poll-Based Delivery of Security Event Tokens (SETs) Using HTTP" both require two or more HTTP connections to exchange SETs between peers. This is inefficient due to the latency of setting up each communication. This specification enables bi-directional transmission and reception of multiple SETs in one HTTP connection, and enables them to do so over a single HTTP or WebSocket connection. About This Document This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://sgnl- ai.github.io/pushpull/. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tulshibagwale-saag- pushpull-delivery/. Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/SGNL-ai/pushpull. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Tulshibagwale Expires 5 April 2025 [Page 1] Internet-Draft pushpull October 2024 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 April 2025. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Pushpull Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Communication Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5.1. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. HTTP Request Response Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6.1. Initiating Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6.2. Response Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6.2.1. Success Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6.2.2. Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6.2.3. Out Of Order Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6.3. Example Request and Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6.3.1. Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6.3.2. Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. WebSocket Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.1. Using WebSockets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7.1.1. Pushpull Subprotocol Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8.1. Verifying the Responder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8.2. Verifying the Initiator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9. Delivery Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 10. All SETs Accounted For . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 11. Uniqueness of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Tulshibagwale Expires 5 April 2025 [Page 2] Internet-Draft pushpull October 2024 12.1. Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 12.2. HTTP and TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 12.3. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 12.4. Temporary Disconnection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 13. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 15. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1. Introduction Workloads that exchange SETs [RFC8417] with each other ("Transceivers") can do so efficiently using the protocol defined in this specification. Although this specification works along the lines of the DeliveryPush [RFC8935] and DeliveryPoll [RFC8936] specifications, it makes a few important additions: * A Transceiver initiating a communication can send multiple SETs in one HTTP connection to a Peer * The Transceiver initiating communication can acknowledge previously received SETs in the same HTTP connection to the Peer * The Peer responding to the communication can send multiple SETs in its response to a connection from the Transceiver * The Peer responding to the communication can acknowledge previously received SETs in its response to the Transceiver 2. Notational Conventions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 3. Terminology Transceiver A networked workload that can act both as a transmitter of SETs and a receiver of SETs. It communicates with other trusted Transceivers to transmit and receive SETs using the protocol defined herein. Peer Another name for a Transceiver, used to signify the other end of the communication from a Transceiver. Tulshibagwale Expires 5 April 2025 [Page 3] Internet-Draft pushpull October 2024 Initiator A Transceiver initiating communication with a Peer. Responder A Transceiver responding to communication from a Peer. DeliveryPush The IETF RFC titled "Push-Based Delivery of Security Event Tokens (SETs) Using HTTP" [RFC8935]. DeliveryPoll The IETF RFC titled "Poll-Based Delivery of Security Event Tokens (SETs) Using HTTP" [RFC8936]. 4. Pushpull Endpoint Each Transceiver that supports this specification MUST support a "Pushpull" endpoint. This endpoint MUST be capable of serving HTTP [RFC9110] requests. This endpoint MUST be TLS [RFC8446] enabled and MUST reject any communication not using TLS. The Pushpull endpoint MUST support the HTTP method POST and reject all other HTTP methods. 5. Communication Object A Communication Object is a JSON object [RFC8259], and is a unit of communication used in this specification used both in requests and responses. When used in a request, the Initiator MAY have additional fields defined the later sections below. The common fields of this object are: sets OPTIONAL. A JSON object containing key-value pairs in which the key of a field is a string that contains the jti value of the SET that is specified in the value of the field. This field MAY be omitted to indicate that no SETs are being delivered by the initiator in this communication. ack OPTIONAL. An array of strings, in which each string is the jti value of a previously received SET that is acknowledged in this object. This array MAY be empty or this field MAY be omitted to indicate that no previously received SETs are being acknowledged in this communication. setErrs OPTIONAL. A JSON object containing key-value pairs in which the key of a field is a string that contains the jti value of a previously received SET that the sender of the communication object was unable to process. The value of the field is a JSON object that has the following fields: err REQUIRED. The short reason why the specified SET failed to be processed. description REQUIRED. An explanation of why the SET failed to be Tulshibagwale Expires 5 April 2025 [Page 4] Internet-Draft pushpull October 2024 processed. 5.1. Example The following is a non-normative example of a Communication Object { "sets": { "dfc38da2-939e-4536-bec9-b8a16ed45c4e": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9. eyJqdGkiOiJkZmMzOGRhMi05MzllLTQ1MzYtYmVjOS1iOGExNmVkNDVjNGUiLC JpYXQiOjE0NTg0OTY0MDQsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNv bSIsImF1ZCI6WyJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vRmVlZHMvOThkNT I0NjFmYTViYmM4Nzk1OTNiNzc1NCIsImh0dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNv bS9GZWVkcy81ZDc2MDQ1MTZiMWQwODY0MWQ3Njc2ZWU3Il0sImV2ZW50cyI6ey J1cm46aWV0ZjpwYXJhbXM6c2NpbTpldmVudDpjcmVhdGUiOnsicmVmIjoiaHR0 cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL1VzZXJzLzQ0ZjYxNDJkZjk2YmQ2YWI2MW U3NTIxZDkiLCJhdHRyaWJ1dGVzIjpbImlkIiwibmFtZSIsInVzZXJOYW1lIiwi cGFzc3dvcmQiLCJlbWFpbHMiXX19fQ.XuVUJWrU6l80dcJ8bTRf-erMzFtQFYo kZLN--Kzd98o", "d93341ad-7329-4d1b-ba4a-9ff6f9f34003": "eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0. eyJqdGkiOiIzZDBjM2NmNzk3NTg0YmQxOTNiZDBmYjFiZDRlN2QzMCIsImlhdC I6MTQ1ODQ5NjAyNSwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwi YXVkIjpbImh0dHBzOi8vamh1Yi5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZWVkcy85OGQ1MjQ2MW ZhNWJiYzg3OTU5M2I3NzU0IiwiaHR0cHM6Ly9qaHViLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0Zl ZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIxZDA4NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciXSwic3ViIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly 9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL1VzZXJzLzQ0ZjYxNDJkZjk2YmQ2YWI2MWU3NTIx ZDkiLCJldmVudHMiOnsidXJuOmlldGY6cGFyYW1zOnNjaW06ZXZlbnQ6cGFzc3 dvcmRSZXNldCI6eyJpZCI6IjQ0ZjYxNDJkZjk2YmQ2YWI2MWU3NTIxZDkifSwi aHR0cHM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9zY2ltL2V2ZW50L3Bhc3N3b3JkUmVzZXRFeH QiOnsicmVzZXRBdHRlbXB0cyI6NX19fQ." }, "ack": [ "f52901c4-3996-11ef-9454-0242ac120002", "50924f49-55a9-47ca-820d-b1161cb0a602", "d563c724-79a0-4ff0-ba41-657fa5e2cb11" ], "setErrs": { "5c436b19-0958-4367-b408-2dd542606d3b" : { "err": "invalid subject", "description": "subject format not supported" } } } Figure 1: Example of a Communication Object Tulshibagwale Expires 5 April 2025 [Page 5] Internet-Draft pushpull October 2024 6. HTTP Request Response Binding This section describes how Transceivers can use HTTP Requests and Responses to exchange Communication Objects described in Section 5. 6.1. Initiating Communication A Transceiver can initiate communication with a Peer in order to: * Positively or negatively acknowledge previously received SETs from the Peer. * Send SETs to the Peer. * Both acknowledge previously received SETs from the Peer and send SETs to the Peer. To initiate communication, the Initiator makes a HTTP POST request to the Responder's Pushpull Endpoint Section 4. The body of this request is of the content type "application/json". It contains a Communication Object Section 5, and the following additional field MAY be present: maxResponseEvents OPTIONAL. A number which specifies the maximum number of events the Responder can include in its response to the Initiator. If this field is absent in the request, the Responder MAY include any number of events in the response. If this field is present, then the Responder MUST NOT include more events than the value of "maxResponseEvents" in its response to the specific request. 6.2. Response Communication A Responder MUST respond to a communication from an Initiator by sending an HTTP Response. 6.2.1. Success Response If the Responder is successful in receiving the request, it MUST return the HTTP status code 200 (OK). This status only indicates that the communication received was well formatted and was successfully parsed by the Responder. It does not indicate anything about whether any SETs in the communication were accepted or not. The response MUST have the content-type "application/json" and the response MUST include a Communication Object Section 5. Tulshibagwale Expires 5 April 2025 [Page 6] Internet-Draft pushpull October 2024 6.2.2. Error Response The Responder MUST respond with an error response if it is unable to process the request. This error response means that the responder was unable to parse the communication or the responder encountered a system error while attempting to process the communication. It does not indicate a positive or negative acknowledgement of any SETs in the communication. The error response MUST include the appropriate error code as described in Section 2.4 of DeliveryPush [RFC8935]. 6.2.3. Out Of Order Responses A Communication Object in a Response may contain jti values in its ack or setErrs that do not correspond to the SETs received in the same Request to which the Response is being sent. They MAY consist of values received in previous Requests. 6.3. Example Request and Response The following is a non-normative example of a request and its corresponding response 6.3.1. Request Tulshibagwale Expires 5 April 2025 [Page 7] Internet-Draft pushpull October 2024 POST /pushpull-endpoint HTTP/1.1 Host: sharedsignals-transceiver.myorg.example Content-type: application/json Authorization: Bearer eyJraWQiOiIyMDIwXzEiLCJJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9... { "ack": [], "sets": { "9deb50b0-d2f8-4793-a420-5e5678cf25a8": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9. eyJqdGkiOiI5ZGViNTBiMC1kMmY4LTQ3OTMtYTQyMC01ZTU2NzhjZjI1YTgiLC JpYXQiOjE0NTg0OTY0MDQsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNv bSIsImF1ZCI6WyJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vRmVlZHMvOThkNT I0NjFmYTViYmM4Nzk1OTNiNzc1NCIsImh0dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNv bS9GZWVkcy81ZDc2MDQ1MTZiMWQwODY0MWQ3Njc2ZWU3Il0sImV2ZW50cyI6ey J1cm46aWV0ZjpwYXJhbXM6c2NpbTpldmVudDpjcmVhdGUiOnsicmVmIjoiaHR0 cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL1VzZXJzLzQ0ZjYxNDJkZjk2YmQ2YWI2MW U3NTIxZDkiLCJhdHRyaWJ1dGVzIjpbImlkIiwibmFtZSIsInVzZXJOYW1lIiwi cGFzc3dvcmQiLCJlbWFpbHMiXX19fQ.KAaZj082ge8I1AiXfnmYw49ILFc5hEA tTZC9LkGg7IA", "d93341ad-7329-4d1b-ba4a-9ff6f9f34003": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9. eyJqdGkiOiJkOTMzNDFhZC03MzI5LTRkMWItYmE0YS05ZmY2ZjlmMzQwMDMiLC JpYXQiOjE0NTg0OTYwMjUsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNv bSIsImF1ZCI6WyJodHRwczovL2podWIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vRmVlZHMvOThkNT I0NjFmYTViYmM4Nzk1OTNiNzc1NCIsImh0dHBzOi8vamh1Yi5leGFtcGxlLmNv bS9GZWVkcy81ZDc2MDQ1MTZiMWQwODY0MWQ3Njc2ZWU3Il0sInN1YiI6Imh0dH BzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9Vc2Vycy80NGY2MTQyZGY5NmJkNmFiNjFl NzUyMWQ5IiwiZXZlbnRzIjp7InVybjppZXRmOnBhcmFtczpzY2ltOmV2ZW50On Bhc3N3b3JkUmVzZXQiOnsiaWQiOiI0NGY2MTQyZGY5NmJkNmFiNjFlNzUyMWQ5 In0sImh0dHBzOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vc2NpbS9ldmVudC9wYXNzd29yZFJlc2 V0RXh0Ijp7InJlc2V0QXR0ZW1wdHMiOjV9fX0.IGbGOmSBtyS8wOGyMhWHe83v YgbGjUoezk-cIpYzVeY" }, "setErrs": { "5c436b19-0958-4367-b408-2dd542606d3b" : { "err": "invalid subject", "description": "subject format not supported" } }, "maxResponseEvents": 10 } Figure 2: Example Pushpull request In the above example request, the Initiator does not acknowledge any previous events. Delivers two SETs and reports an error on a previously received SET. Tulshibagwale Expires 5 April 2025 [Page 8] Internet-Draft pushpull October 2024 6.3.2. Response The following is a non-normative example of a response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-type: application/json { "ack": [ "d8d439e6-b103-47c7-86d9-d5951ce774d1" ], "sets": { "3f1c5fc7-99c5-4c2b-a9a3-68ea90be9ca9": "eyJ0eXAiOiJzZWNldmVudCtqd3QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9. eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2lkcC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS8iLCJqdGkiOiIzZjFjNW ZjNy05OWM1LTRjMmItYTlhMy02OGVhOTBiZTljYTkiLCJpYXQiOjE1MDgxODQ4 NDUsImF1ZCI6IjYzNkM2OTY1NkU3NDVGNjk2NCIsImV2ZW50cyI6eyJodHRwcz ovL3NjaGVtYXMub3BlbmlkLm5ldC9zZWNldmVudC9yaXNjL2V2ZW50LXR5cGUv YWNjb3VudC1kaXNhYmxlZCI6eyJzdWJqZWN0Ijp7InN1YmplY3RfdHlwZSI6Im lzcy1zdWIiLCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2lkcC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS8iLCJzdWIi OiI3Mzc1NjI2QTY1NjM3NCJ9LCJyZWFzb24iOiJoaWphY2tpbmcifX19._Jwjs 2M2AbxvPRRJJi5Kjl_Xepveugdd9Wb_Bh2Jj8s" } } Figure 3: Example Pushpull response In the above example, the Responder acknowledges one of the SETs it previously received and provides a SET to deliver to the initiator. There are no errors reported by the Responder. 7. WebSocket Binding Transceivers MAY use WebSockets [RFC6455] to send and receive Communication Objects described in Section 5. Since WebSockets are a symmetric protocol, a Transceiver MAY send a Communication Object at any time to its Peer. In such communication, a Transceiver sends a Communication Object as Payload data over the WebSocket protocol to a Peer. Similarly, a Transceiver MAY receive a Communication Object from a Peer over a WebSocket connection, wherein the Communication Object is the Payload data. In all such WebSocket communication, the Payload data does not have any Extension data in it. Tulshibagwale Expires 5 April 2025 [Page 9] Internet-Draft pushpull October 2024 7.1. Using WebSockets During any communication initiated by a Transceiver, the Transceiver MAY request the Peer to use WebSockets [RFC6455] by requesting that the connection be upgraded to a WebSocket connection. If the Transceiver and its Peer can successfully perform the WebSocket handshake for the Pushpull Subprotocol described in Section 7.1.1, then the Transceiver and Peer MUST use WebSockets until the connection is closed. If the handshake fails, the Transceiver and Peer MAY use the HTTP Request Response Binding as described in Section 6 7.1.1. Pushpull Subprotocol Handshake The Pushpull subprotocol is used to transport Communication Objects Section 5 over a WebSocket connection. The Transceiver and its Peer agree to this subprotocol during the WebSocket handshake (see Section 1.3 of [RFC6455]). During the Websocket handshake, the Initiator MUST include the value pushpull in the list of protocols for the Sec-WebSocket-Protocol header. The reply from the Responder MUST also include the value pushpull in the list of values in its own Sec-WebSocket-Protocol header, in order for the Initiator and Responder to use WebSockets. 8. Authentication and Authorization 8.1. Verifying the Responder The Initiator MUST verify the identity of the Responder by validating the TLS certification presented by the Responder, and verifying that it is the intended recipient of the request, before sending the Communication Object Section 5. The Initiator MUST attempt to obtain the OAuth Protected Resource Metadata [OPRM] for the Responder endpoint. If such metadata is found, the Initiator MUST obtain an access token using the metadata. If no such metadata is found, then the Initiator MAY use any means to authorize itself to the Responder. 8.2. Verifying the Initiator The Responder MUST verify the identity and authorization of the Initiator. The Responder MAY use common authentication schemes such as Mutual TLS (MTLS) to verify the authenticity of the Initiator. Tulshibagwale Expires 5 April 2025 [Page 10] Internet-Draft pushpull October 2024 Alternatively, the Responder MAY provide OAuth Protected Resource Metadata [OPRM] to enable Initiators to obtain appropriate OAuth tokens to authenticate themselves and prove their authorization. Finally, the Responder MAY use other means to authenticate and authorize the Initiator, which are beyond the scope of this specification. 9. Delivery Reliability A Transceiver MUST attempt to deliver any SETs it has previously attempted to deliver to a Peer until: * It receives an acknowledgement through the ack value for that SET in a subsequent communication with the Peer * It receives a setErrs object for that SET in a subsequent communication with the Peer * It has attempted to deliver the SET a maximum number of times and has failed to communicate either due to communication errors or lack of inclusion in ack or setErrs in subsequent communications that were conducted for the maximum number of times. The maximum number of attempts MAY be set by the Transceiver for itself and SHOULD be communicated offline to the Peers. If a Transceiver previously attempted to deliver a SET in a response to a Peer's request, the Transceiver MAY Initiate a request to the Peer in order to retry delivery of the SET. A Peer MUST be able to either provide acks or setErrs for the same SETs either through requests or responses. 10. All SETs Accounted For A Transceiver MUST ensure that it includes the jti value of each SET it receives, either in an ack or a setErrs value, to the Transceiver from which it received the SETs. A Transceiver SHOULD retry sending the same SET again if it was never responded to either in an ack value or in a setErrs value by a receiving Transceiver in a reasonable time period. A Transceiver MAY limit the number of times it retries sending a SET. A Transceiver MAY publish the retry time period and maximum number of retries to its peers, but such publication is outside the scope of this specification. Tulshibagwale Expires 5 April 2025 [Page 11] Internet-Draft pushpull October 2024 11. Uniqueness of SETs A Transceiver MUST NOT send two SETs with the same jti value if the SET has been either acknowledged through ack value or produced an error indicated by a setErrs value. If a Transceiver wishes to re- send an event after it has received a error response through a setErrs value, then it MUST generate a new SET that has a new (and unique) jti value. 12. Security Considerations 12.1. Authentication and Authorization Transceivers MUST follow the procedures described in section Section 8 in order to securely authenticate and authorize Peers 12.2. HTTP and TLS Transceivers MUST use TLS [RFC8446] to communicate with Peers and is subject to the security considerations of HTTP [RFC9110] Section 17. 12.3. Denial of Service A Responder may be vulnerable to denial of service attacks wherein a large number of spurious requests need to be processed. Having efficient authorization mechanisms such as OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] can mitigate such attacks by leveraging standard infrastructure that is designed to handle such attacks. 12.4. Temporary Disconnection Transceivers must make sure they respond to each SET received in a timely manner as described in the "All SETs Accounted For" section Section 10. This ensures that if there was a temporary disconnection between two Transceivers, say when a Responding Transceiver sent a Communication Object in the HTTP Response, that such disconnection is detected and the missing SETs can be retried. 13. Privacy Considerations SETs may contain confidential information, and Transceivers receiving SETs must be careful not to log such content or ensure that sensitive information from the SET is redacted before logging. 14. IANA Considerations The following WebSocket subprotocol will be added to the "WebSocket Subprotocol Name Registry" [IANA.WebSocket.Subprotocol] Tulshibagwale Expires 5 April 2025 [Page 12] Internet-Draft pushpull October 2024 * Subprotocol Identifier: puhspull * Subprotocol Common Name: WebSocket transport for Pushpull delivery of SETs * Subprotocol Definition: Section Section 7.1.1 of this document. 15. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC6455] Fette, I. and A. Melnikov, "The WebSocket Protocol", RFC 6455, DOI 10.17487/RFC6455, December 2011, . [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, . [RFC8417] Hunt, P., Ed., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari, "Security Event Token (SET)", RFC 8417, DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, July 2018, . [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, . [RFC8935] Backman, A., Ed., Jones, M., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Ansari, M., and A. Nadalin, "Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP", RFC 8935, DOI 10.17487/RFC8935, November 2020, . Tulshibagwale Expires 5 April 2025 [Page 13] Internet-Draft pushpull October 2024 [RFC8936] Backman, A., Ed., Jones, M., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Ansari, M., and A. Nadalin, "Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP", RFC 8936, DOI 10.17487/RFC8936, November 2020, . [RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110, DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022, . [OPRM] Jones, M. B., Hunt, P., and A. Parecki, "OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata", May 2024, . [IANA.WebSocket.Subprotocol] IANA, "WebSocket Subprotocol Name Registry", n.d., . Contributors Erik Gustavson SGNL Email: erik@sgnl.ai Apoorva Deshpande Okta Email: apoorva.deshpande@okta.com Author's Address Atul Tulshibagwale SGNL Email: atul@sgnl.ai Tulshibagwale Expires 5 April 2025 [Page 14]